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PREFACE 
In response to concern about the increase in claims for compensation made 
agai nst agents involved in economic resource development, the escalating nature 
of these demands and the associated threats, the Law Reform Commission 
decided to reactivate the References it holds on Compensation (init iated by 
Minister for Justice Ebia Olewale in  1 975) and Natural Resources (i nitiated 
by Minister for Justice Bernard Narokobi in 1 989). 
A series of three surveys has been conducted in  an attempt to discover 
basic atti tudes held in the population on th is i ssue and the results wi l l  be 
publi shed in the Law Reform Commission Working Paper No. 27. The papers in 
th is monograph complement the survey material in presenting qual i tat ive data 
and analysis which allow an insight into the cultural background in which the 
development in itiatives take place and the Papua New Guinea players take part. 
The authors are all people who have had extensive field-work experience 
in the country, including (with one exception) firsthand experience in one or 
more of three major development sectors : mining, petroleum and forestry. 
The Commission is extremely grateful to them for contributing their knowledge 
and experience to our research. Identify ing sources of tension in the resource 
development arena should reveal i ssues which need to be addressed to promote 
investor confidence and harmonious relationships between people brought 
together by development projects. 
In  undertaki ng the wider project on compensation the Commiss ion 
acknowledges with gratitude the sponsorship of  the Papua New Guinea Chamber 
of Mining and Petroleum and i ts members. Their help represents a genuine 
desire to assist government in addressing the serious problems surrounding 
compensation for land required for development. The Commission is also 
very apprec iative of funds from AusAID for printing both this monograph and 
Working Paper No. 27, and many thanks go to Cyndi Banks of the Pol itical 
and Legal Studies Division at the National Research Institute and our own Ari 
Ephraim for the preparation of this manuscript. 
Susan Toft 
Port Moresby 
Apri l 1 997 
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INTRODUCTION 
COMPENSATION: OR MOVING SWIFTLY OVER 
BROKEN GROUND 
Andrew Strathern 
Issue�; to do with compensation in Papua New Guinea today go to the heart of 
a large number of problems and contradictions in social processes as wel l as 
reflec ting fundamental difficulties in anthropological analysis. The analytical 
difficulties can be seen as questions of translation, and they reflect the oc ial 
contrad ictions and ambigui ties, for example, the re lationship between local 
groups and the nation state, between indigenous and introduced patterns of 
thought, and between the different modes of prod uction to which these 
corre pond . The differences are also conceptual and contested : in practice we 
fi nd an uneasy blending if not blurri ng of notions that mi rrors the awkward 
processes of change and transit ion that are takmg place. Compensation is thus a 
t �m that belongs 'imul taneously to many worlds and is used as a bridge between 
them, albeit a bridge that sometimes breaks or threatens to break with the traffic 
crowding onto it .  
The chapters in this volume all  address the state of affairs with regard to 
the 'e problems in specific ethnographic or topical areas, and all are concerned 
expl icitly or implicitly wi th the thorny i ssues of pol icy: not only how do 'WC 
underst and what is happening, but what do we recommend should be done 
about it? Social sc ienti sts in Papua New Guinea have been involved in pol icy 
issues from colonial times onward , but today the numbers of players in the 
field of contests about pol icy are greater: diverse local groups, individuals ,  
in ternat ional companies ,  representatives of  prov incia l  and national level 
interests and internat ional non-government organisations in some instance , 
not to mention the crucial interventions of legal firms. 
Let me look briefly at translation problems before discussing the indiv idual 
contributions to thi s volume in turn . Here I borrow a set of expressions from 
an anthropologist, Johnny Parry, who wrote a paper on 'the gift, the Indian gi ft, 
and "the Indian gift" ' (Parry 1 986). Parry's title reflected the different modal ities 
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in which a term such as 'gift' can be seen in one ethnographic context: as a 
general concept deri v i ng great ly  from the c lass ic  usages of the French 
soc iologist Marcel Mauss, as  a practice corresponding to those usages i n  part, 
and as a practice seen in i ts own right and particular to i ts own context .  In  
s imi lar vein  we may speak here of compensation, compensation i n  Papua 
New Guinea, and 'Papua New Guinean compensation ' . For compensation, 
however, we lack a classic work to which we can turn as a basel ine. Numerous 
writers, including myself, have tried to provide such a basel ine with broadly 
acceptable definitions, gesturing towards dictionaries with one hand and to 
the Pacific with the other. In such general defini tions two e lements seem of 
importance: the notion of loss and i ts repair and the notion of a wrong that 
needs to be righted, whether it has come about i ntentional ly  or not (on this 
issue see the analysis of Goldman 1 993). In the terms of Western law ' loss' 
suggests a c i v i l  d i mens ion ,  ' wrongdoi ng '  suggests a cri m inal  one. As 
anthropologists agreed early on, Papua New Guinean ideas on social control 
tend to join what Western legal ideas separate, so that 'c iv i l ' , 'criminal ' and 
'pol i t ical ' d imensions form a s ingle tota l i ty. Compensation in this sense 
becomes a term l ike 'the gift' , rich in  particular resonances that are also continu­
al ly subject to change. Linguistic knowledge itself enters as a factor. Tok Pisin 
and English are taught i n  schools and the word compensation enters i nto the 
vocabulary and conceptual worlds of succeeding generations of people in shifting 
ways, particularly at local levels where it enters as a new trans lation term and 
becomes i ncorporated in to the vernacul ar. Thus the term 'compensation '  
entered popular usage i n  the Mount  Hagen area of the Western Highlands 
Province only i n  the l ast few years as local practices became enmeshed more 
and more with the regulations and practices of the State and as the character 
of the local practices themselves altered. It is the 'official ising' of such practices 
that brings about the enmeshing, as well as the disjunctions, and it is  precisely 
in this process of enmeshing and contradiction that what we recognise as the 
'problems' to do with compensation emerge. That i s , the problems lie precisely 
in the relationship of encompassment between the State and local communities 
and resistance to this encompassment (Skaln ik  1 989). 
From a problem of translation we have thus moved swiftly (over broken 
ground) to a set of problems over pol icy and power. Writi ng in a different vein,  
I have myself earl ier attempted to draw a l ine between i nd igenous ideas of the 
recent past and contemporary practices and usages (Strathern 1 993, cf. also 
Trompf 1 994:4 1 0-56), an exercise prompted at least in part by my own 30 
years' historical experience of fieldwork in the highlands provinces. My aim 
was to i l luminate the shifts in ideas that have occurred and so to indicate the 
directions of change associated w ith monetisation, bureaucratisation, and 
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pol it ici sation of relationships . Regardless of such conceptual distinctions, 
however, what we are faced with today, as Col i n  Fi ler points out i n  his 
contribution to this volume, is  a set of circumstances in  which what we may 
label as indigenous constructs are in fact el icited or created in the context of 
confrontations of a political sort between local groups and others . The indigenous 
is  continuously i nvented at the i ntersections of power between people and the 
State, and tradition, invented or inherited, becomes a resource in arguments 
about resources. As Filer argues, while as anthropologists we have for long 
written about indigenous ' land tenure' (in a sense importing or translating a 
term into local cultures), land tenure as a practical concept is only just coming 
into being as a concept to do with contests about access to ' natural resources' . 
One useful way of looki ng at these contests is provided by Susan Toft. She 
uses the model of patron-client relations but gives it a twist. Who is the patron 
and who is the client? While state officials and developers may see themselves 
as patrons and local ' landowners ' as clients, the latter see it the other way 
round and politicians who depend on their votes are l ikely enough to side with 
them. Patron-client terminology here reflects the fundamental issues of power 
and precedence which we may again translate as ' sovereignty ' ,  but it is important 
to recognise that sovereignty is  also a term tied to the State itself. Local groups, 
in demanding compensation, are not necessarily denying political sovereignty 
to the State in all senses, e.g. they would not necessarily oppose the practices 
of elections and debates in parliament. They are, however, denying the validity 
of an in trusion of this sovereignty i nto the sphere of claims to economic 
resources. In one way, each side may over time recognise the sovereignty of 
the other, or at least this i s  the ideal expressed also by Toft when she writes 
that 'constant communication between the development agent and landowners 
on an egal i tarian level is essential to maintain understanding' (see also Errington 
and Gewertz 1 995 on the issue of perceptions of equality). The problem is 
that while communications may be egalitarian in style real i nequalities and 
disparities of course do exist. The Porgera Joint  Venture's practice of holding 
regular meeti ngs at their mine i n  Enga Provi nce with l andowners who gather 
in an open round house built to resemble an i ndigenous men's meeting house 
shows what can be done to adopt at least the trappings of equality that can suit 
the local habitus and improve the l ikelihood of frank speech. The architectural 
style of a meeting house is not l ikely to outweigh concerns arising from fears 
of environmental pol lution, but it is l ikely to make discussions on any topic 
whatsoever more viable. 
Toft's triadic model of people, government, and developers can also be 
used in  a further way, to point out that in Papua New Guinea i t  has sometimes 
been the case that the government has been forced, because of a need for 
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revenues, to adopt the role of cl ient vis-a-vis the developers, only to find that 
the people refuse to fal l into l ine. 
The chapters in  this volume mostly look at the flow of transactions and 
confl icts around the sides of Toft 's triangle. Two, however, take us into the 
detai l s  of local practices themselves, showing us the chang ing significance of 
compensation activities among the Gende, the Bena, and in Hanuabada among 
Motu speakers . These two chapters, by Zimrner-Tamakoshi and Banks, form a 
set in themse lves and I wi l l  discuss them first. 
Compensation as local practice 
Cyndi Banks' chapter is an excel lent ethnographic survey incorporati ng a rather 
unusual comparison between a coastal and highlands people. I find her treatment 
intriguing because in some respects it manages to reverse ordinary ethnographic 
stereotypes about 'coastal ' versu 'h ighland ' people. She finds that the payment 
of compensation is found in both societies ( that is ,  i t  is not just a highlands 
emphasis, a useful point in the l ight of Fi ler's skepticism on this issue). She also 
finds that among the Bena there is a direct admission of l iabil i ty while among 
the Motu this is transmuted in to an act of prestige seeki ng, making the Motu 
appear closer to the Mount Hagen people of Western Highlands Province! The 
effects of bureaucratisation and encompassment are also shown in the point 
that Motu people say they 'do not expect compensation unless it is ordered by 
a court'. Here. the attitude is very different from that of the highlands where 
people  expect compensation regardless of the intervention of a court, as Banks' 
example of a Bena jealousy murder also shows. Banks' argument may be seen 
as a part of an established tradition of anthropological writing (to which I myself 
have contribu ted) arguing that the State must recognise local ways of settl ing 
disputes , including ritual and religious dimensions, if it wishes to enhance social 
wntrol  at loca l levels. Th is position is val id, and was the basis of the original 
introduction ofVil lage Courts in Papua New Gu inea. However, local settlement 
methods cannot e::is ily be extended into new contexts of resource compensation, 
though they can and do sti l l  app ly best in contexts of bod i ly injury and ki l l ings .  
Zimmer-Tamakoshi 's chapter takes a close look at land compensation bel ief 
in Gende, an issue that takes her straight into the tangled problems of social 
change . She insists, however, that one indigenous principle does not change 
easi ly, that is an emphas is on balance in exchanges as an expression of 'concepts 
of personhood and individual worth' .  This is a crucial point. As Banks, citi ng 
Mari lyn Strathern ( 1988), also notes, property is often seen as an extension of 
the person ;  rights in rem and in personam are at some level conflated, and this 
appl ies to ideas with regard to land as well as movable wealth. New economic 
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inequalities resulti ng from monetisati on, cash-cropping and wage labour threaten 
these bal ances and become invol ved also i n  i nheri tance disputes, tensions over 
which can in turn lead to violence. Local concepts of land rights are fl uid, and 
such fl uidi ty can mean adaptabi l i ty, but it can also mean manipulation and 
confl ict. Gende also attempt to redress monetary i nequal ities among themselves 
by card-playing, but cannot assuage their overall feel i ngs of inequal ity vis-a­
vis the world of money outside their v i l lages. And equal i ty is necessary for a 
feel ing of worth and personhood on the part of both sexes . Zimmer-Tamakoshi 
uses this po in t to answer her own chal leng ing question on reconc i l ing  
deve lopment with landowners' claims. She answers 'yes' , i f  developers respect 
local people si nce ' what is being negotiated is not a simple busi ness contract 
but a social commitment ' .  'Al l  is not contractual in  the contract' . In a sense 
we are back here to Durkheim and Mauss, with their vision of morality as the 
bas is of soc iety, and moral ity as based on a recognition of personhood. Agai n, 
unfortunately, it is precisely this recogni tion that can be lost when violence 
intervenes; or when one party thinks claims are excessive and the other that a 
ettlement is inadequate . Having introduced money as the measure of man, 
developers are hoist by their own petard . 
Landowner compensation : forestry 
Tony Power prov ides here a very useful survey of regulations and practices in  
a number of spheres.  He makes an i nteresti ng con trast between mi ning or 
petroleum projects and forestry, arguing that mining and petroleum compan ies 
have responded wel l to heavy government regulation, while the forest resource 
industry is  ' seriously deficient from almost every point of view'. Power raises 
here in particular the issue of sustainable development, a much debated notion . 
Why the difference between min ing and forestry? We may suggest that with 
mining environmental destruction is obvious and massive and can hardly be 
shrugged off, whereas wi th forestry landowners may not real ise ti l l  too late that 
long-term destruction is taking place and that forest replanting is inadequate or 
wil l  take too long to come into effect or wi l l  not halt environmental degradation 
general ly This is  both a cogni tive and an ecological problem. Power impl icitly 
suggests that the State must step in more fi rmly, if i t  is  strong or committed 
enough to do so. His account suggests not that landowners are asking for too 
much but that they may be asking for too l i ttle. 
Hartmut Holzknecht also considers the case of forestry, pointi ng out that 
local level leaders often persuade thei1 communi ties to enter into agreements 
with logging companies for purposes of their own short-term gains at the expense 
of their kinsfolk and the environment, and that webs of influence extend from 
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developers through such brokers and m iddlemen to government personnel ,  
leading to inadequate government monitoring of agreed upon infrastructural 
improvements. S ince resources are accepted to be locally owned (hence in this 
sense a creation of ' landownership' as Filer argues) government's role should 
be to i ntervene actively in  advising local people not to use their legal ownership 
as a reason for leav ing them on their own vis-a-vis the developers . In principle, 
i t  is a straightforward recommendation and one that can be carried out. However, 
at the end of his chapter, Holzknecht poses the question of confl ict between 
communal i sm and i ndividualism that has in fact caused the collusion between 
loggers and leaders, implying that i ndividual ism is on the i ncrease. Clearly i t  
i s ,  and as Robert Foster and others have argued, i ts growth is a part of the en­
compassing force of the nation-state which both detaches persons from their kin 
groups and attaches them to the State in the name of 'the nation' (Foster 1 995) . 
If this is so, it is clear that the State must learn to work against i ts own effects. 
Mining: costs and benefits 
Four chapters examine closely matters surrounding two major mines sti l l in  
operation:  Porgera and Ok Tedi .  Jackson and Burton look at  general issues, 
Kirsch and Bonnell at particular case histories in  terms of soc ial and perceived 
environmental effects. 
Richard Jackson uses the metatrope of balance as his start ing point for his 
discussion of compensation, thus setting up resonances with the views of the 
Gende people and also with ideas of ecological equilibrium.  The Mount Hageners 
would also understand this approach wel l :  compensation should be appropriate, 
kapogla. Having started in this way Jackson poi nts out that balance is getting 
harder to achieve because of the pace of change that is forced by mining 
operations (Holzknecht's point about individualism chimes in here) . As a general 
argument, he notes that the definitions of a resource and of i ts value shift over 
time. This, then, explains why any agreements on resource compensation are 
l ikely to become subject to renegotiation demands over time. The impl ication 
is  that there can be no stasis, and the strength of government is  tested severely 
in controll ing what many see as an unstable or anarchic set of processes . But 
government alone cannot handle matters . The people must always be involved 
(with al l their internal conflicts). We come back to the round meeting house 
(and also its exclusion of women). Final ly, Jackson essentially abandons his 
idea of balance in one direction i n  order to develop it in  another. Compensation 
should aim at developing new relationships, not bring back into balance old 
ones, and issues of national parity or balance here arise. His message is therefore, 
be prepared for endless negotiation, compensation as process not a single event. 
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John Burton, in a chapter that l ike Jackson's is closely argued, looks at the 
scope of items that may fal l  within the compass of compensation (royalties, 
rent, occupation fees etc . ) .  He is  interested in  the problematic process of the 
valuation of resources from the prestidigitations of the Valuer General to the 
complaints of individuals, and he addresses directly the issue of equitabi l ity, 
this giving a pol icy response to Holzknecht's query under the rubric that benefits 
should ' reach the right people' (i tself a contested matter) . Burton intends here 
to include the weak and pol itical ly disadvantaged, thus introducing an element 
of 'human rights' into the debate. Commenting implicitly on Jackson's point 
that government needs to be strong, Burton points out that very often it is not, 
indeed provincial governments are sometimes very weak indeed , and the 
company has to act as its own form of government. This is certainly a cause of 
confusion and some frustration all round. Burton also refers briefly to the red 
discoloration of water in the Porgera and Lagaip rivers and c la ims for 
compensation in  relation to it since the early 1 990s . I would add here that 
resource compensation and bodily compensation (separated by Filer and others) 
come together since deaths have allegedly occurred from mercury and arsenic 
poisoning in these rivers . The issue has become much more significant since 
1 994, including in areas remote from the mine such as the habitat of the Duna 
speaking people l iv ing near to the banks of the Strickland River. Deaths 
attributed to witchcraft in  1 99 1  were diagnosed as caused by pol lution in 1 994, 
following visits by a loiya (lawyer) . The recent settlement by Ok Tedi Mining 
Limited to peoples affected by mine tai l ings from OkTedi will certainly stimulate 
a movement among the Duna people and others to press their claims vis-a-vis 
Porgera. 
Burton's detai led di scussion contri butes to the argument that we need 
empirical materials to determine what i s  happening in  different mining areas. 
His account does not suggest that claims are 'excessive' , only that payments 
have varied. The chapters by Kirsch and Bonnel l explore in  some further detail 
local responses to mining and i ts results .  Bonnell discusses the effects of 
relocation in Porgera, noting that there has been an increase in  polygyny, but 
that marriages are less stable and are harder to maintain in the relocated houses, 
also that wives from far away places are brought in, increasing tensions further. 
Her examination shows us that we cannot stop at the question of the size or 
substance of compensation . Our real task is to follow its social effects . Kirsch 
in his treatment of environmental degradation and its perception also notes 
that compensation issues cannot simply be treated as economic (that is monetary 
and actuarial) .  Rather he stresses people's perceptions of environmental collapse 
and their use of the idiom of sorcery as a way of discussing their fears of this 
collapse. The Yonggum people's resistances to the Ok Tedi mine's operations 
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have to be seen in the light of this general fear, which can be allayed only by an 
infrastructural package, perhaps made possible by the package (June 1 996) 
negotiated with the aid of the Austral ian law firm Gordon and S later (including 
a tai l i ngs contai nment programme, a compensation package) and a landowners' 
trust fund, all of several mil l ion Austral ian dollars). Kirsch also points out that 
local people and investigating scientists 'see' the ecology differently :  this is a 
fundamental point explai ning dispari ties of views. 
Overview : Filer's fireworks 
In perhaps the most chal lenging and wide-ranging chapter in  the col lection , 
Col in Fi ler rev iews all the semantic , pol itical , and economic issues that the 
other contributors address in detail for particular cases. Indeed, at one stage I 
considered whether Filer's chapter should simply stand also as the introduction 
to this volume, especially since he di scusses the work of John Burton and myself 
in the sphere of compensation. His shots over the heads of other commentators 
do enable me to come back finally to the point of reference for the Law Reform 
Commission, that is the matter of 'excessive'  compensation demands. That 
demands by local people are sometimes seen as excessive by developers or 
government does not seem to be in question. That they are out of ki l ter with 
' t radit ional ' rates and scales is also without doubt. The simple reason is that 
scales and circumstances are without paral lel from the past. Filer points out that 
the plasticity of the concept of compensation itself produces disagreements on 
what is 'excessive' or otherwise, and his remarks dovetai l with those of Kirsch 
on economic versus broader definitions of the term . In narrow legal istic terms 
claims may be excessive while in broader social terms they are not, regardless 
of whether we take 'custom ' as a basel ine or impute rational ity/irrational ity to 
the actors . What is excessive in other words depend, l ike beauty, on the beholder. 
One of the most interesting parts of Fi ler's discussion is his review of the 
idea that 'compensation ' is beginn ing to be a vehicle for other economic 
relationships, an argument I find attractive since it fits with other processes that 
are woven into the fabric of Melanesian social life in this way. Interestingly, he 
suggests that discussions about resource compensation can be an index of 
either deteriorat ion or improvement i n  landowner/developer re lationships. This 
alone should indicate why compensation is such a hot issue and why a Law 
Reform Commission volume is needed on it. In the end, also, issues about the 
size of demands that appear to be modern/distorted col lapse back into i ssues to 
do with personhood that as Zimmer-Tamakoshi and many others have shown 
are pervasive and long standi ng (therefore 'authentic ' ?). Filer here notes what 
I have done in the outset of this chapter. There is a search for equal ity, but to 
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echo Margaret Jol ly in an earl ier context (Jol ly 1 987) the search is chimerical . 
Given thi s, the struggle is l ikely to continue. In spite of th is and Filer's own 
skepticism regarding solutions one conclusion does seem to follow from these 
chapters. There is an obligation on the part of the government to the people 
and this must consist of he lpi ng to ensure that development is  sustainable and 
that compensation payments sustain that idea of sustainabil ity. I would now 
reformulate my earl ier idea of a Compensation Commission away from an 
actuari al and toward an ecological focus.  Large compensation claims would 
not then be excessive if  seen in  the l ight of long-term rather than short-term 
aims. Such long-term aims should i nclude repairing the broken ground over 
which I have here attempted to move swiftly. 
CHAPTER ONE 
PATRONS OR CLIENTS ? ASPECTS OF 
MULTINATIONAL CAPITAL-LANDOWNER 
RELATIONS IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
Susan Toft 
People are, with extremely few exceptions, ethnocentric .  They are nurtured 
in a unique culture which imbues them with concepts defining general l y  
acceptable, 'normal '  behaviour based on a set of  social values with standards 
to adhere, or aspire, to. Some people become cultured in  more than one society 
and, even if they do not adopt all facets of normal behaviour for that particular 
culture in which they are transiently present, they can usual ly  u nderstand and 
accept the differences-and they know that to be different is not to be wrong. 
Even  then ,  bel iev i ng  themsel ves  to be b icu l tura l , fluen t ,  not m erel y  
l inguistically, i n  their abi l ity to comprehend and communicate i n  more than 
one culture, they can display unexpected bl ind spots. Individuals '  j udgement 
as to thei r  own successful cultural adaptation is subjecti ve in  any case. Not 
only dependent upon personal sens it ivi ty to others and an innate abi l ity to 
adapt, it is also u ltimately, to some degree, unconsciously ethnocentric .  
There are various c ircumstances which place individuals i n  conditions 
where they may become 'bicultured'. For instance, those who leave their own 
cultural environment to work or study abroad and, especially, people who 
marry into a foreign culture, may successful ly assimilate a second set of values. 
B icultural interaction also occurs at a group level where two sets of cultural 
values operate simultaneously, either side by side or with one dominant over 
the other, as between colonisers and the colonised. Then, two cultures coexist, 
but the level of cultural exchange is l imited and largely one way. 
When people from different cultures interact without sufficient knowledge 
or understanding of the others ' values, 'cu lture conflict'  often occurs. This 
can happen on many different levels from the overt tactile demands of etiquette 
to more subtle yet fundamental , often covert, aspects of psyche: 'mind sets ' ,  
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expressed in  atti tudes which are difficult  to understand or even detect and 
which, perhaps,  neither of the people,  nor groups of people, invol ved in the 
situation of culture conflict are even aware of. 
This chapter suggests an area of culture conflict between foreign capital ist 
developers and their Papua New Guinea hosts i n  the arena of  resource 
development. The concept of the patron-client rel ationship is i l l ustrated with 
a description of the relationship of ascribed status between the dominating 
patrimony of the feudal landlord and the subservient peasant labourer. The 
achievement oriented egal itarianism of traditional Papua New Guinea soc iety 
is shown in contrast. Then fol lows an assessment of the typical characteristics 
of development agents in Papua New Guinea and their ethnocentric approach 
towards the owners of land they use .  The incompatibi l i ty of this attitude with 
traditional Papua New Guinea cultural values is posited as a reason for culture 
confl ict leading to a break down in the relationship between development agents 
and project landowners which puts capital and development at risk, thus also 
eroding the confidence of potential investors . 
Patrons and clients 
The theoretical basis for the patron-cl ient rel ationship is wel l establ ished in  
soc iological and anthropological texts (Gel lner and Waterbury 1 977; Schmidt 
et al . 1 977).  It describes a symbiotic relationship, a partnership, which benefits 
to some degree both the patron and the c l ient .  It is wel l  i l lustrated in  the 
feudal relationship between landlord and peasant tenant (Bloch 1 96 1 ;  Tuchman 
1 978) .  In this case an el i te and often absentee minority group hold the capital 
asset, the land, and require labourers to make i t  productive. The formal aspects 
of the rel ationship vary wi th in  and between societies.  Economical ly the 
landlord patron usual ly retains the l ion ' s  share of productivity and the landless 
labourer is often kept poor and dependent. 
The formal d i stri but ion of  harvested c rops i s  a key e lement  in the 
maintenance of the social dichotomy and control by the patron of the cl ient. 
The peasant compensates the landlord for the use of l and either by surrendering 
a large share of the harvest or by paying dues (rent) in some other way; he 
ideal ly  retai ns enough produce both for his own family 's  subsistence and for 
some surplus to exchange for cash and other necessities or valuables. The 
landlord receives a l arge proport ion of the produce which, as vastly surplus to 
his personal needs, is sold and by which he profits. The peasant is l argely at 
the mercy of the landlord, many of whom contri ve to keep their peasants as 
subject and dependent as possible. In some areas feudal landlords had the 
power of l ife or death over their serfs (Bloch 1 96 1 ; Tuchman 1 978) .  
1 2  COMPENSATION FOR RESOURCE DEVELOP MENT 
The defin ition of peasant society, in which the patron-c l ient relationship 
is so prevalent, is also wel l discussed in the l i terature (Redfield 1 956; Banton 
1 966) . For the purpose of this chapter it  suffices to say that peasant soc iety is 
usual ly  viewed as be ing essential ly a segment of a preindustrial agricultural 
soc iety. The peasants are the subordi nate majority who culti vate mainly for 
subsi stence but also for tribute or exchange. They are largely excl uded from 
the publ ic domain of society by an el ite minority who employ the state as an 
i1. lrument of domination . There is l i tt le chance of social mobi l i ty in these 
steeply stratified societies. The el ite inherit land, other wealth and high class 
status and the peasants are denied access to the cul tural resources by which 
the el ite retain the ir dominance. 
Papua New Guinea land and leadership 
In contrast, traditional Papua New Guinea soc ieties are virtual ly al l acephalous 
and egalitari an . There are over 800 different ethnic groups in Papua New 
Guinea, the largest being over 200,000 Engans, out of a national population 
verging today on four mi l l ion. Among so many cultures there is c learly a 
wide variety of customary behaviour (Berndt and Lawrence 1 97 1  ). But despite 
differences in content and style, with discernible reg ional characteri stics, the 
basic ideology of land tenure and leadership is, with few exceptions, s imi lar 
almost everywhere. It can best be understood through an appreciation of 
trad itional social structure .  
Social orgamsation is  tied to  genealogy : members of an ethnic group trace 
thei r descent from a com mon ancestor. The di verging l ines of descent from 
that ancestor are represented as clans, sub-clans and l ineages down to the 
extended fami ly. Leaders of the soc iety emerge through achievi ng success in 
the competit ive acquis i t ion of status, according to cu l tural  val ues Most 
commonly, in traditional times, these were men who were brave warriors , 
sk i l lful orators and successful  entrepreneurs in acquiring tradi tional wealth 
and exchange partners ; vari ations of those qual i ties are manifest in modern 
pol i tical leaders . An important aspect of tradi tional leadership is that, having 
acquired wealth, a person gained prestige by sharing, that is distri buting it, 
rather than by holding it for long. There was in fact an obl igation. uphe ld by 
traditional moral sanctions, for al l people to share benefits and wealth, in 
keep ing wi th egal i tari an pri nciples .  The achievement orientation of the 
leadership system meant (and sti l l  means) that i t  was always open to chal lenge 
and changi ng a l l iances ; i t  was a fluid system of equal opportunity un l ike that 
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represented by the ascribed status of the peasant in  rel ation to the landlord 
and the landlord in  relation to his inherited, eli te posi tion in  society. 
Ethnic groups used and 'owned' specific terri torial areas which, l ike the 
people, were also subdivided on descent l ines.  Consequently clans and sub­
clans 'owned'  discrete territorial segments which represented pol i tical segments 
a few generations deep. Pol i tical control is based on the segmentary opposition 
of l ineages . Equal segments opposed each other. For simpl icity, the following 
diagram of a patri l ineal society expresses this principle. 
Figure 1.1 The segmentary lineage system 
Clan y 
};:� 
Sub-clan 
Lineage L 
If A disputes with B the members of sub-clans L with M and P with Q can 
be expected to join  the fight on opposite sides. But if A disputes with C i t  
could involve the whole of  c lans X and Y, this time A and B with L ,  M, P and 
Q on the same side. In reali ty maverick groups may use opportunities to even 
scores or advance interests by joining battle and upsetti ng the balance; much 
can depend on numbers which in  turn are influenced by population ratios and 
rates of birth and death. The system is i l lustrated by Banks in a discussion on the 
Bena in Chapter Two and Zimmer Tamakoshi i n  Chapter Three of thi s volume. 
Nonetheless, in  principle, poli tical control was represented by the balance 
of power between equals, from the grassroots up, on both an i ndividual level ,  
leader to leader, and group level , clan to c lan.  Traditional Papua New Guinea 
manifested a number of competing patrons representing and supported by kin 
rather than a landlord in a symbiotic but unequal relationship with a mass of 
subordinate, submissive cl ients. Feudal l andlords were perhaps equals who 
warred on occasion with one another, and raised armies, but within the feudal 
unit the horizontal l ines of stratification contrast sharply with the vertically 
fragmenting clan groups of Papua New Guinea. 
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What is more, access to, and control of, the tradit ional economy through 
l and was and sti l l  is different. Rather than a handful of l andlords who inherit 
the l and and thereby exert entrenched pol i tical and economic control ,  in  Papua 
New Guinea landownersh ip  is vested in descent groups-tribal  or c lan 
segments . Al l  clan members are co-landowners . Thi s  g ives i ndiv iduals the 
right to use land but not to al ienate it. Thus, l and ownership is part of the 
identity of a group. It is an i nal ienable right, passed from the ancestors into 
the guardianship of successive generations .  
Land may be lent  to someone from outs ide the l and owning group (often a 
relati ve-in-law).  The borrower uses the l and, often over a prolonged period, 
whi lst acknowledging the favour according to custom, and the l and eventual ly 
reverts to the owners . In many areas, as on Lihir Island (Jacklyn Membup 
with others 1 994, pers . comm.)  and Misima Island (Poate Edoni and Peter 
Sai loia 1 996, pers . comm.) custom occasional ly allows the complete transfer 
of l and ownership, for instance as part of a homicide compensation agreement 
or in return for certain types of mortuary payments, but this is not the norm. 
In pre-colonial times territorial disputes were, and stil l  can be, a major, constant 
source of trouble, and traditional ly  land al ienation only occurred through 
victory and defeat in tribal fights . 
Today traditional owners find that their property, previously affected only 
by their own subsistence activities, i s  sought by others for various uses ranging 
from aircraft landing strips to logging, plantation and mining ventures . The 
property is alienated in a way which at least removes it from previous personal 
use, and at worst destroys i t .  The property is usual ly changed so that i t  can 
never be returned to its original state or revert to customary use .  
Within the modern context, the concept of land ownership as  a custodial 
role has serious consequences. In  simplest terms,  using Western terminology, 
the Papua New Guinean approaches l and ownership transfer with the idea of 
a lease sale. In other words, it i s  a long-term loan of land with interest payments 
to the owners-the lease wi l l  eventually  expire, meanwhi le may even be 
renegotiated, and the land wi l l  eventually  revert to the real owners . These 
owners wi l l  keep a watchful  eye and retain a proprietary i n terest in what 
happens on their  l and. Whereas outside purchasers prefer to operate on the 
basis of land title transfer into perpetuity, a freehold tenure, or, at very least, 
complete undisputed control for the long-term l ife of the lease, and they assume 
this i s  what i s  being provided. 
Developers 
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Agents o f  development projects in Papua New Guinea belong t o  organisations 
which function through a hierarchical bureaucratic system, be they government 
departments, non-government agencies, multinational corporations or small 
bus i nesses .  There is an apica l  l eader wi th functionaries who operate 
underneath. Differences between these hierarchical structures are essentially 
due to scale, though the particular function of an institution and personal i ties 
of people within i t  can influence the style in which i t  operates . 
This institutional form of management has evolved in cultures where social 
organisation has been on stratified, hierarchical l ines similar to those reflected 
in feudal systems which have existed from the Chaldees to China and beyond, 
where the patron-c l ient  type of rel ati onship has been so evident. The 
hierarchical management system has survived and has been efficient, if not 
entirely fair, to al l sections of the organisations into which it has been adopted, 
from mi l itary institutions,  where i t  is found probably in  its most absolute 
form, to public and private bodies. I t  has been imported to Papua New Guinea 
where i t  is  very different from tradit ional ,  non-hierarchical  systems of 
organisation .  A crucial characteristic of the hierarchical form of management 
is established leaders with sanctions to support their positions. If used properly 
the authority avai lable to these leaders through a chain of command creates 
an efficient organisation.  Unlike feudal l andlords and managing directors , 
traditional Papua New Guinea leaders head kin groups, so cannot select and 
appoin t  supporters; they cannot recru i t  and expe l ; they can only strive 
constantly for consensus on both an inter- and intra-group level . Consensus 
can be very elusive and the ordered hierarchy of the developer has trouble 
recognising this ;  i t  may even have trouble in identifying people it can describe 
as leaders . In fact the developer may also become very confused as to who 
are the 'true' landowners . The opening paragraphs of a newspaper update on 
a long standing dispute over a small parcel of uncultivable land on a mountain 
i l lustrate one aspect of the issue : 
A GROUP of people calling themselves legitimate landowners of the Mt Yule 
repeater station in the Central Province have accused Telikom of taking sides with 
a group of landowners who were not genuine landowners. 
This is despite the fact that a court appeal is still pending regarding who the rightful 
landowners were (The Independent 1 9  April 1 996). 
In some cases a group which once 'inhabited' an area, but which moved 
away enabling a d ifferent group to use the 'vacant' land may revive claims of 
ownership once a development project  shows an interest in the place. Land 
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boundary disputes, which previously had ei ther lain dormant or not been at 
issue, multiply, consequently protracting and frustrating in i t ial negotiations. 
Self-appointed, and therefore (often) ineffective, ' leaders' may emerge and try to 
manipul ate developers , landowners and government officers to their own 
advantage 
When development agents come to Papua New Guinea from abroad they 
bri ng with them thei r institutional structure and some personnel to represent 
their interests and identi ty. They al so bri ng money, and where busi nesses are 
concerned this is io invest, which means they expect to profit in the long run ;  
and they bring expectations other than o f  profit-of success in  the venture 
overal l ,  of support from national officials with whom they have negotiated 
permission to be there, and of cooperation from the local people whom they 
are helping, they bel ieve, ei ther by providing goods or services or employment 
etc . ;  and they bri ng advanced technology, on one level or another, with the 
assoc iated, required ski l l s .  These latter characteristics are often the basis on 
which the developer, as a corporate body, and indi viduals who compose the 
expatriate person nel, misjudge their relationship with local people who have 
different technology and ski l ls-they assume that the general superiori ty which 
they feel g ives them control , and they underestimate the proprietary atti tude 
and importance of the landowner. 
The modern , introduced technology and skil ls are more soph isticated. That 
is why they are there . The operators who bri ng them perceive a need for them 
to be there and behave as benefactors, benevolent overseers , patrons akin  to a 
feudal landlord. The local people are seen as cl ients and treated as such, and 
from an outsider 's cul tural perspect ive may appear to conform as such. The 
cultural mould of the foreigner is imposed in the work place, often by necessity 
to enable the project to function and progress, and always, in itial ly, with the 
Papua New Gui nean in an apprenticed, subordinate role .  Consumed by what 
is bel ieved to be the overriding priority of day to day project implementation, 
and despi te goodwi l l  on both sides, the outsider loses sight of the importance 
of understandi ng the Papua New Guinean cultural mould outside the work 
place. In fact this is to deal only with short-term project interests to the neglect 
of long-term project objectives, which may fal l  victim to ignorance of how the 
local people actual ly see themsel ves in re lation to the project. 
Virtual ly any type of development requires use of land or land-based 
resources, from the plot of land for a school ,  timber for use in its construction 
and water once the place is  operat ional , to the destruction of landscape caused 
by a gold or copper mine .  Land ownership, as described above, is at al l levels 
of the community. In in itiating a project, the entrepreneur negotiates with 
bureaucrats and po l i ticians representing government at the national level as 
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wel l as, since Apri l 1 989 with the in troduction o f  the 'Development Forum' 
negotiation process, landowner representatives. In theory this is both to protect 
the grassroot l andowners, inexperienced in Western style  deals,  and best to 
serve state interests. (It applies even when one arm of government is the 
entrepreneur, then another arm mediates between it and the benefactors . )  So 
at thi s point there are two negotiating teams representing similarly structured 
hierarchical bodies-people who operate wi th in  the same admin istrative 
culture, who in principle 'speak the same l anguage ' .  
The Land Act stipulates that only the Government may deal i n  land. 
Procedures for government acquisition of l and are under review today, but 
certainly with regard to most resource development projects, the freehold title 
remains with the traditional landowners and the Government owns the lease 
which it then subleases to the developer (Land Act, Chapter No. 1 85 ,  Revised 
Laws of Papua New Guinea 1 996).  
So developers depend upon the Government to acquire the necessary l and 
from the traditional owners and to lease i t  to them, and they do not deal 
directly with landowners at the point of acquisition. This i nitiates the partners 
in to the eternal tri ang le :  the relationship between state, developer and 
landowners, the l atter a loosely organ ised col lection of kin groups often 
competing with each other and anyway lacking the hierarchical structure to 
meet and match i ts fellow players . It also implies government control over 
the essential asset : the land, or i ts resources. In fact the Government does not 
have this control . It may have a contract with i ts two partners, the landowners 
and developers, but in the past has not been able or had the wil l  to uphold the 
contract and to assert i tself properly against the demands, often with menace, 
of irate landowners . 
The problem 
What makes the landowners irate? There are many apparent reasons, depending 
on each case, often due to fal se, high landowner expectations of benefits that 
would accrue. But the underlying problem is perhaps a basic misconception 
on the part of developers as to the view landowners have, of both themselves 
and the developers , specifically in  relationship to the project. Assuming the 
landowners actually want a project, which is  not always the case, and ignoring 
the fact that they do not understand al l  the changes which are i ncurred by the 
development, they come to the fray with the psychological perspective of patrons, 
not cl ients. They are, after all ,  the l andlords. Yet they begin to feel that they 
have lost control ,  not only of their l and, but also of their l ives. The developers, 
however, also believe themselves to be the patrons, without whom their clients 
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would not have the opportunity, the good fortune, to enter a brave new world. 
So the two groups who have the face to face relationship, on site, are in  direct 
competition. Rather than the symbiosis of a patron-client partnership, there 
are two patrons neither of whom appreciates that each sees the other as cl ient 
and neither, therefore, playing the anticipated appropriate role. 
Evidence abounds in  the national press supporting this thesis ,  that the 
Papua New Guinea landowners view themselves as patrons  and expect to be 
treated as such. For instance: 
DOME Resources (PNG) Pty Ltd of Australia who is developing the small high 
grade Tolukuma gold project in the Goilala area of the Central Province has had 
two of its exploration l icences rejected by landowners . . .  during a mining warden's 
meeting at Mondo. 
The villagers told the mining warden that they will wait for two years to see how 
Dome Resources can develop Tolukuma mine. This period they said will give 
them enough time to learn the benefits of mining and effects on the lifestyle, 
environment, the water systems, and social changes and impacts. 
Although the mining warden explained that an exploration licence did not give the 
company the right to mine, the landowners strongly opposed the extension of the 
licence which covers the headwaters of Auga (Sidove) and the headwaters of Dilava 
(Duma) where drilling carried out had been done by Newmount (an exploration 
company) previously . . .  
. . .  The landowners told the hearing that the Tolukuma project has given them a 
very bad impression of mining. "Unless the mining company is willing to sit with 
landowners and listen to their problems only then they can come to a compromise 
to start exploration", a landowner said. 
The landowners said they were not rejecting Dome Resources but making sure 
that things are properly done in consultation with landowners. The mining warden 
gave the landowners two weeks if they wish to change their decision as by then the 
minutes of the hearing will be then submitted to the mining advisory board . . .  
The landowners said they believed the Auga Di lava area has rich gold deposits and 
they could not allow companies to come in and exploit the area unless they are 
willing to meet certain requirements expected by the landowners (The National 
20 March 1 995). 
Politicians may actively encourage this attitude too. When negotiations for 
the Lihir gold mine in New Ireland Province were at a stalemate the Min ister 
for Mining and Petroleum 
. . .  told the Bri tish government that RTZ's attitude and treatment of the PNG 
government over the project was "intolerable" and could not be accepted by any 
properly constituted government. . .  
. . .  "We may be  a small country and therefore do  not warrant a visit by  the chairman, 
but we are the owners of the resources and if after my three letters of invitation to the 
chairman of RTZ, on behalf of the Prime Minister (Pai as Wingti) and the Government 
of PNG, he is too busy to visit PNG in order to finalise matters at his level and 
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with the authority requi red, then RTZ cannot blame the Government of PNG for 
any delay i n  the project. 
The ti me for despatching directors or lesser executives to deal with governments of 
the Third World is gone. If the Prime M ini ster, through his  mini sters, had requested 
a meeting with the chairman for talks on a one to one basis, this is the prerogative 
of the Pri me Mini ster and should be treated as such with the respect and dignity 
the invitation deserves (Post-Courier 6 M ay 1 994). 
The fact that a wel l  educated leader, experienced in international affairs 
and with a Western cultural aura can express such sentiments should indicate 
what less sophisticated leaders and relatively isolated rural populations may 
feel .  This quotation also i l lustrates the sense of patrimony felt  and displayed 
by many national leaders themselves . From the time of Independence the 
records show that pol i tical leaders have empathised with landowner claims 
and have responded to l andowner pressure groups . This is consistent with the 
fact that they share the same trad i t ional va l ues regard ing l and,  which 
developers wou ld also be wise to acknowledge. This  does not  mean that 
developers should become subservient, rather that they would be well advised 
to approach negotiat ions and community rel ations either as a c l ient, albeit a 
powerfu l one without whom the community would become in various ways 
bankrupt , or at least acknowledge that the landowners are fel low patrons, not 
to be treated l ike cl ients. It might even be appropriate, especial ly concerning 
long-term projects, to conceptual ise the relationship between development 
agents and landowners with the former in the role of a ' super c lan ' , an al ly of 
the landowner c lans with whom consensus and a balance of power must 
constantly be cultivated . 
Ministers have the power and authori ty of office to influence matters 
personally on certai n levels .  But even Ministers , l ike other leaders , including 
bureaucrats , are not as powerful as their formal positions might suggest, nor 
do they necessari ly have the support of the people they purport to represent. 
Furthermore, unfortunately, these so-cal led leaders have a high nuisance value, 
mi s leadi ng developers i nto bel iev ing they exert control and m islead ing 
l andow ners w i th s i m i l ar rhetor i c ,  i nc i t i ng them w h i l s t rai s i ng  fal s e  
expectations. They may sound and seem l ike patrons but they often lack the 
prerequisites to fol low through. Even if they do succeed in negotiations with 
the developer they may be ei ther too greedy or too i nefficient to pass benefits 
sat isfactori ly through the group they c la im to represent, creati ng serious 
di scontent which may jeopardise a project. (Holzknecht, this volume, refers 
to the prob lem of the sham big-man . )  
Landowners have so far been discussed in this chapter as  a group juxtaposed 
with developers and government officials .  But another dimension to the scene 
is that landowners are rarely a unified group. Segmentation, akin to traditional 
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practice, along with other, modern stimul i  propel groups in to competi tion 
against other land owning factions or groups to secure what they believe to be 
their fair share of benefits from the development. Even if l andowners of a 
particular project stand together in it ial ly, it is no guarantee that they wi l l  
remain united. Th is i s  a characteri stic of  landowners which  can di srupt and 
delay projects and seriously frustrate the developers , but it is possible for the 
latter to turn this divis iveness to their advantage . Particul arly in activities, 
such as logging, which are more diffuse and less intense than mining, developers 
can use the lack of coordination between l andowners to play one group or 
faction off agai nst another-the developer can divide and rule. Th is  would be 
a tactic not wi thout r isk and today, wi th the benefit  of h indsight,  many 
developers seem to try to minimise the competi t iveness among landowning 
groups in an attempt to create and maintai n harmonious ' umbrel la'  coal itions. 
Papua New Guinea l andowners are clear about what they consider to be 
their rights and they have a sense of fairness, but it i s  what they consider to be 
fair. This may not coincide with what the developer finds fair and people do 
not always behave according to Western ideas of rational ity in these matters . 
Traditional val ues concerning the sharing of wealth come into play by which 
leaders are expected to distribute their  wea!th. This  occurs through the general 
sharing of assets, through the giv ing of feasts which require quantities of pigs 
and surplus food (the abi l ity to produce such alone bei ng a mark of distinction) 
and also through an ongoing series of ceremonial gift exchanges. The latter 
formalise bonds of friendship between leaders but also create obl igations and 
expectations -a person giv ing a gift has expectations of a reciprocal gift and 
the value it should represent, the gift recipient has the obl igation to perform 
as expected. 
These expectations and obl igations of formal i sed friendship are aspects 
of tradi t ional leadership which i mpinge on the development scene. For 
instance, when expectations in government services are not bei ng met, 
l andowners feel j usti fied in  turning to their alternative more accessible partner 
who, they think, has ongoing obl igations to ful fi l ! .  They demand more from 
the development agent who is using their asset, their land. However the developer 
has a contract which is ,  by defin ition and for ethical busi ness purposes, 
i n fl ex ib le ,  not des igned for ongoing responses to sh ift s  in l andowner 
perceptions. The contract i s  intended to avoid confrontation . The development 
agent has the legal right to adhere to it and the moral right to be indignant if 
attempts are made to break it .  If the Government then fai ls  to mediate, the 
landowners, unimpressed with contractual paper power, resort to selfhelp and 
exert the only real power they have, manpower, against the project. This may 
be i n  nobody's long-term i nterests, but it is a response to people who do not 
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want to  l i sten, who  are not respondi ng i n  the con ventional  spirit of the 
leadership system which constantly fi l ters avai lable weal th through society. In 
the minds of landowners the development agents (their friends, their partners 
in a joint venture) have expectations and obl igations to fulfi l l-profits to share . 
When the developer displays, what is to vi l lagers, visible wealth, how are 
the v i l lagers to know they are being given a fair  share? They feel at least as 
vulnerable as most Westerners do when they take their car or watch or teeth 
to be repai red, and are told they need this, that and the other, which wi l l  cost 
a large sum of money. There can be a second opin ion, but in the last resort 
there has to be an e lement of trust that the technic ian is both expert and 
honest. The v i l lagers cannot gauge the real fairness of the deal that has been 
struck because, l ike the Western car owner, they do not have the required 
knowledge. Their land, which is so tied to their identity, is removed from 
their contro l  and, unable to assess the real value of benefits avai lable from the 
project, they must ensure they are receiving fair dues as patrons. It i s  difficult 
to justify the way profits are distributed when v i l lagers see others display ing 
indices of great weal th apparently deri ved from their land. They want their 
'pound of  flesh' and are never sure whether they have it .  Profits are a patron ' s  
right, not a c l ient's priv i lege. 
Development projects vary widely i n  the extent to which they intrude on 
the local scene. But however firmly the developers bel ieve themsel ves to be 
the real patrons i t  does not alter the fact that their landowner partners bel ieve 
otherwise. Considerable disruption, even sabotage, can cause project c losure 
if landowner frustrations explode in attempts to be heard. The Government 
can impose legal , contractual sanctions agai nst a developer because both sides 
acknowledge the same code . But if landowners feel they are not receiving due 
rewards they may take uni lateral action to press their claims. The most extreme 
case of such behaviour resulted in the c iv i l  war on Bougainvi l le .  
Conclusion 
Thi s chapter has noted differences, both practical and psychological , in the 
way landowners and developers approach development projects. The traditicnal 
land tenure system determines that l and is owned by groups, not individuals, 
that group membersh ip is sel f recruiting through ki nship, that the land remains 
with the same kin group over generations and that this t ies people to a place, 
becoming important in establ ishing both personal and group identity. These 
facts result in a possessive attitude towards land which means i t  is not easily 
or freely avai lable for use by others . In addition, it means that negotiations 
with groups within which leadership is diffuse (consistent with tradition) ,  do 
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not run according to standard corporate procedures .  There i s  then a tendency 
for the developer to underestimate the power of the l andowners and a confl ict 
arises due to cultural interpretations regarding patronage. 
The developers come with an ethnocentric approach as to how the job 
should be done. This  appl ies to both the h ierarchical management system and 
the behaviour of indi viduals who do not percei ve, apprec iate or accept local 
cultural norms.  Papua New Guinea v i l lagers cannot be expected to bridge the 
cul tural gap. Constant communication between the development agent and 
landowners on an egal i tarian level is essential to maintain understanding. 
The developers are i n  a position to discover what irks the local l andowner 
and to understand the concepts of culture conflict and ethnocentricity. Bringing 
change, as i ndeed they do, developers , whi lst encouragi ng the pre-industrial 
Papua New Guinea structures and practices to adapt to meet the needs of 
development in the interests of development, must not lose sight of the fact 
that on certain cul tural level s they wi l l  al so benefit from adapting their style, 
by doing in Papua New Guinea as the Papua New Guineans do. As Marc 
Bloch advises :  
The ties based on blood relationship existed long before, and were by their very 
nature foreign to, the human relations characteristic of feudalism; but they conti nued 
to exert such an important influence within the new structure that we cannot exclude 
them from our picture (B loch 1 96 1 : 1 23).  
Developers in Papua New Guinea would be wise to include this concept in 
their own picture. 
Whi lst the thrust of this chapter has been to examine the developer­
l andowner (patron-patron) relationship, i t  is manifest that Papua New Guinea 
indi vidual s-espec ial ly pol itic ians, other people with pol i tical ambitions and 
some rank outsiders not from the project area, hangers-on-also pose as patrons 
to both developers and landowners. The main reason why such self-seeking 
spoi lers are able to muddy the waters is because of the inadequate rol e  played 
by the third contractual party of the orig i nal troika, the Government. The 
Government, supposedly safeguarding landowner and national interests whi lst 
fac i l i tating the path of the developer, is often the 's leeping'  partner. Rather 
than interpreting and adjudicat ing for its two partners , seemingly unwil l ing 
or unable to assist or partic ipate authori tatively, i t  leaves them to each other's 
mercy and the mercy of sundry interested but interfering parties . Even when 
serious confl ict arises the Government appears to shun the role of mediator 
whilst refuting responsibi l i ty or blame. 
CHAPTER TWO 
SHAME, COMPENSATION AND THE ANCESTORS : 
RESPONSES TO INJURY IN HANUABADA AND BENA 
Cyndi Banks 1 
This chapter examines the ethnographies of two societies in Papua New Guinea, 
the Motu, represented by the people of Hanuabada in the National Capital 
District ,  and the Bena of the Eastern Highlands Provi nce, wi th particular 
reference to the manner and the means by which members of those societies 
respond to i nj uries, or perceived injuries, caused by others. A description and 
analysis of these responses assi st in understanding a society, its cultural values, 
its expectations and, therefore, the probable response to actual or perceived 
injuries. It is suggested that the addition of this contextual understanding to 
contentious si tuations provides an underlying dimension, often overlooked, 
which enables those adjudicating any dispute to gain a fuller appreciation of 
the forces at work . Should contentious situations result in social disorder, the 
explanation and incorporation in j ustice poli cy of information about response 
to injury may, in many si tuations, be more productive of social order than sole 
reliance on the usual State control s .  
By response to i njury I mean an act (sometimes 'v iolent ' ) which i s  done in  
response to a perceived wrong. An approach which considers a range of responses 
to i nj ury avoids emphas i s ing a part icular response, such as violence. A 
consideration of the various responses to perceived i nj uries provides a context 
which promotes understanding of any one episode. 
I will discuss the nature of such responses, contextualising them within the 
ethnographic background of each culture. I outli ne the traditional and modem 
day responses to i njury, which in each case appear to i ndicate that the Motu 
and the Bena seem compelled to give expression to their sense of inj ury, and 
that traditional forms of behaviour (or adaptations from the traditional) continue 
to provide a mechanism for that expression. 
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Background: Han uabada 
The .Motu l i ve i n  fo u rteen  v i l l age " a long the south-ea"it coast of Papua New 
G u i nea .  The v i l l age of H a n uabad a i s  l ocated on t he harbour  of t he cap i ta l . Po rt 
i vl o re s b) . a n d  i s  com posed o f  fi v e  sm a l l er . adj acent  v i l l ages  of Hohodae ,  
Porcporc na , Tanohada. G u r i u , and Ele\'al a .  T h e  Ko i t abu people were the or i g i na l 
i n ha b i t a n t s  of  t he a rea where the l\fotu  set t led ; th ey were s lowly pu shed towards 
t he coast by con � ta n t a t tacks from the  i n l a nd Koi ari peop l e  ( Lawes 1 879) . 
E ve n t u al l y  t he Ko i r abu merged (and freq uent l y i n ter-m arri ed w i t h  the M ot u ) ,  
u s u a l l y  l ocat i ng themse l ves at one  e nd o f  t h e  v i l l age ( Se l i gm �rn n 1 9 1  O) ; they 
ad op t ed many Motu c u s toms and much of  the i r  l anguage . 
I n  the past .  the irs was a l arge l y  homoge neous cu l t ure i n  \vh i c h  the most 
i m portant  u n i t  was a res iden t i a l  u n i t  or 'sec t i o n '  cal led idulw . A \' i l l age was 
mat.le up of  a n u m ber of iduhu.  Each iduhu has a n ame and trad i t i on a l l y  me mbers 
l i veJ i n  a l i ne o f  houses extend i ng from the beach out  i n to the sea.  Res i dence 
a fter  marriage was patri l ocal so that  the bri de m oved to  the groom ' s  father's 
house and was cons iJered part of his iduh u  as l ong as she re m a i ned m anied,  
a l t hough she had no r ights  in  the  iduhu of her h usban d i ndepe n d e n t  of h i m  
( G roves 1 96 3 ) .  
Each idulzu had i ts heredi t ary l eader cal led t h e  iduhu lohia w h o  p layed a 
-; i gn i ficant  ro l e  i n  sett i ng dates for i m portant  feasts  and dances (Se l igmann 
1 9 1 0) .  The idulzu lohia exerted considerable i n fl uence over iduhu members 
buc that i n fl uence was kept in check by p u b l i c  op i n io n  represented by the 
'\e n io r e l ders of the  iduhu. Leaders p l ayed a c e n tral ro l e  in e n suri n g  that 
appro pr i a te r i t u a l s  were conducted in re l at i o n  to trad e ,  garde n i ng,  fi s h i n g ,  
danci ng :rnd bur ia l  cere m o n i es so t h a t  t he ancestors and sp i ri t s  were sat i sfied 
and t hat the J i v i ng would t herefore not be adverse ly  a ffected (Oram I 989). A l l  
men were req u i red to pe rform r i t u a l s  w h e n  they bu i l t  a house o r  canoe, a t  the 
b i rt h  of a fi rs t ch i l d  and i n  ascertai n i ng t h e  cause of i l l ness and sorcery ( Kopi  
1 9 7 9 : 3 7 ) .  
G ro ves s uggests that gai n i ng prest ige was central t o  a l l  m em bers of Mot u 
soc iety as each man 
. . .  strove to  gai n advantage over others in a cont inual battle for prestige. The heads of  
vi l lage sections competed a t  the highest level,  but lesser men competed also a t  lower 
leve l s .  a l l  at temp t i ng to outshine their rivals in certain pub l ic enterpri ses that 
particu larly conferred prestige: smal l-scale distributions of food at vari ous stages in 
the cycle of mortuary ri tes;  bride-price payments;  the hiri ,  and the great feast with 
danc ing that closed the cycle or mortuary ri tes (Groves 1 973 :  I 04). 
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Men attempted to enhance the ir  own prest ige and sett le senous i :�u through 
'discu ions of rel at ive pres tige · during which they made referen ... � to the i r  
comparat ive accompl i shments i n  act iv i t ies considered to bestow prest ige nd 
therefore greater status .  
Between September and December each year, duri ng the south-west trade 
wi nds, Motu men travel led west in sea vessel s  ca1 1ed lakotoi to the G u l f  of 
Papua where they traded c lay pots and armshelb for sago, ret urn i n g  three 
month l ater during the north-west monsoon (Barton 1 9 1  O;  Gi l l  I '76 :  Rom i l ly  
1 8 87) .  Due to the poor env i ronmental cond i t ions of the Moresby �u·e< i t  i 
widely bel ieved that the Motu were dependent on thi trade ior adequate suppl ies 
of food (Bel shaw 1 957 ;  Groves 1 960, 1 97 3 ;  Holmes 1 954) . The lziri t rad i ng 
exped i t ion was the central focus of the l i fe rhythm of the Motu a\ it contai ned 
wi th i n i t  represen tat ions of every aspect of Motu soc iety. I t  encompa:. d 
economic need , compet i t ive prestige seek.ing.  a return for labour in the form of 
pots for sago and , abo\'e al l ,  it su · tai ned relat ionships between person:.  the 
di fferent iduhu ,  the ancestor ( regarded as among the l i v ing ) and be tween 
husband and wife through ri tual practice. 
Tradi t ional ly ,  and in  the modern day, Motu l i fe appears i n  man) 1 e:')pe ts 
to be stre fu l and compet i t ive. There is a s trong focus on re lat ion hip and on 
imbalances which may occur i n  re lat ionship within the iduhu .  Ancc1:itor ' and 
other spi ri ts are consi dered present  in the physical world and a per�on ' s  anger 
and i njury can be man i fested through them . I nj ury i s  experienced i n tensely  to 
the extent that it goes beyond ' i nj ured fee l i ng ' and has the capac i ty to i nduce 
i l l n ess,  un les the fee l i ngs of anger and hurt are released . S imi larly, the person 
towards whom the anger is d i rected is thought to become i l l  and w i l l  on!) regain 
health if  the i nj ured person 's hurt is acknowledged and resol ved i n  some way. 
There are processes of releas i ng feel i ngs through ri tual such as tikara (mak.rng 
of tea) and public acts which include publ icising accusat ions, compet i t i ve fea · t ing 
or church donations which help al lev iate tens ions ,  at  least for the t ime bei ng . 
Respon es to i nj ury are for the most part i nd i rect .  I n  the ti�ara it is the 
ance tor to whom an appeal is m ade for re lease of anger if no human 
acknowledgement of bad fee l i ngs is forthcoming. The gatheri ng together of 
re lati ves in the tikara ceremony enables anger to be d iss ipated in a pri rnte 
context and the i n i t ia l  ca l l  to the ancestors to help a sick person avoids any 
early con fron tation with in  the fam i ly and iduhu . The tikara i a proces · of 
evoking a confession for i nj ured feel i ngs so that appropriate amends can be 
made . Confession a lso fi nds a pl ace today through the mediat ion efforts of 
church deacons who regularly check for tensions with in the iduhu and encourage 
confession to re lease an imos i t ies and resol ve i nj uries. 
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Although, in the past, the mechanism i nvolv i ng publ ic i s ing accusations 
appears to have been confrontational , i t  was control led by the i ntervent ion of 
in termed iaries and so consti tuted a d i splay of anger which d id  not provoke 
physical attack agai nst a person but took the form of a verbal assau l t .  Today, the 
Motu conti nue to pub l ic i se accusations, espec ia l ly in cases i nvol v ing sexual 
jealousy, and the publ ication may be fol lowed by the destruction of the i nj urer's 
property. Violence towards a husband in th is context seems to el ic i t  an angry 
response against h im from his w ife through h is  goods and property. When a 
wife confronts an adulterous woman there is a d irect accusation and anger w i l l  
often be  released through physical attack or publ ic i nsults. The actions taken 
agai nst property or through physical attack and i nsult are al l regarded equal ly as 
attacks agai nst the person. It i s  of s ignificance whether the attack takes p lace in 
publ ic or private s � nce a publ ic attack draws more persons  in to the d ispute and 
its resolut ion .  
Another response to i nj ury in the past was the use of sorcery, where an 
in termed iary, the sorcerer, was h i red to cause e i ther death or i l l ness. Today, 
sorcery is widespread, or at least thought to be widespread, and is used,  not as 
a release of feel i ngs, but to affect the status or posi t ion of another. The Motu are 
therefore capable of del iberate and planned acts of harm but draw a d i sti nction 
between v is i t ing harm on re latives and on outsiders. 
The traditional ly competit ive nature of Motu society, man ifested for example, 
through the hiri trad ing expedi tion and hekarai competi t ive feast ing ceremony, 
or in maki ng  greater brideprice pay ments ,  cont inues  in the presen t  d ay. 
Competi t ive feast ing and danc ing seem to have been replaced by the col l ection 
of money for church and by the ach ievement of pos i t ions  of power and 
respons ib i l ity through the modern wage economy. Tradi tional ly  the competit ion 
wou ld  end when the other person ' s  resources were exhausted . Today, the 
d ifference seems to be that re lat ive prestige i s  derived more from intang ibles 
such as a better job, or a ch i ld performing better in school ,  and there are fewer 
methods for bri ng ing the rivalry to an end by v is ib le  means except through an 
act of sorcery causing i l lness, misfortune or death. Th is  may account for the 
perception that the use of sorcery has increased in recent times. 
Violent response (in a Western sense) i s  not a central feature of responses to 
inj u ry except apparent ly in cases of sexual jealousy. The Motu seem to fee l  
compel led to  make thei r  i nj uries v is ib le bu t  have cont inued to  fol low trad i t ional 
forms of release of anger, and the practices of tikara, harangue and the destruction 
of property have continued as mechan isms to express i njury. Adaptations from 
the trad i t ional i nc lude the use of deacons  to i nduce confession of bad feel i ngs, 
and g iv ing the l argest church donation in competit ion w i th other iduhu. Even 
trad i t ional v iolence in the form of c lub fighting was constra ined as the fight 
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ceased once blood had been drawn .  If sorcery is taken to be an act of violence, 
then there i s  a paral le l  between tradit ional violence and sorcery i n  that sorcery, 
or vadari, within the iduhu was also i ntended only to inj ure and not to ki l l .  
Violent attacks occur, however, i n  the form of  fights between women over 
adu l tery, between husband and wife (over accusations of adu l tery) and in the 
domestic sett ing when husbands or their parents consider the wife i s  not fu lfi l l ing 
household duties adequately. I t  seems, therefore, that withi n c lose k in  re lations, 
where in terdependent re l at ionships are affected by acts such as incest and 
adul tery, the threat to the stabi l i ty of those relationships i s  considered serious 
enough to warrant physical confrontat ion .  This may have the effect of forcing a 
more immediate resol ution of the fami ly i ssue. 
Women are infl uent ial in Motu society and, as mothers , have s ignificant 
status in the soc iety. Choice in marriage ,  prestige through the iduhu, recogn ition 
of labour, and the abi l ity to cal l upon traditional constrai nts and rel ational support 
in marriage, al l indicate that the Motu woman is respected and val ued .  Above 
al l ,  she i s ,  through having the right to choose her marriage partner, able to 
greatly influence the pattern of rel ations. 
The rel ationship between i n- laws and a wife i s  of paramount i mportance 
because m uch i njury and bad fee l i ng can flow from d isputes between those 
parties. The consequences of a d ispute between a wife and her in- laws can 
inc lude assau lts from her husband, the wife return i ng to her re lat ives and, 
depend ing on who is perceived respons ib le  for the i nj ury to re lat ions ,  the 
poss ib i l i ty of chi ld custody being given to the wife's rel atives rather than the 
husband's .  The conduct expected from the wife i s  set by her i n- laws and the ir  
d issati sfaction i s  often communicated to the husband, thus putting him under 
pressure to correct his wife's att itude and conduct. Thi s  pressure ,  on both 
husband and wife, is a persi stent source of tension in many fam il ies and a prime 
cause of injury in that context. 
In cases of adu l tery a m arried woman usual l y  expresses the main force of 
her anger toward the other woman rather than her husband . An important 
consideration for a woman is  the demand for a return of brideprice if the marriage 
breaks up as this w i l l  present serious economic problems for her relatives, causing 
them a serious loss of prestige and p lac ing stress and strain on her personal ly. 
The emphas is  in responding to i nj ury is therefore on maintai n i ng the stabi l ity 
of the marriage and i t  may be for this reason that a woman's objective i s  often 
to 'chase away' the threat and not to end the marriage .  
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Respo nses to injury 
� h) t 11 ::.1.h.�ict:  1 -,  t:o m pe t i t i ·e · ncl e x pl i c i t  d i sph.) � 1..,f wea l t h and tat u s  can 
generate e n \' )  :.111 J j er l o U� )  res u l t i n g i n  a t tac ks on repu tat i on through the  u e 
of �hame a n d  ::iorcery .  There is a �p i ri t ua l  JSpect i n  the reso l u t ion  of i nj ur ies i n  
t hat ance�tOI" ar� cal led upon :.is age nt · i n  order to cau 'e i nj ur) as 'A e l l as to 
t ake p. 11  i n  the proces of recon .: i l iat i on .  The c u l tural context  w i th i n \\'h ic h  
most i nj ur ies o c  ·u r  i ,  made exp l i c i t through mari ta l  and k i n  re l at i on s h i ps 
w i th i n  t he idulw and amongst c l ire k i n . 
' \  iolent'  responses 
f farfare 
Poreporen Lt and other f\.fotu v i l l ages in Port Moresb) . s trat eg ica l l y s i t u ated for 
e v e r) � i g h t i n g o f  tra n ge c a n o e · c o m i n g i n t o  t h e  h a rbo u r . ha \ ' e b e e n 
charac ter i�ed , s a ' bd l i ge re nt  m ari t i m e power ' ( G ro \'es 1 95-l .  78) .  Warfare 
\\ a � thoug ht to be ' emk m i c '  w i t h i n the coastal  Motu/Koitabu regi on bet\\ een 
c�stern and we. tern Mo tu groups .  G rove notes tha t \\ ars \\ ere a l so fo ught  to 
a\'e ngc wrongs anJ to shm\ g reater streng th  (Groves 1 9 55 ). Accord rng to Oram . 
\\ e..,rern �fo t u  groups did not fight e� eh other but raids were conducted ' to obta in  
food ' (Oram 1 9 89 : 5  l )  si nce Port 1 1 oresb) is s i tu ated i n  a ra i n  shadow and ib 
i n hosp i table habi tat and poor soi l often res u l ted i n  famine  before the 1 9 30s 
(Chal mers 1 8 8 5 :  Oram 1 968 ) .  The Motu be l i eved that the Ko i tabu contro l led 
the weat her throug h sorcery and S e l i g m a n n  observed that they wou id a t t ac k  a 
Ko i t J bu \ i l l  age w h i c h  they bl amed for a l ength) drought or for cau s i n g  i l l  
fo11 une i n  trad i n g exped i t ion  (S e l i g man 1 9 1 0 : 1 80) .  
Wi t h i n  or between iduhu responses to  i nj u ry c o u l d  take q u i te d i fferen t  form . 
l n  the pas t , the  obl igat ion for reparat ion through compensat ion for acc idental  
death e n s u red t hat v i l l agers d id  not fi ght each other a l though angry words 
were exchanged . However, if a man was ki l l ed by a stranger gro u p  ' b l ood price . . .  
k warava m i ght  be refused , a n d  war t h e  res u l t ' , tho ugh Sel i gmann reports that 
' ! n  such cases matter� were general ly sett led peaceably '  ( S e l i g mann 1 9 1 0 : 1 2 7 ) .  
B )  1 884,  when the  B ri t i sh declared a Pro tec torate over  Papua,  miss i onaries 
had al l but succeeded i n  bri ng i n g  peace to the area. To break t he cyc l e  of 
warfare they "constan t ly  vis i t [ ed ]  m ut ual l y  hostilt� gro ups . .  . '  (Oram 1 989 :52 ) .  
Rape 
There is no word for rape in the Motu l anguage.  The Motu i nstead descri be 
such behaviour as, ' they spoi led her ' .  I cou l d  find  on ly  one passi ng refere nce 
to rape in t he l i terature2 and the o l der peop le i n terv ie wed a l l  s tated that rape 
was non -ex i s te nt in trad i t iona l  t i mes al though women were sometimes the 
vic t i ms of at tacks from men from other e thn ic  groups.  
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You nger women revealed a n u m ber of rapes which they ..:aid too k p l ace i n  
1 99..f w i t h i n  the v i l l age o f  Poreporena.  Tata na and E leva l a .  The women noted 
that t hree of the fi ve rape i nc ident  they ve e aw are of had bee n com m i t ted by 
Porepore n a  and E l e v a l a  men . I n  one ea e. a 2 5 -year-o ld  Porepore n a  m a n  
�ex u ·1 l l y  a �  au l ted a 9-year-old g i r l  from t h e  a m e  iduhu after  h e  i n v i ted her 
i n to h is  hou ·e for a dri n k  of cold water. She l ater i dent i fied him and he wa · 
arre teJ by po l i ce and ·ent  to pr ison to a\vai t  h i · t r i a l .  The g i rl ' · father worked 
as a pri..;on gu ard and i t  was rumou red hat the man wa · bad l y  beaten wh i l e  on 
re mand In a not her ca�e. a woman and her h u sband were stopped by a g roup 
of fi ve young men when ret u rn i ng to Tatana v i l l age after an eve n i n g  out  at a 
c .:l ub .  The men (from Poreporena) a ked them for a l i ft home. They subseq u en t)� '  
he l d  the husband at k n i fe po i nt and took o ff with t he veh ic le  and the man's  
wife. They \Vere  i n terrupted i n  the i r at tempt to rape the  woman when her 
hu ·band arr ived i n  another \'ehic le he obtai ned after  ·ee k i n g  a. si stance . Later, 
members of both the wom a n ' s  and her husband 's  fam i l ie 5  reported ly  reta l iated 
agai n s t the boys '  fam i l ies by throwi n g  stone and bot t l e  at their houses i n  
Poreporena,  a l l the t i m e  crea m i ng a n d  demanding  that they come o u t  anJ 
fi gh t .  N�H ional Cou rt records i n d icate that one of t he g u i l ty men recei ved a two 
year ·u  pended sentence and w as pl aced on a Good Behaviour Bond for 1 2  
m o n th - . :  
Constraints on 'violent '  responses 
I n  t he pa · t ,  people accepted the i n tervent ion  of d i s i n terested part i es to set t l e  a 
d i .  pute accord i ng to the strength of t he iduhus i n vol ved . One sen ior Poreporena 
man noted that t rad i t ion a l l y  there was acceptance of a t h i rd party a ·  mediat r, 
usua l ly  a le ader. As changes in the leader ·h i p  s t ructure occu rred . church deacons  
took  o n  th i  mediat ion  ro le and th i s  has con t i n ued i n to the  present day. 
Nowaday s,  many di spu tes are re o l ve d  in t h i s  manner. An example  was 
prov ided by E l eval a v i l l ager . In the i r  v iew, church attendance i s  high and i t  i s  
co m m o n  prac t i c e fo r de aco n s  t o  v i s i t  e a c h  h o u se h o l d  m o n t h l y  b e fo re 
co m m u n ion serv ices are conducted i n  c h u rch.  Dur ing t hese v i s i t s  deacons ask 
membe rs to confess and reso l ve any outstand ing d i  agree ments  w i t h  fam i l y 
me mbers or o t hers i n  t he v i l l ag e .  I f  th ey are u n able  to reso l ve d i sp u te , 
com m u n i on i s  w i thhe ld .  Accordi n g  to v i l l agers, most w i l l  accept the deaco n ' s  
ad v i ce when h e  or s h e  med iates d i sputes .  However, some re main  4 U n w i l l i n g  to 
fo rg i ve '  and c on t i n ue t o  ho ld  on t o  t h e i r  anger  even after  t he deacon '  
i n tervent ion . I n  these cases ,  the deacon does not concede defeat but  pers isten t l y  
v i s i t s each s i d e  of t he d i spute u n t i l t he m atter i s  so l ved. I f  i n  fact t he deacon 
does fai l , and d i sputants cont i n u e  to refuse a l l  efforts at mediat ion ,  t he m atter 
i s  usu al ly  taken to the Vi l l age Court .  
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Invocation of the supernatural 
The influence of ancestors 
According to Kopi ( 1 979), ancestors in the spiritual world are seen as everyday 
partic ipants in fami ly l ife interacting with the l iving by punishing the l ineage 
when angered. Ancestors become offended and angry when a person is not 
fulfil l ing soc ial obligations correctly or has breached a taboo.4 One woman 
articulated the bel ief of al l those I spoke to on the matter saying, 'When the 
spirits see a person arguing or not behaving properly toward his or her relatives 
they wil l  spiritually "bel t" that person and he or she wi l l  become i l l  or have bad 
luck' . To Kopi, himself an eastern Motu, the physical world is seen as operating 
. . .  alongside an equally important spiritual entity [where] the central figure of man is 
seen to be conti nually interacting with place, plants and ancestral spirits which all 
have an influence on the affairs of the living and are capable, conversely, of  being 
manipulated to man's advantage. Feeling himself in the centre of a web of personal 
and spiritual relationships, the Barakauan [an eastern Motuan vi l lage] is first of all 
aware of the strong pull of his ancestors, who conti nually demand maintenance of 
social order, and stepping aside from this pul l  would result  in  i l lness or misfortune 
(Kopi 1 979: 1 7) .  
Prayer and invocation of the ancestors are the methods used by aggrieved 
members of the iduhu to induce i l l ness in the person who has caused them 
injury. Men's and women's statements indicate that nowadays when a Motu 
becomes i l l ,  whether adult or child, he or she wil l  first be taken to hospital for 
treatment. If the person does not recover within one or two weeks the doctors 
inform the family that they cannot fi nd the i l lness. Often the relatives bel ieve 
that they must 'work it out amongst themselves' .5 Within  thi s  context, all 
assume that the i l lness i s  the result of anger and relatives begin questioning 
the i l l  person about any outstanding disputes or disagreements . In response, 
an affl icted woman might say, 'I argued with uncle' . Her relatives, i ncluding 
the uncles, brothers, aunts and sisters of both the ai l ing woman and her husband 
are brought together for tikara. Once gathered, the husband asks everyone if 
they are conceal ing any anger or i l l  feelings against his wife and invites each 
person to confess their grievances. Some might say, 'I was cross because she 
didn 't  share the brideprice properly '  or 'I ' m  cross because I wasn ' t given 
enough money after I had contributed much more' or ' I ' m cross because she 
didn ' t  give me sugar when I asked for it ' . Some clai m  that they have no anger 
to confess.  Those who do confess to having harboured feelings of anger toward 
the woman wi l l  add, 'Now I don' t  feel this anger anymore' . A bowl of sea 
water, tadi, is passed from person to person as each of them call s  an ancestor's 
name while washing their hands. After everyone has confessed and washed 
SHAME, COMPENSATION AND THE ANCESTORS 3 1  
thei r  hands, the water i s  used to  bathe the unheal thy woman . Pita e t  al . have 
described the process of washing  hands as symbol is ing the washing away of a 
person 's anger and the anger of the ancestors ( 1 975 :6 1 ) . Church deacons are 
also present sometimes and, if so, do not wash the i r  hands but place them on 
the i l l  person and pray instead . I f, d uring  the process, the person who has 
harboured i l l  fee l i ngs releases h is  or her anger, recovery is expected to fol low. 
In si tuations when no improvement can be observed i n  the person's condi tion 
after a 'washing of hands' ceremony, a divi ner or babalau may be cal l ed in to 
ascertain who is  responsible for the continu ing  i l l  heal th. Babalau, also known 
as healers,6 are general ly women but males can also be healers (Kopi 1 979). 
After identifying the cause, the babalau 's task is  to restore the imbalance ' through 
confession or appeasement ritual s '  ( 1 979 :27).  The babalau 's explanation for 
the m isfortune or i l l ness w i l l  be put in to one of two categories ; ancestral anger 
or sorcery ( 1 979:25) .  Both the i l l  person and the relati ves bel ieve the babalau 
wi l l  d iscover the cause of the i l l ness through a physical examination and through 
consu l tation with the rel ati ves. During  consul tation, the rel atives are asked to 
pass c lockwise a clay bowl with a flame i nside unti l  the flame is extinguished . 
The rel at ive left hold ing the bowl when the flame d ies is considered to 'have 
access' to the ancestor who i nduced the i l l ness (Kopi 1 979). When the babalau 
finds that the i l l ness has been cau sed by ancestral anger, she w i l l  go to the 
ancestor's grave side and harangue him or her say ing ,  'Why are you not happy ? 
Why are you troubl ing h im?' 
I n  the past, ancestors also played an important role i n  the success of hiri 
expedi tions. A man first consul ted his wife before taking the decis ion to sponsor 
a hiri (Pita et al . 1 975 :98) and the behaviour of both men and women duri ng 
preparations for the journey and during the men's absence was critical to the 
s uccessfu l  outcome of the hiri. Men travel l i ng on the lakotoi vessel were 
considered helaga (endowed with the ' ri tual potency' of the l i neage) (Groves 
1 957 :42). They were therefore required to avoid certain foods, abstai n from 
sexual in tercourse and to avoid carefu l ly  al l people not i nvolved in the expedi tion 
(Rahobada and Rahobada 1 975 :99). The hiri sponsor and his wife were expected 
to avoid bath ing unt i l  the vesse l ' s  return (Moi 1 979). The leader's (baditauna) 
wife and the leader's helper's (doritauna) wife ,  as wel l as the crew members' 
wives were also obliged to follow rituals  related to food taboos, to practise sexual 
abst inence duri ng the absence of the men and to behave accord ing to custom. 
Duri ng i nterviews conducted i n  1 956,  two Tatana men,  Pekara Rahobada 
and Rahe Rahobada explai ned Motu expectations about reveal i ng anger: 
Because a woman behaves properly, her husband will not become i l l ,  and will 
not have a phys ico-spiri tual breakdown. They will l ive in rectitude, will not show 
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wroth j s ic J ,  and be correct . not act sense less ly, w i l l  not be loose. be dc\'otcd to 
her hu !:>bamL not q u arre l ,  becau�e shou!J she do :::.u c h ,  the house s p i ri ts wi l l  be 
wrath fu l [s ic J .  and bri ng a phys1 co-sriri tual breakJown ei ther on the woman.  or on 
the man of the h i ri ( Rahohada and Rahobada 1 975 . 1 05) .  
They further o u t l i ned Motu expectat ions about  reveal i ng wome n ' s  behaviour  
w h i c h  m i ght i mpact on the men and t he i r  safety. For e x ample .  i f  t he lakotoi wa� 
l a te return i ng ,  the hin crew 's  v. ives w ou l d  gather w h i le an elder man quest io ned 
the wom e n  to fi nd out  the c, use of the spi ri t s ' anger evidenced by the con t i n ued 
ab-;e nce of the men . The o l d  man urged the women to confess:  
Let  anyth ing of  your ha\' i ng �!cpl  together be revealed.  ) ou h:.i\' i ng slept w i t h  your 
hu sband at the t i me o f  sai l ing then now le t  i t  be publi shed.  then the lagolOi wi l l  be 
speedy ( R ahobada and R nhohada 1 97 - : J 09) .  
One of the women would  usually aJ m i t  her transgression say i ng .  ' Yes .  t ru ly. I 
have done wrong' , and she wa� sent from the /akotoi mat and another g i rl \ ·ho 
had not  t ra n s g res5ed w a s  cal l ed t o  j o i n  the other  women ( R ahobada and 
R ahob::ui� 1 975 : l 09 ) .  The s piri ts \\ ere then as ked to ensur e  the  safe arr ival of  
the h i  · i  bec�rn se the so urce of the i r  anger  had been ide n ti fied and corrected . 
Cpon t h e  return of the hiri, there \i\'as m uch danc in g and feast i ng .  However. 
Wo r ld War 11 bro ught an e n d  to hiri ex ped i t ions al though a few took p l ace i n  
t h e  1 950:-i .  The very bst hiri expedi t i o n  too k  place i n  1 96 1  (Gro\'es i 973 ) .  
Sorcery 
Ac�ord i ng to Kop i  ( 1 979) tht! u.;c of sorcery or mda7 by the Motu is not rand o m .  
The re i \  al way .: a re a s o n  or perce ived i nj ury wh ich prompts  resort to the 
d estructi ve powers of a sorce rer. I n terv i ews wi th  women i ndicate that the  use of 
\ •ada can resu l t  f1 om a percept ion that o ne has been shamed by another per  ... o n .  
A n y o n e  can h i re a sorcerer b u t  vada i s  not norm a i l y  u sed agai nst m rm am 
( clo�e d at i ves) .  The Motu state that trad i t iona l l)  t hey d i d  not  pract i se sorcc:ry 
thcm'-t!h e '> .  Whene\ er i ada wa� bel ie ved to be the cause of i l l ness.  m isfortu n e  
i n  li �h i n g ,  h u n t i ng .  or p oor � w p s  d u e  t o  l ack o f  rain .  rhey b l amed t he Koi tabu 
(Lawe ... 1 R75 ; 1 879 . ChLi imer� 1 980) .  The Motu also sent  for a Koi tahu :,orcerer 
t o  treat an ai l i ng person . I n t e n· i e \V S reveal  that  nowaday s many st i l l  seek the 
a�-. i !:-> cance uf tht. Ko itJbd .  
I n  the pas t people  h 1rea a sorcerer d uri i1g  dbputes i nvol ving : brideprice .  
wom en i n  re l at ilJn to  ad u l tery, land,  j ealousy about  h u n t i ng or  food prod u c t i o n ,  
as we1 1 a� t o  p u n i sh g aruen thi eves . Today, peop l e  bel i eve that t h e  u se of sorcery 
has i n c reased , po ssibly due to acce .... s to m odern fom1� of weal th and prest ige 
s uch as bu�i ness .  lhc acc u m u l at i o n  of money telev i s i o n ,  stereo e q u i p m e n t .  
out bo�rd m o t o rs , a good e d uc a t i o n  a n d  e m p loy me n t  opportu n i t ies . \loda ,  
v i l l agers 13X p l ar n ,  i �  used, n o t  to h e l p  soc iety. but  as a way ' to bri ng peop le 
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dow n · s i nce e levat i n g onese l f  i s  regarded b y  1otu peop l e  as an i nj ury . The 
: ·e ponse o f -;orce r) to the i nj u r  · cau sed by that e l evat i on , is a l s o  an i nj u r_'. I t  i s  
oft e n  u sed ag a i nst  people w ho are con s i dere d  to : 1 �1\'e weal t h  or to holJ a good 
pos i t i on in the 'Jovern ment or in a company. or C\ 'en aga i n  t tho"e who are 
cons idered :;ood workers .  netbo lI p l ayers . or sports men and wome n .  If some one 
has a goo d  house . or propert y, or a ' h i g h pos i t i on ' ,  or has a c h ' l d  w ho i �  
perform i ng \\ e l l  i n  choo l . i n terv i ewee e m pha: i sed that co 1TeSpl nd i n g l  1 ' there 
.m: peop l e who \\ �rnt to bri n g h i m  down · . Accord ing to one o l de r  w o m a n .  i n  
t h e  past o n l  · mdori (m ere ly i n t ended to cau se harm or i nj ti r)  ) . wa u ed w i th i n  
t h e  idu ll l i  a n d  c l os e  k i n .  W hen re l a t ives not iced ano ther ' s p 1 ogress in garden i ng , 
or beca me jeaiow over a no ther person 's ac4 u i  · i t ion of property.  or be · amc 
ang ry whe n  t hey be l ie ved that a re bt i \  e \\ as not sha1  i ng food r bridepr '  ce 
p w pc r l y . t hey m i g h t h i re a vadari taudia o r e t al i ate  dgai n s t  t he i r  i n." u ry 
>Jo\\' ad a _ ' s .  a ·cu�at i o n s  of n1da or wularii are u s ua l l ;  m ::ide when t h e \ i c.: t i m r 
h i · ur her fa m i l y  be l i e ve t ha t he \ i c t i m  ha · ,  ' frn. trated he \' bhe. o !' the 
.. 1 t t a  ker or ang e red him i n  some wa; · '  ( Kopi l 979 : _- 2  . Gl· ner""i l ! y. penplt: � �  y 
they  do not  d i re c t l y accu ·e e ac h o t her of sorc ery b u t  ma) m a k e  i nJ i r e t  
acr n sat i o n s  b _  gos ' i p 1 11g .  Ne, e rt he l ess . a n  Elevala V i l l age Cou rt 1ag i � trate 
he ard t wo c ases of �orce r. · bet ween .Jan u ary and A u g u s t  1 99 . S i nce t here '' �h 
l i t t l e  ev i d e n  · e  aga i n s t the de fe nda n t i n  one of t he ea ·es .  the m ag i :-- t ratt' a1J 
th�H he g ave h im a · 1 i g ht pena l ty ' by orJer i  ng h im not  to be ·ef'n in  Ele'  al  a at  
cert a i n t i m e s of the  n i gh t and not to go s i p i n  the  co m m u n i t y ( \V. r ekoi . 
1 99- L El e\':i la  Vi l l age Court Mag i strate , per · .  c om m . ) . I n  tht: sec rnd en e, t he 
defendan t  was fi ned K60 ( U S$-4 5 )  and w a s  g i ve n an orde r pre\'e n t i ng h i m  
from pa-. s i n g  t hrou g h certa i n areas o f  t h e  v i l l age . The defenJant  had bragged 
o a g roup of men that he p lan ned to sorceri se · pe r on and one of  the  1 1  e n  
repo r  e d  t he m �tter t o  t h e  Yi 1 1 ::ige Cou rt .  The E l eva l a Vi l l ag e  Cou rt Cha· rman 
i n d icated th�lt  h e  a l so d e a l t  w i th t hree sorcery cases i n  1 99- t I n  one case.  a 
woman t hre ate ned to u se sorcery aga i nst another woman after  acc u s i n g  her  of 
t ratern i � i ng w i th her h usband.  The secc nd case i n\ 'o l ve<l a woman ' ho a cu seJ 
another woman of u s i ng  sorcer� in a rugby match and in the t h i rd case , a 
woman threat�ned to sorcerise a m an for h i · s u spec ted ad u l ter) < K .  H e n i , 
1 99- L C h a i r m a n ,  E levul a Vi l l age Cour t ,  pers . com m . ) .  
Vi l l age rs SdY t h e) be l i eve that sorcery h as a negat i ve effec t  o n  t h e  com m un i ty 
as a \\  hol e .  They e rnpha i se that  i t  m ake� peo p l e fee l  fr i .:;h te n ed and � u ·,pi 1..· i o u s  
of one othe 1 . Peop l e a r e  ne\'er sure w h o m  t hey Ci.l n  rust  ar d whene 'er omeone 
Jies.  the i r fi rst t hough t s are of  sorcery and ot  who i s  re -;po ns i b le for t he deat h .  
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Shaming 
Hekarai and Turia dance: competitive feasting ceremonies 
One method of sett l ing  d isputes between men in the past was through 'competitive 
feast ing '  cal led hekarai, predi cated on rivalry (Sel igmann 1 9 1 0 : 1 44-5) and 
which publ ic ly shamed the loser. In  a man's purs u i t  of prest ige he would,  i n  
conversat ion,  compare the abu ndance of h i s  garden  w i th that o f  h is  rival 's .  
The two men,  general ly iduhu lohia, needed the support of thei r  iduhu and 
other fol lowers before u ndertaking a hekarai feast s ince they would  require 
assistance to conti n ue making gifts of food (bananas, yams and sugar cane),  
armshe l l s  and stri ng bags to thei r  r i val u n t i l one of them cou ld  no longer 
rec iprocate . Groves notes that the hekarai 'provide[d]  formal mac h inery for 
the prosec ution of a persona l  q uarrel to the poi n t  where one of the parties 
[was ] defeated by bankruptcy ' ( 1 954 : 8 1 ) . The man who won the compet i t ion 
was able to demonstrate h is  superior wealth,  ski l l ,  fol low i ng and access to 
ancestral powers ( 1 954 : 82) .  
The turia i n vol ved a mortuary feast ceremony compris ing  a series of dances . 
Danc i n g  demonstrated respect for ancestors who, i f  p leased , provided wel l ­
bei ng a n d  strength t o  t h e  iduhu. Turia m i ght a lso b e  used a s  a m ethod for 
sett l i n g an argument .  Al though conducted i n  respon se to a d i sagree ment w ith 
another man, Groves suggests that the turia did not provide any ' spec ial i sed 
mac h i nery for the prosecution of a q u arrel ' .  Instead,  it enabled a man's  socia l  
stan d i n g  to be reflected publ ic ly  s i nce turia was cons idered a ' trial of strength ' 
through dance. Dances were owned by iduhu and were performed i n  competi t ion 
with ri val s (Groves 1 954: 80-8 1 ) .  Reci procal presentat ions of bananas, bread 
and other foods were exchanged throughout the dance series extend i n g  over a 
period of two to three months (Belshaw 1 957 :  1 33-9) .  
The h eka rai  and tu ria fe asts  de c l i n e d  as  m o re m e n  e n tered w a g e  
employment a n d  there was less m an power t o  cont inue these trad i tional acti vit ies 
(Belshaw 1 957 ;  Chatterton 1 980) . The church also opposed the dances,  which 
in the ir  view led to sexual l i cense and adu l tery and, i n  turn , to q u arre l l i ng 
(Belshaw 195 1 ,  1 957 ;  Groves 1954). The churc h  ' suspen d ed membership'  
and w ithheld comm u nion  for those who part i c ipated in  the dances (Groves 
1 954 :85 ;  Sel igmann 1 9 1 0 : 1 33). 
Thi s  compet i t ive response to i nj ury appears to have been transl ated i n  the 
modern day i n to r ivalry between iduhus within  the c hurch.  The effect iveness 
of the iduhu system of leadersh i p  s lowly began to cru m b l e  fol lowi ng the 
i mpos i t i o n  of a v i l l age cou nc i l  system i n  1 926. The iduhu leadership system 
no longer fu nct ions as i t  did in the past but has reproduced itself in t he election 
of church deacons (Groves 1 954: 86-7) who are e lected every fou r  years by 
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their sub-iduhu members . A system under which deacons competed for status 
was introduced in 1 948 by a Motu pastor. The iduhu which col lected the most 
money for the church was g iven the Boubou Kwalim Toana fl ag to fl y 
symbol ising the achievement. The money collected from this annual gift-giving 
competition was used for the financial development of the church while the 
remainder was donated to chari ty. lduhu famil ies were encouraged to compete 
with other iduhu by giving gifts of food and money to the church and this 
practice has continued to the present day (Gregory 1 980) . Vi l lagers reveal that 
nowadays, pari shioners give their pastor quantities of food to last up to three 
months even though they are encouraged to give assistance for only one or two 
weeks. 
The Hiri trading expedition 
Since prestige was of such importance to Motu society, Groves i l lustrates how 
shame could motivate a man to challenge his adversary to a hiri: 
. . .  d i scussions of relative prestige constituted the major form of pol i tical  discourse. 
A man of hi gher prestige could usual ly si lence a lesser man comp letely, causing h im 
to wi thdraw i n  shame, by  referri ng to their relative performances i n  those enterpri ses 
that particu larly confer prestige (Groves 1 973 :  1 04) . 
Groves suggests that the main motive for sponsoring a hiri expedition was to 
attain prestige and social standing ( 1 973 :  1 04).  However, a man might also decide 
to sponsor a hiri expedition after being chal lenged by a man he had quarrelled 
with and who had taunted him 'for his lack of achievement in feast giving, 
[fishing] net making or undertaking hiri voyages' (Oram 1 982: 1 4) .  Both the 
'challenger and the chal lenged ' might then sponsor a hiri. 
Publicising accusations: harangue 
Tradit ional ly, a common response to an injury within Motu society involved 
the publ icat ion of an offence from the accuser's veranda (dehe). The accuser 
would shout out his or her accusation and make abusi ve speeches denouncing 
someone for offensive conduct (Groves 1 956;  Belshaw 1 957).  These quarrels 
between individuals soon became disputes between famil ies and iduhus, one 
denouncing the other. Groves indicates that people shouted irrelevanc ies at  
each other unti l an 'objective and disinterested ' third party intervened to support 
one side or the other. Once it was clear that publ ic opinion was lean ing heavi ly 
toward one side over the other, the losing party 'cut their losses' and wi thdrew 
from the argument. The dispute was then considered settled, with the losing 
side feel i ng pressured to withdraw out of shame (Groves 1 956 :242) .  In the 
case of an accusation of adultery, a man publ ished his al legation from the 
dehe, shouting invective and abuse for everyone to hear. If the woman's relatives 
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be l i ;:' e<l that  �he was g u i l ty they would  not respond abusively. In th is  s i tuat ion ,  
t h �  "'- i i1 of t h e  gui l ty \voman woul d  beat her, t herefore adm itt i ng the i r  ')hame. 
�ht"' w �h beaten by her kin for sham i n g  the fam i ly  reputat ion and for forc ing 
r h c m  to � ie l J  to the other s ide (Gro' es 1 956) .  
I n  rhe pa �r,  accord ing to Groves , a d i spute became a ' general tr ial  of strength ' 
bet\\·een t vo ' ad hoe fact ions'  w i th the stronger fact ion ord inari ly  end ing up as 
the \\· i n ner  no matter wh ich side was backed by 'j ust ice'  and ' truth' ( 1 95 6: 252-
3 ) . He sugge!)ts that the .Motu wou ld not support k i n  who were c learly to b lame 
for lhe  i n( 1de nt , a l though they usual ly  assu med that kin were bl amel ess u n less 
i t  \\'as i m pos i b le  to do otherwise such as when the ir  pos i t ion was i ndefens ibl e .  
\Vi th in  t h e  context  of importan t  confl icts ,  k i n  ordi nari l y  w i thdrew t he i r  support 
f r0 m  -,uch i n d iv idual s . 
... ccorJ i n g  to v i l l agers . haran g u i n g  wrong-doers to pub l ic i se i nj ur ies  
co n t i n ues .. ts a response to  i njury in  the modern day. Peopl e shout at the i r  rival s, 
· l t: t l l 1� g  oft : team ' in a pu b l i c p lace ,  and ' ge tt i ng out  the i r  frustrat ions '  by 
' Je c n b rn g  one another in i nsu l t i ng ways' thus ' putt i ng  the other s ide to shame ' .  
l n  the pa\ l ,  when v i l l ages were smal l er, and the iduhus closer. any shout i ng 
took p lace nearby. Nowadays, the ' i nj ured '  person and h i s  or her rel at ives 
t re4uc1H l)  �onfront rival s at the i r  residence i n  order to publ ic ise the transgression. 
\ \  nt.:re\ e r  � h at may be in the c i ty. Vi l lagers a lso say th�lt some peop le  now th ink  
that  t 1 1 e � e offences shou ld  be p u b l i c i sed i n  a more 'qu iet and Chr is t ian way ' by 
t . 1!-. 1 11 g �h� 1 1wtter to the Vi l l age Court .  
Th e u s e  uf court a s  a response to injury 
1\ n i nju reJ party w i l l  someti m es dec ide to pursue a reso lu t ion  to an i njury (and 
iherdore publ ic ise the ident i ty of the injurer) through the Vi l lage Court or District 
Court .  e spec i a l l y in adu ltery cases. An exam ination of Vi l l age Court data 
1Jen t i  fi e,  offe nces i..i n<l the c i rcumstances const i tu t ing  the offence.  
�loq d i sputes com ing before the Vi l l age Court from Eleval a  v i l l age are 
�e t t l ed t h rough mediat ion .  Based on the records exami ned from January to 
ept e m be r  1 99-+ Elevala Vi l l age Court hears on average t hree or four cases 
e a c h  \\ e e k . "  Acc ord i n g to E l eva la  Vi I l ag e  C o u rt M a g i s t ra te s ,  m an y  
co 111 p l a i nantl\  do not fee l  happy w i th the amount  o f  compensation  ordered i n  
re la t ion t n  adu l tery charges and often appeal  the i r  cases to the Local Court 
'> i nce the max imum pena l ty a Vi l l age Court can i mpose i s  K I OOO (US$750) or 
'-ix month in ja i l .  Adu l tery cases are a lso handled by the Distr ict Court in 
Port !\ lore b) . When Motu men and women are not sat i sfied w i th the court 
re u l t .  t h e  m atter  i s  not  see n as so l ved and,  accord i ng t o  Dist r i c t  Court 
!\bg i strates .  �omet imes ends up i n  the l ay ing  of formal assau l t  charges re l ated 
t 11 doines t ic  v io lence. 
Injuries within the family9 
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There are .- trong �xpectat ion , ab<)Ut appropri<  te conduct for both hu band 
and w i \'eS .  These expectat ions relate to household chores .  the care of chik ren 
and . in the a e of wives. to the care of and obedience to i n- l aw . E pect..i.tion 
ex i st i n  re lat ion to the husband\ abi l i ty i n  the modern day to pro\' ide an i nco:1 e 
for the care of hi w i fe and fami l) .  Social obl igat ions al so exist i n  the f rm of 
contri but ions for brideprice and funeral payments .  Al though a hu-.band wa · 
permi tted to d iscipl i ne h is  wife for fai l i ng to behave as expected . i t  \\ a. not 
consi dered leg i t imate for him to mi treat her habi tual ly or mal i c iou. ly (Bd ha\\. 
1 95 7 } and i n  such case a woman cou ld return to her relat ives \\ h i !e  t 1e i nju ry 
wa'> being settled between the two fam i l ies .  S i nce young married couple usu. l ly 
l i ved with the hu  ·band's parent� (and often sti l l  do) the wife '  re l rit iord1 ip  wi h 
the in- laws played a ign ificant role i n  fami ly harmony. 
Disagreements often lead to the i n- l aws l isti ng a wife 's  defic ienc ie · t t' her 
and agai n to the i r  son. S tatements made by both young and old · i l l ager.: in 
1 994 ind icate that when the wife quarrels  with her i n- laws, her h u  banJ  '' i l l 
sometimes react angri ly and w i l l  beat her i n  support of his parent . rgument� 
may occur when the i n - l aws perceive that  a wife has not shown th 1 1  I roper 
respec t ,  when she argues wi th  them,  goss ips about them to othe r ·  or i 
di ·obedient .  A wife may return to her own re l at ives i f  tensions between ll�r · e t · 
and her husband or i n - laws lead to arguments and v iolence.  
Destruction of property 
Strathern ( 1 988)  argues that a l l  property is considered an exten � i on of the 
per on who owns it and this i mpl ies that the de truct ion of a per'>on · · pn r erty 
is equ i valent to a phy ical attack on that person .  Thus, in d isputes \ 1h ich takt 
pl ace between c lose relat ives ,  members d i  p lay re tra int ,  and attack l he i n j u rer·. 
property i n stead of the per on, h im or her ·elf. 
I n  Hanuabada th is  response m ight also have been appl ied to 'out iders · 
i n  case of adul tery .  Older Motu v i l lagers explai ned that i n  the pa , whe 1 
adul tery occurred, the men of the iduhu destroyed the male adu l terer' hou e 
and property w i th axes . In such cases, i t  was explained. the re lat i v  · of the 
adu l terou. man d id noth ing to protect the man or hi property si nce tlk) ' k ne\\ 
he was i n  the wrong' . The adu lterous wife was also pun ished for he bel m" our  
and might even be k i l led by her husband i f  caught m the act ,  or she w ,  , beat n 
or si mply sen t  away by het husband (Sel igmann 1 9 1 0 : 80) . 
In the modern day, women report that an adu l terous wife w i l l  usual l )  be 
a · saulted by her angry husband who w i l l  a lso de troy property i r  the hou.:e .  
Most o f  the v i l l agers I i nterviewed from Poreporena and Elevala i n  ! 99-t aid 
that destruct ion of property s ti l l  takes p lace in cases of adu l tery. Some argued 
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the inc idence had increased because of a corresponding increase in the incidence 
of ad u l tery.  They s ugges ted i n  exp l ana t i on  tha t  young  g i r l s  tod ay 
are attracted to married men, especially those with money. When a married 
man is observed to be in the company of a young woman, relatives or other 
community members wi l l  often inform his wife .  Frequently, the wife and her 
relatives respond by attempting to destroy the other woman's property in her 
house. 
The use of destruction of property to express anger toward kin or others 
perceived to have committed an injury is evidenced in the statistics from Elevala 
Vi l lage Court between January and September 1 994. The statistics ind icate that 
out of 1 3  cases of destruction of property, seven occurred between close kin . 
Four cases involved the destruction of publ ic property or beer bottles, one case 
involved the destruction of the property of a betel nut sel ler and one case was 
unclear. Both the Vi l lage Court Magistrates interv iewed indicated that the 
motives cited for the offender's actions included : adultery, quarrels between 
husband and wife, quarrels between father and son , between grandfather and 
grandson , and a wife destroy ing her husband's gi rlfriend 's property. 
Mr Hekoi (Vil lage Court Magistrate) explai ned that he dealt with property 
damage offences invol ving the destruction of public walkways or of a parent's 
property often resulting from arguments within a fam ily. He suggested that 
men frequently react when they are angry by destroying thi ngs (often wal ls  or 
household goods) whether the property is owned by their parents, their wife or 
themselves. 
Fights between women 
My research indicates that nowadays women argue over household issues such 
as the unfai r di stribution of food or brideprice, another woman's  perceived 
' greed' in taking more than her fair share of food, perceptions that a ' l azy ' 
woman has fai led to do her share of the work or because of jealousy over 
suspected adul tery wi th husbands. Except for jealousy, these disputes usual ly 
result in the women bickeri ng with one another or spreading gossip about the 
others. Often though, there wi l l  simply be tensions between them. 
Older woman say that in the past women argued about many of the same 
things but al so over suspected theft from gardens, the use of water from the 
water hole, and firewood . A further common source of friction between women 
was sexual jealousy. 
Sexual jealousy 
In the past, when a man committed adultery, his wife often attacked the other 
woman and 'bashed ' her. Belshaw ( 1 957) argues the continuing support of the 
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in-laws was cruc ial to marital stabi l i ty. If the husband's parents bel ieved his 
wife was a 'good wife'  they would advise her to stay with him regardless of 
his acts of adul tery. Older vi l lagers explained that a wife's relatives agreed to 
her remaining with her husband only when they were sure she had the support 
of her in-laws, if not, they would take her back.  One older Poreporena woman 
explai ned that in responding to the injuries caused by an adul terous wife, 
sometimes in -laws would hi re a sorcerer to cause her i l lness or to guarantee 
fai lure in her family 's attempts to find her another husband . She suggested 
that sorcery was used to retal iate because of the great shame the woman had 
brought to the man's family, indicati ng their assessment of the scale of injury. 
Resort to sorcery, as a response to a woman's  act of adultery, she said, was 
dependent on the amount of brideprice paid and therefore to the degree of loss. 
Women indicate that nowadays many women continue to attack other 
women who show interest in their husband . When a wife suspects a woman 's 
in tentions she wil l  usual ly attack her in publ ic,  either by verbal ly insulting her 
or by physical ly attacking her. One Poreporena woman revealed how, when 
she discovered her husband and a woman together in the bedroom of her house, 
she chased her husband's girlfriend out of her house wi th a knife. On another 
occasion, she said she went to the store where the woman was worlcing and 
attacked her, causing her to fall to the floor. 
Gossip and insults 
Gossipi ng is both an injury and a response to injury. Women 's statements 
suggest that when they hear reports that a person is goss iping about them or 
their fami ly, they often directly confront the offender, although they must also 
bear in mind the relationships invol ved . This is because at times it i s  cons idered 
inappropri ate to confront an individual in the presence of others , thereby 
creating add itional injuries, since the confrontation may insult those witnessing 
as well as the person who has original ly caused injury. Some respond by 
sol iciting the support of others, and in retal iation, wi l l  spread gossip about 
their opponent. 
Summary 
The Motu appear to j udge conduct within the context of marital and kin 
relationships and according to expectations for acceptable conduct in each. Motu 
leadersh ip, marital practices and trading expeditions provide the cultural context 
for the Motu emphasis on the supernatural , i l lness, and on relationships withi n 
the iduhu and amongst close kin in the ir responses to injury. There is a spiritual 
dimension to injury, as the ancestors play a significant role, both in  the creation 
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of i njuries and i n  the reconc i l i at ion process.  The compet i t ive nature of Motu 
soc iety means that i njury often resul ts from envy, jealousy and v is i ble d i �play 
of greater wealth or status which lead to attacks on reputat ion through shaming 
or sorcery. 
The Bena 
Background 
The area known as Bena i s  located east of the town of Goroka and i s  occupied 
by two groups of people :  those l iv i ng  i n  the forested Upper Bena (man bilong 
bus) and those l iv ing i n  the grasslands of the Lower Bena (man bilong kunai) . 
I n  the 1 990 census a total of 2 1 ,2 1 8 people were l iv i ng i n  the Bena area 
occupy i ng a total l and area of 6 1 9  ki lometres (National Stat i st ical Office 1 993 ). 
Bena are hort i cu l tur i sts and d i v ide themse lve · i n to approx i mately 65 
separate tribes  (Langness 1 967) . Each tribe consists of three to seven J i stricb 
and each d i st ri c t  is made up of two to fi ve patr i l i neal exogarm u� c lan s .  
Trad it ional ly, a d istrict was the largest socia l un i t  recogn i sed by  the Bena  and 
accord ing to Kei l ,  this group 'defined the boundary between inter-group confl ict 
(warfare with bows and arrows) and i ntra-group confl ict  (fi ghti ng with sticks) ' 
(Ke i l  1 974:22) .  According to Langness, the most important pol i t ical group 
wi th in  the Bena social structure i s  the c lan (Langness 1 964 ) . Clans may help 
each other in warfare i f  they belong to the same dis t rict, however. suspic ion of 
sorcery between clans  often consti tutes grounds for not ass ist ing .  
A clan i s  div ided further i nto several sub-clans who trace the i r  nn1...estry to 
one of the sons of the c lan founder (Langness 1 967) .  The sub-c Ian d i v ides 
aga in  i nto l i neages that are effect iYely extended famil ies .  In ternal co-operat ion 
w ithin the l i neage i s  most pronounced, and accord i ng to v i l lagers.  i n  the modern 
day the l i neage has taken on even greater importance. Marriage i exogamous 
as the Bena may not marry with in  the i r  own c lnn or the mother's sub-c lan .  
Langness ( 1 969) considers that res idence is  a n  important determ inant of Bena 
ki nship in  that adopted chi ldren may not marry i nto the c lan of thei r adopted 
parents nor can they marry refugees res id ing  w i th the c lan ,  i ndicat i ng  that 
both adoptees and refugees are ideaJ ly  absorbed in to the c lan as fu l l  mem bers . 
A Bena leader or big-man (gipina) was described by Langne'is as ' a  man 
with a name' (a man with a reputat ion) (Langness 1 97 1 ) . Gipinu.� bui l t  thei r  
reputations almost exclusively on thei r  abi l i ty a s  warriors and  prowess i n  warfare 
and a reputat ion for having k i l led many men was a crucial qual i ty i n  leadership.  
A gipina bui l t  up a fol lowing amongst as many of h is  kinsmen, age-mates, and 
trad ing friends as possible ,  thus constructi ng an extens ive network of personal 
relat ionships with in the sub-clan ,  c lan , d i strict and outside the d iqrict so that 
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h i s  name was known and therefore h i s  power  and i n fl uence (Langness  
1 97 1  : 3 1 2) .  He did thi s by contributing  toward brideprice, death and i n i t iation 
ritual payments for both affines and cognates, sustain i ng trade relationships, 
offeri ng  support to other gipinas in war, or by offering  bribes or presents .  
Support i ng  re lat ionships had to be main tai ned s ince wi thout sustenance a 
gipina 's fol lowers would lose fai th i n  h i s  abi l i ty as a leader and would no 
longer support his point  of view or al low themsel ves to be persuaded by i t .  
There was no cen tral i sed authority and often several gipinas ex isted in a clan. 
They frequently disagreed with one another and competed in the recru i tmen t 
of fol lowers (Langness, 1 97 1  :3 1 3) .  The real balance of power, i t  seems, was 
held by the fol lowers, who could  decide at any t ime to w ithdraw their  support 
for a part icu lar gipina causi ng his eventual dec l i ne, transferring  the i r  support 
to another gipina whom they considered stronger and more successfu l .  S trength 
was an important factor in the dec i sion to associate with an ind ividual or a 
group. As Langness puts i t :  
Phy i c a l  pow e r, b o t h  i n  i n d i v i du a l s  and  groups  i s  res pected ,  va lued a n d  
ad mired . . .  There i s  n o  notion of a n  underdog . .  . l f  a group i s  strong i t  i s  a lso good. 
People respect it and are eager to join and be i dent ified with it .  Converse ly, i f  a 
group-or a person-is weak it is not good. The expectation is to be dominated, if not 
destroyed, by the strong ( Langness 1 973 :  1 54 ) . 
There was also a 'meri bUong tok ' or ' woman of talk '  (gipinae) who was 
chosen b) the women of the community and who represented their  views and 
i nterests to the men (Dickerson-Putman 1 986). In  the v i l l ages I researched, 
older women referred to female leaders gagay 'ae.  A gagay 'ae was chosen for 
her exemplary character and gave advice to women part icu larly when disputes 
arose bet\.\een them.  However, she had no powers to decide punishments or 
compen at ion sett lements as that was the 'job of men ' . 
There i a c lear di sti nction i n  Bena responses to i nj uries from outside the 
clan and \\ i th in  the clan . In the past, retal iat ion, w ithout restrictions or controls ,  
was the response to an i nj ury from outside the clan . Within the clan, 'physical 
viol ence· m ight be used to respond to i nj ury but i t  was control led i n  most 
cases. Central features i n  Bena soc iety are respect for strength and making 'a 
name' which are essent ia l ly identical i n  that the latter flows from the former. 
Th is respec.:t for strength is consistent  wi th the Bena approach to outs iders in  
that there was l i t t le  sense of compromise .  Strength was  also measured i n  
procreat i ve abi l i ty a s  refugees were taken i n to the c lan to supplement  i ts 
numbers .  
I n  terms of leadership, the Bena  would on ly  support those who demonstrated 
strength as successfu l  fight leaders in warfare . A gipina could not assume that 
he wou ld retai n leadership and was requ ired constantly to demonstrate success 
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and affi rm h i s  a l l i ances w i thi n the c lan.  The trans i tory nature of leadership 
was reflected wi th in  the c lan as c lan members were not able to count on others 
for support in d i sputes but had to sol i c i t  the ir  assistance and support act ively. 
I n  essence therefore, the Bena rel ied on c lan re l at ionsh ips to strengthen their 
pos i t ion in d isputes . Yet ,  relat ionships could al so be the cause of d isputes.  
Leadersh ip was related to making ' a  name' and al leg iances were g iven on the 
basi s  of self- i n terest and se l f-promotion .  
The Bena are a people who demonstrate their fee l i ngs  through acts .  If 
i njured they respond actively and confront the i ssue. They are not so much 
concerned w i th i nqu i ries  as to the tru th of  an a l legat ion ,  as they are with 
respondi ng to i t  immed iately, i n  order to resol ve breakdowns in relat ionships 
caused by an i nj urious act .  There is a lso an element of shame attached to a 
received i njury, i n  that an accusat ion against another has the effect of ' spoi l i ng 
one's name' or reputat ion amongst c lan members and this m ust be addressed 
i mmediately in  order to maintain one's name. Further, a fai l ure to respond to 
a perce ived injury would be construed by others as a d isp lay of weakness. Al l 
these pressures combi ne to ensure that responses to i nju ry are swift and 
effective. For example, the act of s imply identify i ng a garden thief was suffic ient  
to warrant confrontat ion .  The main focus was the resol ut ion of the i nj ury and 
not its cause .  
Both i nter and i n tra-c lan d i sputes were publ i c  affairs i n  the past and remain 
so today. The objective i n  intra-c lan d i sputes was to organ i se support for that 
part icu lar di spute or i nj ury and this could only be ach ieved in a pub l ic  forum .  
Although violence could resu l t  from i ntra-clan responses to  i nj ury, t he  level 
of 'physical v io lence' was constrained and mediation by leaders would occur 
whenever the response was considered excessive. 
There i s  a constant emphasis on action and the Bena appear to assess and 
j udge the qual ity of others by the acts of those persons  rather than by any 
other criteria. For example, methods of identify i ng sorcerers con t inue to centre 
on the behav iour and appearance of others and if new c lothes or u nu sual 
behaviour are d i splayed at the t ime of mourn i ng these are considered to be 
i nc rim i nati ng evidence of sorcery. Tradi t ional ly, sorcery was used only against 
enemies, but today appears to have developed a use wi th in  the clan especia l ly 
to ' br ing people down ' who are perceived to have achieved more wealth and 
status and therefore as having caused injury by elevat ing themselves. Thi s  
may also have resu l ted from a weaken ing of c l an  cohesion due to  the process 
of change, i nc luding i ncreased mobi l i ty and a reduction in warfare, which has 
led to a correspondingly greater emphasis on the l i neage. Greater access to 
education and weal th have created new i nj uries which also requ i re a response.  
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The Bena admire women who d isp lay qual i t ies of strength, determi nation, 
and si ngle-mi ndedness.  Women were trad i t ional ly expected to fi ght each other 
over men in  response to the ir  i nj ury and, i n  the eyes of men and women, th is 
cons t i t uted a d i sp l ay of streng th  which earned respec t .  Conve rse l y, not 
re pond ing would i ndicate weakness and the woman and her husband ( in the 
sense that they were an in terdependent un i t) would suffer a l oss of reputat ion .  
Today, some women do not be l ieve that  v io lent ,  physical confrontat ions between 
women over men is acceptable behaviour. They look to al ternat ives such as 
returning to their fam i ly, goi ng to court ,  i nvol v ing the church in a med iat ion 
role ,  or d i rectly rai i ng the issue wi th the offending woman in  ' the Christ ian ' 
way. Women have a para l le l  support system to that of men involv ing other 
women on a rec iprocal bas is  when respond ing to injury such as accusations of 
adu l tery. Violence towards women by men is prevalent in the domestic phere, 
espec ia l ly  when a husband suspects that h i s  wife has fai l ed to di charge her 
responsi bi l i t ies and has therefore caused the reputation of the husband and wife 
as a un i t  to d imin ish .  I n  tradi t ional  t imes there were constraints on the level of 
domestic violence and many of these are s ti l l  operati ng today. 
Compensation is a major form of response to injury and there are many 
instances where compensation is expec ted . It is s ign ificant that an offer of 
compensat ion is seen as an admission of l i abi l i ty as th is  resol ves the i ssue of 
responsib i l i ty for an i njury. At the same t ime,  payment of compensation requires 
a correspond ing payment by the v ic t im,  al though the amount is less. The acts 
of giv ing and receiv ing compensation are a v is ib le and external recogni t ion of 
the re lat ionships i nvol ved in  the exchange and are a lso an acknowledgement 
that both sides have suffered inj ury. They a lso represent a demonstration of the 
good i ntentions of the giver s ince the Bena j udge in tent ion by act and behaviour. 
Responses to injury 
I n  Bena, the nature of response to inj u ry i s  dependent upon the re lat ionships 
i nvo lved between the i njured party and the injurer and d iffers according to 
whether the i njury occurs within the c lan ( i n tra-c lan) or between c lans ( i nter­
c lan) .  However, in ei ther case the response is direct, as between c lans, or between 
clan members. In ter-c lan re lat ionships were characteri sed by warfare , sorcery, 
some trad ing, and the development and mai ntenance of reputat ions .  In the 
present day, warfare and sorcery conti nue,  w i th the latter, together wi th the 
use of poison, bei ng employed to ' bri ng down'  those caus ing i njury by creati ng 
i nequal i t ies between people .  I n tra-clan  rel at ionships were i n terdependent and 
concerned w i th ensuring group surv ival , and members who had been inj ured 
might resort to di rect 'physical v iolence' i n tend ing to wound rather than to 
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h l l .  The pay m e n t  of  1.. ompen a t ion  wa · .  and re m a i n s .  a m ajor fac t or in the 
re ol u t i J n of i nj u r ie� .  
• l jo f  e r  t ,  responses i n t e r-cl a n  
The object i \ 'e o f  warr i n g \\ i t h  e nemy gro up: ap pears t o  h ave b e e n  to  an n i h i l ate 
a -.. many me mbers a ·  poss i b le �o that  the e nemy wou ld be �ubstant ial l y  weake ned 
and th � re fore of no t hreat to . u r v i val  i n  fu t ure ( Lan g ness 1 9 7 1 ) .  
L ui ·a :  ·Fights against t ru e  enemies ' 
\\'a1 r�re < !um) \\ as ende m ic and v. aJ" were fou g h t  w i t h  ne i g hbou ri n g d i s tr i\: ts  
\1. h i d  cou l d  u u a l l y  be reac hed w i t h i n  a ' few hours ·  ( Ke i l  1 9 7..t J .  Ke i l  s ugge ts  
t h at  i \\ � b  . 01 ·ea-., i b l e  to fi g h  \\ i t h group;; v. ho w e re ' t0t. fo r away to fi g h t ·  
\.i i  nee he form o f  warfare \\ as u n a b l e  to sus t a i n  e n d u ri n g  cam pa i g n  req u i r i n g 
1 ul1d re -..en e.., a nd o her · u pp l i e . I ns tead . warfare wa · characteri  ·ed by � nea.k 
·1 ' l ac k 1.., and � k r r m i  he · d e 1:, i g n ed t � tre ng t he n a c I a n ·  po: i t ion and weaken 
n e i g hhr >tiri n� t:nemy c l an s  before they were ab l e to ac t fi rst  ( Ke i l  1 974 ) . S tronger 
c l a n  Hrc part i u l ar l)  tar  �eteJ . forced out  a n d  the i r \ i l l ages d eva tated ·o that  
th ·'� cou Id n H ea� i I� return < La ng ness 1 97 l ). La ngn ess character i se. Bena · ty ie  
wa fare a .... u me!'tr i 1...· �ed  i n  that  t here were n o  formal ru les  l I 96...f : l -l 2 J .  :vten from 
d i f  ·e re n t  I a n · ·1 1 I i ed t he m  e l ves temporar i l  · to fi g h t  ( L a n g n e  · · 1 97 1 ) bu t m e n  
<l cc i J e d  h e rn se h  e� a bo u t whet h e r  o r  n o t  t hey wou l d  fi gh t i n  a n y  a t t ac k  
<lepe n d i n g  on t h e · L1! i on �h i p : i n \' l ved . 
The re \ ere \, lJ t: 1 es of fig h t i n g . s m a l l - :ca le  a i d i n g  and l arger- sca l e wars . 
) m a l l - c a l e  ra i d i n g  o · c u rred typL.. a l l y  ove r. ·� us p i i o n  o f  :c rcery , t h e f t  of 
\\  c 1 m � n  o r  p i g  . an arg u m e n t  m er the owner hip of  trees and per. o n a l  d i s pu t es 
o f  ar iou�  k i n d ( re urn ( Lan g ness 1 97 I :  ""O J. A man u u a l l y  sought su pport 
ru m h i -.. affi n e�.  fr i en d · .  t hose w i th out: tan d i n g  obl i g at i o n s  to h i m  and tho e 
\\ ho h ad :-; >me qu arre l w i th the targeted g roup. On!) gipinas \ ere c apab l e  of 
mob; l i � i n g  l arge gro up · o f  supporter� and they provoked t he l arger w �w .  O ften 
t h e <-.e war \\ ere lr i  •e n by the �ipina ' s  se l f- i n tere: t  i n  persorn.11 revenge w h i c h  
c o u l d e re i t e  i n � t ab i l i t y w i t h i n t he c l an and i n  re l a t i o n  bet \ een  d i s t r i c t s  
( D i ckerso n - P u t m a n  1 9 86) .  
E n t i re group were ·ome t i me s dest royed.  Us ua l l y. however, ra id.' e n ded 
af te  · o n l :t  one or a . e\l.· death;; had occu rred (Langness 1 964 ) .  The Bena ea e 
appe.ir-., . i m i l ar to t h a  ou t l i ned for E nga t ri ba l  fig ht i ng by W. E. Wonn · Jey : 
l:. n g a  co lcc i vc o f  fi gh ts  not as problem� ( or cri mes )  but  as a solu t ion to o t h e r  
pr blc rw .. 3n I not as threats  to order bu t a.: :.it tcmpt� to res tore order '  ( 1 98: :6 1 )  and 
the  · · 1pp l i .:- a t i on t>f f m:c is de s i gned Lo promote se l f- i n tere s t  or  g roup i n teres t  
( \\'orm. le1 1 9  - :6-;' )  
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Wi t h i n  t h i s  trad i t i ona l  framework. v i o l e n  e through warfare 3nd sorcery i n  
b e  t h  B e na a n d  E n g  a soc i e t i e  become� '1 de l i  berate s t r  tegy fo r a t t;.i i  n i n g  
po l i t i ca l  objec i ves ( \\'orm � l ey I 9 8 5 : Appe n d i x  I :  1 8  ) .  The pretcxr�  t or fu l l  
s ·a le  warfare i n  B e n a  i n  l u JeJ : 
To avenge a deat h .  t h e ft of a \\ oman or p ig  ( and other  t h i ng:- t h � l  mat te 1 1 .  f.1 i 1 u rc 
to ru t li l  an e x change ub l i gat ion .  rape. and . much more i mportant pc rhap . .  a l mo l 
an� Jcat h othu than t hose from old age or acci de n t .  I n  the , se of death other than 
from th l .n t c r  c.1u cs .  the dc:.llhs �l r e  :.ittri butcJ to sorcery ' �  h i ch the Ben l c i te '  c .  
a hLI) � L·umc from ou t s i de t h t.!  c l :.rn .  Such death a l mu::.t i m a r i a b l �  re u l t d i n  
light ing  ( Langnes' 1 %-t : l -t2 ) .  
O l der ma k:-; affi rmed that \Var· were m a i n l y  fo ught over arg u m e n b  about 
p i g ·  and women and ·om .... t i mes gan1en 10 w h i l e  everyone fought  O\'er Jent l 
at tr i buted lO sorcery. Re i �  t i onsh ips between ne igh bour ing  g roup� we r� frag i k  
and co u l d  ch�rnge between act i ve ho. t i l i ty. a l l i ance.  and · ac t h e  non -ho�t t l i t _  · 
( Ke i l  1 97.+ : 8 5  ) .  Groups w i t h i n  a 20 to 30 m i le rad i u  · we re pote n t i a l a l ! i e -.,  and 
e nem ic: and at  d i ffer e n t  t i mes they co u ld be bot h s i nce ' ho. t i l i t �  and a l l i a nce 
l \vere ] fl u i d  rather than  r ig id ' ( 1 9 74 :99)  
S u r\ ' in.1rs of attac k · became re fugees . The i r  n u m ber red u ·ed . t h  �)  co u l d  
not  ret u rn  to the i r  l a nd beca u se t he i r  r i l l ag e .  p i g s  and  g arde n h:-1d bee n 
c u m p l e t e l :  d e s t ro y e d  a n d  because of t h e i r  weakened po s i t i  ) n .  R e fudee 
\\ ere taken i n  by other g ro ups where t h ey were we lcomed for th b • ne ti t 
J e ri vcd fro m i n cre .. i n g  t h e  g ro u p ' s  s t re n g t h  ( i n c l u d i ng fi g h t i n g  ' t rc n g t h .  
s tre n g t h  1 11 women a n d  t herefore i n  i ncreas .d product ion  and more ch i ldren ) 
( Ke i l  1 9 7-t ) .  
Langness .:> Uggests t hat Bena  had no lo ng-term pol i t ica l  p urpo ·e  for marriage 
( 1 96) . �-m.  They waged war w · t h most  g ro ups  wi th in  the i r  ranse of c i n u.i...: t  
and \\' i ves  \\ ere o ften  o btai n ed from t hose same gro ups ur i n g  t i me� of · ac t i \ e  
n o n - host i l i t y '  ( Fort u ne 1 9-t. 7 ) . M arriage prov i Jed the mec h a n i s m  for tempo1-. r: 
� l l i an 1... e · between c lan.· but  these mergers were i m permanent  t lang nes  · 1 97 _' J . 
A l e  hough some re:earcher · have l i n ked marriage � n <l warfore ( a l i sbury 1 96 2 : 
Megg i t  1 9 7 7 l .  Pod o l e f · ky l l 9 t1 4 )  r g u e  t h at t here i s  n o  d i re t c au s a l  
re Ll t i un s h i p between t h e m  desp i te a ' st ro n g  a soc i at i o n  · .  , Tevert h t: l e  s ,  h e  
concede� t hat one cou l d  argue that.  · . . .  m arriage e ta b l i �hes ;i so ' ia l  re la t ion  ... h i 1  
w h i  h a c.t  pri m ari l y  as :.i cu11srraim u p o n  t h e  cxpan · ion  o f  a d i spute ' : t hat t h e  
affi ncs of both groups play an  i m portant  ro l e  i n  re i nstatmg pc:a e a nd that  ' th 
freq uency of m arri age .  r dens i ty of the web [of affi na l  re l at ion  between t lw 
t wo g roup� Jnd the i r  a l l i e s ] ,  i s  re l ated to efficacy of c n fl i ct ma n agl! men 
proce. :es '  ( Podolefsky 1 9  ' - k 7  my em phas i s ) .  E v e n  though w�rfare i t  e l f  o u l J  
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not be prevented through the establ i shment of marital ties, such ties, if there 
were enough of them, could act as a constraint on i ts conti nuation . S ince the 
interests of the two groups were so intertwined , the chances of a d ispute 
escalating to the point of warfare would be greatly dimin ished. Relationships 
establ ished through marriage were acknowledged on the battle ground. Fortune 
outl ines how women, who might easily have brothers and fathers on one s ide 
and husbands and fathers-in-law on the other, were afforded ' neutral rights' 
which allowed them ' an acknowledged right to immune passage between the 
lines ' .  Thus, if a woman was on her brother's side at the culmination of the 
battle and her brothers were winni ng, she was expected to cross over to her 
husband's side to assist in carry ing val uables (such as pigs and shell-money) 
away for safe-keep ing (Fortune 1 947: 1 09) .  
It is  d i fficult to trace the orig in  of Bena tribal fi ghts to a single event. 
Typical ly, the two sides have a hi story of fighting and any one event will feed 
into a series of events which contribute to the perception of injury. I l lustrative 
of such a hi storical re lationship invol v ing past host i l i t ies ,  five young men 
from one Lower Bena vi l lage between the ages of 1 8  and 32 described an 
ongoing dispute they were having with a neighbouring clan over land . The 
land their grandfather had first cult ivated 50 years earl ier was being claimed 
by another clan and the two clans had fought as recently as the previous year. 
They suggested that part of the problem was that they were perceived as more 
affl uent by the other clan and that the land dispute was motivated by 'jealousy ' .  
The di spute had been taken to Goroka Land Court I 0 years before at which 
time the current res idents were g iven a restrai ning order permitting them to 
stay. The enemy clan,  however, had not accepted the court dec is ion and 
continued to harbour a grudge . 
According to these men , the dispute was played out in many ind irect ways. 
Many incidents, in their view, were attributed to their enemies and were designed 
to inci te a fight. They l isted incidents of garden theft, missing items from houses, 
damage to houses, fights over sport ing events and , more seriously, insults and 
threats made while drinking at the local club (for example, suggestions that 
their wives would be raped or were committing adultery). All incidents were 
attributed to the dispute over land and jealousy. The men bel ieved that the enemy's 
jea lousy could be attributed to their having better housing, more gardens and 
more material possessions than the other c1an. So far, they claimed ,  they had not 
retal iated , although they had, on occasion, started fights with enemy members at 
the village club as a 'way of paying them back' .All incidents were well remembered 
and the men said when their ' l imit '  was reached they would be forced to respond. 
When asked what that l imi t  was, they suggested that if anyone touched their 
wive or if their houses were destroyed they would certainly retal iate . 
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Another modern day example, provided by a woman from the Lower Bena, 
i l lustrates the degree of 'physical v iolence' sometimes used in tribal fighting 
and the way violence i s  employed to insult and taunt an enemy. Two clans had 
been fighti ng for several months over land and men had been lcil led on both 
sides . To retal iate , men from one clan captured a young man from the enemy 
clan . The woman said this man had a reputation for ' tallcing too much' (in other 
words of being provocative in his crit icism of the enemy over the land issue). 
Before ki l l ing him, she explained , the men cut the captured man's mouth by 
cutting around his jaw and sent the message that 'he would talk no more' . 
Sorcery 
Integral to the Bena response to al l unexpected deaths was the perception that 
death was caused by an enemy clan's sorcery. Some deaths, however, were not 
attributed to sorcery including an ' i rresponsible' person's death or the death of 
an old man considered to have died from ' natural ' causes (Trompf 1 994). 
Nevertheless, Langness suggests that incessant suspicions of sorcery combi ned 
with a history of deaths and 'payback' ki l l i ngs, worked to sustain ' the cycle of 
v iolence and ki l l ings' ( 1 964 :  1 04-5) .  Johannes and Kei l  observe that accusations 
of sorcery were directed at members of enemy clans and never toward a member 
of the victim's  clan (Johannes and Kei l  1 974) . As they suggest, '. . . sorcery is the 
functional and affective equivalent of war' ( 1 974: 1 3). 
Suspicion of sorcery as the underlying pretext for warfare continues in the 
modern day as i l lustrated in four prosecutions of Bena men for conspiracy to 
murder ( 1 990) ; attempted murder ( 1 985) ;  and two cases of wilful murder ( 1 987, 
1 989) (Public Prosecutor's Office, Goroka) . In  the first prosecution , a man was 
convicted of conspiracy to murder after he engaged a sorcerer (nalissalobo) to 
kil l a member of an enemy clan .  The remaining three prosecutions were related 
to the deaths of three men who had been ki l led in tribal fights. The fights had 
been initiated in retal iation for previous deaths each clan had attributed to their 
enemies' use of sorcery. 
Older male i nterviewees from Upper Bena stated that sorcery is sti ll used in  
the modern day. In most cases, they explained, sorcery is resorted to only between 
enemies but can also occur wi thin the clan especially when refugees are i n  
al l iance with an  enemy clan and use sorcery against clan members . When thi s 
happens the murderer is discovered through a woman who functions as a spirit 
medium (geneffaili). 
A sign, both in the past and in the modern day, which impl icates a particular 
i nd iv idual i n  a death caused by sorcery, i s  revealed by his behav iour and 
appearance during the mourning period. In interviews, men and women stated 
that people watch for indiv iduals (both from outside or within the clan) ' who 
C< J \ 1 l ' E  ' '; XT !CJ ' I·  OK R LSOL'RCC D F V ELOPf\ t E:\T 
:_ ud<le n l y  ha\'e the i r  bear<l . beg i n  wear i n g  new c l oth i n g  ( i n the past t hey wo u l d  
l·h:.rnge t he i r  trad i t i o n a l  c l oth i ng o r  wear n e w  feathers ) .  have a bat h .  cut  t h e i r  
hai r. or appe:tr happy.' Th i s  is  w h y .  i t  w a s  expla i ned . peop l e  wear o l <l c l ot h i ng .  
do n o t  b�t he .  refra in  from maki n g  n e w  g arde n s  or from act i n g �s t ho u g h  they 
are happ) u n t i l  the feas t i n g  an<l fu neral r i tes  are com p l eted .  I n J i \' i d ua ls  who 
behave d i ffere n t ly  ri�k s u s p i c i o n  of sorcery. 
· Viol e n t '  responses i n t ra -clan 
L:J n � ness  notes t hat when a man 1 s  wronged by another t he onus  i s  u pon h i m  
to � et t l e  hi  gri evan ce ( 1 97 3 :  1 56 ) .  He cannot  cou nt  o n  t he autom::it ic  �upport 
of true brother' .  c l a n .  su b-clan or even l i neage bu t m u s t  e n l i t other� to he l p  
h i m  because h is  grievunce i "  a ' pu b l i c  affair ' which .  i f  n o t  set t led,  w i l l  d i sru pt 
rn< 111 peop l e ' s  l i ves .  Often i t  is the man 's  age-mates ( those w i t h  whom he 
u nderwe n t  i n i t i at i o n r i t u a l s )  who p rovide ass i stance.  Usu a l l y. affi nes al so he lp  
h im.  as do fri e n d s  and trade part ners on occas ion . To deal  w i t h  the s i t u at i on 
g roups coa l esce for t hat  purpose . 
No11ogat11a: 'Fights against fellow clansmen or allies ' 
Langness s uggests that fi g h t i ng w i t h i n  the d is tr ict ,  c l an  or w i t h a l l i es i nvol ves  
the use of  fi s ts ,  s t i cks ,  spears but does not i nc l ude k i l l i ng ( 1 97 1  : 303 ) . When a 
d i sp u te c ann ot be resol ved through tal k i t  may res u l t  in actua l  fight i ng w i th 
fi s ts  or c J u bs .  I n  t h i s  case ' an i nd i v idual ' s l i neage or sub-gro u p  w i l l  support h i m  
even though they censored h i s  behaviour or i g i n al l y '  ( Young,  1 974:  1 67) .  
The response w i t h i n  t h e  c l a n  to ad u l tery a n d  i n cest i nvol ved t h e  aggrieved 
man shoot i ng the offe nder in the leg w i th an arrow w h i l e  o ffenders from outs ide 
the  c l an m i ght  be k i l l ed ( Langness  1 972;  Yo u n g  1 974 ) .  I n terv iewees noted that 
when ad u l tery occurred w i t h i n  a c l a n ,  the man o ffe nded agai n st wou l d  use less  
le thal  spears or wou l d  a im to shoot past h im.  Older male  and fem a le  v i l l agers 
poi nt ed out that sex ual  re la t ions  need not take p lace for the enco u n te r  w i t h  
another man's  w i fe to  b e  see n as ad u l terous .  Just tal k i ng to a m a n ' s  w i fe o r  
g i v i ng h e r  a g i ft of food was evidence of ad u l tery a n d  adu l terous w o m e n  were 
u sual ly  beaten (Langness 1 972) .  
How far a fi ght woul d  be take n depended on the rel a t i onsh ips between the 
men i nvo l ved,  and on whether they were membe rs of  the same clan or sub­
clan ( between t wo l i neages) ,  the same l i neage or members of enemy groups.  
Older men s tated that when a wom a n  of one l i n eage com m itted ad u l tery with 
a man from another l i neage w i th i n the same s u b-cla n  the mem bers of both 
l i neages would  fight  each other, but the fight was soon resol ved by ki l l i ng a 
p i g  and eat i ng toget her. Older m e n  and women at S egoya i n  Lower B e n a  
expl a i ned that men woul d  not com m i t  ad u l tery w i th wo men from enemy c l a n s  
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due their  fears about orcery. Langnes al o noted the Ben.i fear about l i a i s  n 
w i th  strange women ( 1 967 : I 73J .  
An o ld  m an from GJfu l aga ,· i lbge i n  the Upper Bena stated thrit men 
sometim e , .1rgueJ wi th other c lan members O\er garden theft .  He exp l ai ned 
that if a man <l1s overed omethrng m1 s ing from his gMden he would publ ic i  e 
his  i nJUr) m the · i l l age and shout out h is accusat ion that ome bJnanJs . for 
e amr le .  were mi · ·mg from his garden.  Other v ould rt• \ e.il to h im  .in )  o ne 
they had recent ly seen cooki ng bananas or wi th banana i n  their  po s c s  ior. .  
The owner then d i rect !) confronted the ident i fied man and i f  he denieu the 
a l l egat ion .  a fight usua l ly fo l lowed. Each attempted on l ;  to i nj u re and frighten 
the other and the matter wa fi na1 ly  resol ved when the rv.o exch.inged she l l s  
and fea · ted together. 
Young men indicate that no\'.·adays they ometi me argue w i th other young 
men over port · .  They note that the p lay i ng fie ld  is  often an arena where men 
work out the i r  gr iev ances \\ i th other men b: rough p lay. The) abo argue over 
women at dances when their wives or g i r l friends ta l k  to other men. UlUs  ng 
them to fee l  j ea lous .  Men occa ional l y  i nc i te and taunt  each other w i th i n .-.u l ts .  
·a} ing th ing l i ke, ' I ' ve u ed her a lready so she is my rubbi5h and ) OU can ha\'e 
her' . The en u ing  fight end up in Vi l l age Courts at t imes where demanJ for 
compen ation are m ade due to the seriou5ne ·s of the insul ts .  
Rape 
Langne · argues that tradi t ional l )  the soc ia l  t ies between the rap is t  and the 
female v ic t im affec ted the at t i tude of the comm u n i ty toward the rape . He 
pos i t  that  i n  ·pre-contact New Gui nea H igh lands lone women i mply  expected 
to be raped and d id  not ord i nari ly  trave l  w i thout compan ion  ' (Langne 5 
l 987 :  1 5 ) .  I n  other art icles he states that 'a l l  lone women were usual ly "fair 
game" . . .' ( 1 98 1 :  1 76)  and further suggests that raping a woman from a group 
outs ide the clan w as  ·considered more humorous than cr im inal ' ( 1 98 7 :  1 5 ) 
and acts commit ted agai nst  other c l ans such as rape , ent ic ing their women 
away or steal ing their  pigs were ' expected and even encouraged ' ( 1 987 :  1 6 ) .  
Wi th in  the  c lan .  Langness suggests that mul t iple rape by the h usband and 
other c lan members was somet imes 'pun ishment for a defiant w ife' a5 a way 
of contro l l ing her perceived promiscu i ty ( 1 974 : 204 ) . He observed that rape 
was somet imes a consequence of warfare ( 1 98 1 :  1 76) .  One middle abed woman 
from S igoya expl a ined that rape is  a form of reta l iat ion by enemy clan5. Such 
rapes, she aid, are considered i nsu l t ing  and i ntens ify tribal fight i ng . 
Rapes which occur i n  the vi l l ages are usual ly regarded as an offence against 
the v ic t im's  rela t ives (lain ) rather than as an offence against the v ic t im as an 
ind ividua l . The rape is  treated as an i nsu l t  to the woman's group and as a theft 
50 COMPENSATION FOR R ESOU RCE DEVELO P M ENT 
si nce kinsmen are given a say as to who can have sexual access to their young 
women (al so see Strathern 1 975) .  Compensation is always an important factor 
in sett lement .  In terv iews at the Publ ic Prosecutor's Office in Goroka indicate 
that the majority (95 per cent was the figure suggested) of reported rapes which 
occur in the vil lages in the jurisdiction are opportun istic. Upon di scoveri ng a 
lone woman, men drag the woman in to the bushes or garden and push her on 
the ground. They typ ical ly do not beat the woman but use threats and physical 
force. Prosecution in terviews reveal that v i l lage women are very c lear about 
what happened and wi l l  describe the rape as 'em tromoim mi i go long graun na 
kuapim mi ' (he threw me down and had intercourse with me) . 
According to the Publ ic Prosecutor's Office, reported rapes which take place 
in the town are more ambiguous. Typical ly, it was explained, a boy 'entices ' a 
girl into a house, locks the door and 'rapes' her. The girl s  are often reluctant to 
te ll their mothers because they expect to be bl amed for going with the boy in 
the first place. In some prosecutions there is difficulty with the issue of lack of 
consent .  I n  town, more girls fi nd themsel ves in  a non-traditional and non­
chaperoned situation with young men due to co-educational schools and the 
less segregated l ifesty le in town.  Girls tend to relate to boys on a friendship 
level more than wou ld have been conceivable in  the past, and fl i rting is possible. 
There are more opportu n i t ies for rom antic re lat ionships to develop and 
si tuati ons are more ambiguous when accusations of rape are made. Such 
relationships often compl icate any assessment of the i ssue of lack of consent 
in a trial . 
Interviews with younger women reveal that young women who attend discos 
on their own without their brothers or another man are sometimes 'grabbed 
and forced to have sex' . These gir ls al so do not te ll their parents about the 
incidents because they know that they have disobeyed their parents by going 
to the di sco in  the fi rst place and al so because of their shame . In this type of 
situati on , it was expl ai ned, girls rarely took action . 
According to the Public Prosecutor's Office, of the reported cases, there 
tends to be a greater number of gang rapes than si ngle rapes in the Eastern 
Highlands. Typical ly, groups of three to ten young men between the ages of 
1 8  and 25 years commit  pack rape. Prosecutors find that most pack rapes are 
also opportun istic and not committed as a 'payback ' .  Pack rapes are often 
committed when gangs hold up vehic les on the rughway and women are present 
in the vehicles. Three of the 1 5  sexual prosecutions from the Bena involving 
rape, attempted rape , carnal knowledge are i 1 1 ustrative (Public Prosecutor's 
Office, Goroka). In the carnal knowledge case a 1 5-year-old girl was raped 
after a dance by three men ( 1 984 ). They asked her to have sex with them when 
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they met her walking home. When she refused they grabbed and raped her. Each 
of the men received s ix months imprisonment. One woman was raped when 
five men held up a veh icle with a shotgun and bush knives ( J 988) .  After forcing 
the male driver out of the vehicle they drove off with the female passenger 
and raped her in turns. One of the men was later convicted and sen tenced 
concurrently to 5 years imprisonment for robbery and 6 years for rape . A third 
case ( 1 989)  of attempted rape involved two young men who broke in to a 
woman 's  house, stabbed her with a knife and took her 1 6-year-old daughter 
outside into the coffee garden and unsuccessfu l ly attempted to rape her. The 
two men were sentenced to five years impri sonment. 
Constraints on 'violent ' responses 
Accord ing to Langness, in di sputes between two clans or between two sub­
clans, med iation by a th ird 'objective' party was deemed necessary only when 
di sputants seemed unable to settle after a long time or if the grievance looked 
l ikely to escal ate into something greater, or, ' i f  it threatened to result in excessive 
in tra-group strife' (Langness 1 964: 1 1 5) .  He suggests that an excess of fighting 
would resu l t  i n  a third 'object ive '  sub-c lan i nterven ing by organ is ing a 
reconci l iation ceremony ( 1 964 : 1 1 6) .  The act of eating together symbol ised the 
'good faith' each side had toward one another since fear of sorcery and subterfuge 
was common at such meetings. Thus, Langness concludes this was 'probably the 
most important and powerful way of acknowledging friendship' ( 1 964: 1 1 6-7).  
One older man explai ned that v i l lage leaders brought members of the two 
sides of the dispute together to get them to ' shake hands ' .  He clari fied that 
' shaking hands' meant to compensate each other. Compensation, he noted , was 
one way of showing how much wealth you had as wel l as how much support 
you had and that c lan members always supported their own clan (lain ) over 
outsiders no matter what the issue. 
Compensation 
The Bena, payment of compensation is  referred to as pullim bel bilong ol 
mean ing a payment of compensation al lowing the part ies to re lease the bad 
feeli ngs (Lusim belhat) that have been created over the di spute and acceptance 
by the injured party of the settlement. The payment of compensation is intended 
to settle the matter so that there wi l l  be no further trouble (pinism dispela bel 
hevi or mekim i die dispela trable) . 
Men and women say that the payment of compensation is an admission of 
l i abi l ity by the offending party (also see Strathern 1 974) .  If it is not paid, 
another argument wi l l  arise. Therefore, i n  order to prevent further outbreaks 
of the confl ict, the party who is judged to have started the di spute is  obl iged to 
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pay compensation to the injured party. When both part ies are perceived as 
guilty, both must pay, the initiator pay ing more. The compensation is col lected 
from a person's supporters and when an amount is received from the other 
s ide, it must be d i stributed amongst those supporters. At the t ime of the 
payment, a feast is al so prepared so that good relations are restored in the 
community (bringim gutpela sindaun insait long komwziti) . 
In terv iews reveal that compensation is regarded as mandatory in situations 
involving death, sickness due to poi son, wounds received during fights, injuries 
involving bloodshed, injuries received as a passenger in a vehicle and for 
emotional pain resulting from serious insults which cause the 'bri nging down 
of a person ' s  name' . Trad it ional ly, a woman 's  sub-c lan was required to 
compensate her husband if she attacked or struck h im although the converse 
was not true (Langness 1 974 : 1 9 1  ) . Vi llagers suggested that disputes which arise 
between individuals or groups outside the fam ily always require compensation . 
Compensation is expected when a girl becomes pregnant by a bo) whom 
she does not wish to marry. Hi fami ly must compensate the girl ' fami ly for 
' spoi l i ng her name' and the boy 's fami ly is entitled to custody of the child aftet 
the birth .  Those who raise the child mu t also be compensated should the natural 
parent clai m the chi ld and take h im or her away. Those who have cared for a 
child require compensation for that care , the amount depend ing on the length 
of time involved . One older woman noted that a midwife has the right to demand 
compensation for 'getting her hands dirty' with women 's blood at chi ld birth as 
blood is perceived by the Bena as pol luting and contaminating. Compensation 
is also necessary when pigs spoil gardens. 
Ind iv idua l s  who express appreci ation for another 's  care in dress ing 
traditionally, singing wel l  or  composing a good song also expect compensation. 
Admirers show their apprec iation by saying, 'You kil l  me' , and early the next 
morning, they can be found sitting outside the house of the performer who wi l l  
compensate each of  the vis itors by giving them food, a p ig  or  money. When 
such apprec iation is not shown, performers know that people did not regard the 
s ing ing as very good and that there wi l l  be ' ta lk '  (cri t icism and gossip) .  
Conversely, if people come to the house of a performer who fai ls to compensate 
them the latter wil l  lose status and respect . People wi l l  say, ' at first we thought 
he was a good composer but now we no longer think this way ' .  There wi l l  be 
much 'tal k' in the commun ity in such a case . 
Interviewees' statements indicate that when major di sputes arise between 
enemy clans the first incl ination is to fight al though whether they actually fight 
depends on circumstances. Someti mes it is deemed a better strategy to wait .  
When compensation is mentioned the fight ing may stop while the offer is being 
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nrn · i Jercd .  Howe\'er the p yment of compen ation does not necessari ly 
perma 1ent l y  re-,o l \'e d ispute between two clan · .  Cnresoh·ed disputes, it was said, 
ofte n  le ad tu more tribal fighting. The payment f �ompen ation may not resolve 
cl isputL' · bt t .  a ·  wi th Enga  people, may be ' i nterpreted as  a mechanism for re l ieving 
t ens ion  a1 d r�cogn i � i ng soc.: i ,  I responsi bi l ity '  (Worms ley and Toke 1 985 : 36) .  
The Pu b l i c  Prosecutor's fi les in Gorob pro\· ide an example of how the 
pay ment of compensat i o n  is  \·iewed as a recogn i t ion of soc ial responsibi l ity. 
A man wa · ind icted for w i l fu l  murder ( 1 99 1 )  vhich involved a 'payback'  
ki l l ing .  The \'i c t im  and his  w i fe separated after he accused her of s leeping 
w i th  another man ( the husband's  re lative also from the same v i l l age). The 
wif� ->aiJ in a atement to the po l ice that after receiving cont inuous accusations 
from her hu ·band s he decided to make his al l egation · come true. Upon meeting 
the other m�rn a long the road , she inv i ted him to have intercourse. He agreed 
and they went to the s ide f the road to l ie down . HO\ 1ever, they were discovered 
a lmost nn med iately by her husband who beat the man on the head several 
t imes \\ ith a s t ick .  He d ied inst�mtly. The dead man 's re lat ives fo l lowed the 
woman · ·  hu - band in to the town when he went to buy J coffin for the deceased . 
After block i ng hi, ehicle on the road , the dead man' , father and other re latives 
shot the hu ·band numerous t imes with arrows in the head , chest and abdomen, 
k i l l ing h im .  The man conv icted of the murder was the first vict im's father who 
stated to po l i ce :  
I t hought [ the v icti m]  murdered h is  brother and  a fter w e  k i l led h im everyth ing was 
fair. We made compens;it ion to each other ant.l shake hand and have been l iving 
ve ry peacefu l l y  i nce . . . I  had sy mpathy for [ the fi rst dead man] who was murdered 
by [ the \' ict i m ]  and [t he vict im]  wasn' t  a good man within our community therefore 
they both have to die together. Then the younger generat ion see the example and 
wou ld not do the same thing in future . .  .! k new that there was a law but [ the victi m ]  
murdered h is  brother s o  myse l f  and others k i l led h im . . .  ( Publ ic Prosecutor's fi les, 
Goroka) .  
Prosecution fi les indicate that the offender paid K 700 (US$525) compensation 
to t he v ic t im's re lat ives and they paid his re lat ives K500 (US$375). The court 
sentenced the convicted man to four years of l ight  l abour due to the fact that 
he was i 1 l  and that the two sides had sett led the matter between them. 
In Andrew Strathern 's view, the payment of compensation also recognises 
the pr inc ip le  of 'mak ing returns for any act' inc l uding 'helpful and beneficial 
actions as we l l  as harmfu l  ones ' (Strathern 1 98 1  :6) .  This would appear true 
for the Bena as demonstrated above. Reciprocity also appl ies in the sense that 
people must be mindfu l  of their soc ial ob l igations. There is a need to regularly 
maintai n and sustain re lationships by cont inual ly exchanging food and assistance 
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to ensure one's future in the vil lage. As one Bena woman put it, 'How I act now 
determines how I wil l  be treated in the future' . This  principle is pertinent to 
Bena responses to injury. 
Invocation of the supernatural 
Traditionally, it appears that supernatural responses within the c lan were not 
divisive . The assistance of the ancestors for protection and punishment might 
be invoked as direct retal iation, for example, for garden theft .  Also, an ancestor 
would retal iate against a sub-c lan member who had caused ' injury ' to the 
ancestor whi le  he or she sti l l  l ived . This  retal i at ion was made expl i c i t  
in the misfortunes of  the offending member. 
Ghosts 
To the Bena, each person has both a soul and a ghost (Langness 1 965 :263). The 
soul journeys to frenonua in the north-east to exist in much the same way as 
humans in vi l lages but with more of everything (i .e. bigger and better gardens, 
many pigs, many wives). A person 's frere (ghost) stays with the deceased's  
relatives after death and makes i ts presence felt in malevolent ways if  a l iving 
relative caused injury to the deceased while he or she was alive. The ghost is 
only able to affect k insmen within the sub-clan but this includes women who 
have married into the sub-clan ; a woman's ghost can also affect her husband's 
sub-clan. The bel ief that ghosts can influence the l iving after a person 's  death 
has the effect of ensuring that the elderly are well cared for ( 1 965 :263) .  
Otherwise, a negl igent man or woman can experience misfortune in  gardening 
or with their pigs, if ei ther quarrels with a person who later dies. 
An Upper Bena man confirmed that the ghost of a recently deceased person 
can cause 'worms, diarrhoea, and scabies in kinsmen who fail to look after their 
elderly parents or kinsmen properly ' .  They might also 'make tame pigs turn 
wild' or 'cause dogs to become sick' .  These bel iefs, he said,  are less prevalent 
nowadays. 
Garden magic 
People invoke the assistance of ancestors in protecting valuable crops and to 
enhance their productive capacities (Langness 1 964). Poisons are also used 
to protect crops and deter thieves . A grove of areca nuts, for instance, could be 
protected by applying poison at the base of trees. Thieves who touch the poison 
might develop facial sores or irritations on their hands. The thief views such 
symptoms as retribution for the offence which can be treated effectively only 
by the garden owner spitting or spraying water over the offender (Johannes 
1 976: 1 1 0) .  
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A middle-aged Upper Bena woman explained that people plant  certain 
herbs mixed with pulverised bones . The combi ned substance has a beneficial 
effect on the garden crop but causes a prospective thief to become i l l  or to 
develop cysts on his or her hands. The woman suggested that her husband 
became i l l  after eati ng a wombat he had caught in a garden planted with 
protective herbs. The next morning her husband was unable to speak until the 
garden owner sprayed water on his face and tongue. 
Curses 
Vil lagers reveal that men and women can invoke the assistance of ancestors to 
pl ace curses on a person perceived to have offended them. Statements are 
made to bring misfortune on offenders . The offended person wil l  say (sometimes 
within the hearing of others), ' Yu wokim olsem. Okay, yu no kamap gut' (you 
wronged me so now you wil l  have troubles). In the case of a relative feel i ng 
aggrieved because, i n  his or her v iew, they did not receive an adequate share 
of brideprice, a curse may be laid to create unhappiness in the marriage, 
domestic violence and barrenness. One woman said her sister had been cursed 
by an older female relative in this way and as a result she had been 'belted' 
frequently by her husband and did not bear chi ldren during the first five years 
of marriage. The curse was released when the sister visited the old woman, 
bringing gifts of food and the disputed share of brideprice. The young woman's  
relatives ' admitted their mistake and apologised ' .  The o ld  woman admi tted 
her anger over the unfair brideprice distribution, and offered gifts of sugarcane 
and food . The old woman then made a statement (susa bai orait), meaning 
everything would be fine for the woman from then on. The curse was thus 
released and the woman's s ister has subsequently g iven birth to a child. The 
woman interv iewed noted that the gifts and brideprice share were offered 
because, 'you 've got to give something to show you are saying sorry with 
your whole heart' . 
Sorcery 
Sorcery (poisin) is mainly used as a weapon between clans (see above), however, 
in the modern day, the term is also used to refer to i nc idents involving i l lness 
or death perceived as being caused by other clan members. Vi l lagers spoke of 
poison as the direct act of putting ' acid'  on food which was then given to the 
intended victim .  Others referred to other contaminating substances which were 
also placed on food. Johannes, in her l ist of the different types of sorcery, 
refers to ' sorcery substances placed on food ' as when poisonous substances 
are placed on food, tobacco or betel nut and given to the intended victim 
(Johannes 1 976:  1 35) .  She suggests that too much of the substance would never 
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be added to food, for if the victim becomes i l l  too quickly, the relatives wi l l  
attack the sorcerer. One woman advised me that most people did not have any 
knowledge about  sorcery but wi l l  often s imply ' assume after the fact'  that 
' sorcery ' or 'poison' has caused a person to become i l l  or die. 
S tatements from men and women i nd icate that the c i rc umstances 
surrounding the use of poison within the clan often i nvolve attempts to ' bring 
someone down' by causing i l lness or death due to jealousy over a person 's 
success i n  busi ness or when one extended family is  considered more affluent 
than others. A number of interviewees noted that they no longer bel ieve in 
sorcery s ince they are now strong Christians. However, statements made by 
these Christian men and women indicate that al though they may not participate 
in the use of sorcery or poison themselves, they st i l l  bel ieve they can suffer 
from i ts effects and consequently wi l l  take precautions. 
Injuries within the family 
Expectat ions of conduct of husband and wife amongst Bena couples are 
concerned with gardening and husbandry ski l ls and the abi l i ty to work hard, to 
be hospitable, to look after the in-laws well and to take care of children and the 
household .  Both women and men made statements which i nd icate that women 
are required to adhere to customary taboos, especially in  relation to menstrual 
pol lution, and that traditionally obedience (harim tok) was regarded as important 
as was co-operation in building a man's name (and consequently enhancing the 
fami ly 's reputation). Husbands were required to show strength in battle, work 
hard, own plenty of gardens and pigs, show hospital i ty, not beat their wives 
often and to satisfy their social obl igations by contributing in exchanges and 
brideprice. 
Most of these virtues are expected today and many marital disputes stem 
from the perceived failure of either the husband or wife to fulfil  the ideal role. 
The d isputes which result from these failures place pressure on marriages and 
often lead to injuries . Frequently the pressure comes from in-laws who scrutinise 
their daughter- in- law's  behaviour to assess whether the brideprice paid has 
been worth the investment (see also Dickerson-Putman 1 986). In-laws can 
exert pressure on the ir son to 'correct' his wife's 'fai lures ' and if they withdraw 
their support for a wife, mari tal problems often fol low inc lud ing domestic 
assault .  Expectations of behaviour can al so be rhetorical s ince people can 
point to breached expectations whenever d isputes arise. The disappointed 
expectations act as ready-made issues to which appeal can be made. It seems 
many husbands and wives wil l  tolerate breaches of expectations when there 
are no pre-exi sting d isputes, however, when a dispute exists these become 
targets for reprisal . 
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Marital violence frequently occurs when men bel ieve that women are not 
satisfying marital responsibi l i ties, or through jealousy when men attempt to 
take additional wives and as a result of men's use of alcohol . Men and women 
say, in the modern day, there are many pretexts for domestic assaul t  but fai lure 
to follow traditional taboos, bel ief that a woman is barren and fai l ure to pay 
brideprice (resulting in great shame for the wife and her fami ly) cause much 
discord in famil ies. Women nowadays usually have the option of return ing to 
their relatives when the v iolence is considered excessive and unwarranted . 
Women's and men 's statements i ndicate that they consider it legit imate to 
punish a woman when she fails to conduct herself as a 'good wife' but that 
' excess ive'  v iolence ,  ' c au s i ng deep cu ts ' , is cons idered wrong by the 
community and people will gossip about such a man. When a man exceeds 
this l imit, v i l lagers say, his family wi l l  chastise him and his wife's relatives 
have the right to demand compensation . 
Fights between women 
Trad itional ly, di sputes between women arose when jealous co-wives fought 
one another over their husband , when men attempted to take on additional wives, 
over pigs spoi l ing gardens, through rumours and gossip, and over a woman 
fail ing to perform reciprocal work for other women who have assisted her in  
communal gardening activities. These disputes persist in the modern day. 
Sexual jealousy 
Langness found that about 25 per cent of marriages were polygynous and that 
fights between co-wives were 'frequent, d isruptive, and violent' ( 1 969:49). 
Co-wives often fought because one bel ieved she was not receiving equal 
attention from the husband in terms of work assistance and sexual attentiveness 
(Langness 1 965 :268). Today, co-wives become angry for the same reasons 
although money is often a factor. When fighti ng, nowadays and in  the past, 
women use weapons (sticks, knives, stones in  string bags), pull each other's 
hair, tear off the other's clothing and scratch and bite. According to one Bena 
woman, traditional ly, co-wives were expected to fight ritual ly with one another 
and then settle down and co-operate together. The ritual fighting took place to 
reinforce the first wife's position and her accompanying rights. Nowadays, 
women who fol low this trad itional practice are taken to court in  order to seek 
a compensation order (Banks 1 993 :72). 
Occasionally women are seriously inj ured or ki l led . A Goroka National 
Court prosecution involving a woman convicted of murdering her husband's 
first wife with a knife ( 1 995) and another case in  which a wife attacked and 
kil led the woman her husband was having an affair with, also using a knife 
( 1 988), are i l lustrative (Public Prosecutor's Office, Goroka) . Probation Service 
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statistics for a 22 month period between 1 987 and 1 989 show that 1 1  Bena 
women were convicted of assault ing other women and 2 were convicted of 
usi ng abusive language (Banks 1 993) . All of these cases occurred after the 
offender suspected her husband of becoming i nvolved with the attacked woman. 
In the view of one Lower Bena woman, nowadays, i t  i s  the exception and not 
the rule  for co-wives to l ive peacefu l ly with one another. When thi s  does 
happen, she noted, the two women will assist each other in the garden and 
house and help care for each other's children. She attributes the success of 
these latter relationships to the husband's abi l i ty ' to control the women and to 
ensure that they receive equal attent ion and treatment' . 
Most women I i nterviewed said they feel angry when their husbands stay 
away all night drinking because they do not know where the men are or who 
they are with. They often feel suspicious and if they discover their husbands 
have g iven money to other women they will often attack the women.  These 
confrontations, they explained, begin  as a verbal attack and frequently result 
in physical assault, both occurring i n  publ ic .  The objective of the attack is  to 
shame the other woman in  publ ic as wel l  as to send a c lear message to her to 
end the affair. Publ ic shaming is  also cited as a motive for physical ly attacking 
adulterous husbands i n  publ i c .  One woman recal led how she first hit  and 
scratched her husband at his office and then fought with him all weekend at 
their house after she was told of his affair. Usual ly, assaults result  in demands 
for compensation by the assaulted woman . 
Women's statements indicate that whilst most disputes are settled privately, 
a wife wil l  take the matter to court when the other woman persists i n  pursuing 
a relationship with her husband. Women say that widows and d ivorced women 
are closely observed by other women because they suspect their i ntentions .  
One woman revealed that she became suspicious once when her husband gave 
peanuts to a divorcee, who accepted the gift .  She explained that actions such 
as looking directly i nto a person's eyes, buyi ng food and giving i t  to a divorced 
woman, or accepting a gift of food were clear signs of adulterous intentions. 
A wife whose husband attempts to take a second wife may run away to her 
own fami ly. Because of brideprice, the family wi l l  often encourage her to 
return to her husband up to four or five t imes before they relent and assist her 
to take steps to divorce h im or to lay adul tery charges (Simbou, 1 995, Welfare 
Officer, EHP, pers. comm.) .  Older women say that, both in the past and today, 
women attack younger women rumoured to be consorting with their husbands. 
Nowadays, older women 'gather in gangs ' ,  locate the young woman and 'bash' 
her. Sometimes the women use weapons such as sharp knives and occasionally 
someone is  kil led. The women assisti ng the i nj ured wife to retal iate are from 
her community and i nclude relatives and those for whom she has previously 
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shown support (not necessari ly in s imi lar c ircumstances) .  The women offering 
assistance can in turn expect support from the other women involved when 
situations arise which require assistance or a retal iatory response. Those who 
do not return the support given previously cannot expect any future assistance. 
Interviews with the Goroka Publ ic Prosecutor's Office, however, indicate 
that the serious cases which come to the higher courts almost always relate to 
unpremed i tated ' v io lent '  attacks ari s ing  from jealousy when women are 
indicted for ' violent' offences. In almost all reported jealousy cases, one woman 
attacks the other woman, al though in a few cases a woman wi l l  attack her 
husband . One manslaughter case ( 1 988) involved a woman who kil led her 
husband's lover wi th a kn ife after she was tol d  of their affair. She told pol ice 
that she in tended only to fight the woman but in her anger used a knife she 
carried in  her string bag. During the altercation she severed an artery causing 
the victim to bleed to death . She was given 1 8  months imprisonment because 
she had already spent 6 months in custody on remand. The court also considered 
the fact that she paid K2000 (US$ 1 500) compensation to the deceased's relatives . 
Some women say they no longer bel ieve that attacking the other woman is  
the 'Christian way ' to deal with fami ly problems and wi l l  instead deal with 
problems themselves by talking to the other woman and warning her to stay 
away or by returning home to their famil ies.  
Insults and gossip 
Insults tend to heat up the feel ing of hatred two women might have for each 
other. Describing body parts or suggesting that someone has eaten the vaginal 
juices of another is  considered extremely i nsult ing as is  one woman l ifting her 
skirt or laplap and exposing her bottom to the other. When insulted in such 
terms, a 'v iolent' reaction is  provoked. General ly, women feel they have to 
respond to thi s kind of shocking i njury to their pride and that they would be 
considered less of a person if they fai led to act. 
Gossip is regarded as an insult to one's reputation . In the past, older women 
explain that leaders al so punished those who passed on the rumour to an 
individual because it was thought that the person was 'spoi l ing relationships' 
in  the community and causing fights. One older woman from Samoga v i l lage, 
Lower Bena, said that such a messenger would be ordered to kill a pig as 
compensation. Today, the Summary Offences Act i ncludes the offence of 
spreading false rumours (s l l ) . 
Destruction of property 
Destruction of property often results from arguments wi thin the l ineage and i s  
viewed as  an  assault on the person. Fathers and sons sometimes argue over 
work (not helping with fencing or digging ditches in the garden). Two young 
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men suggested that young men become angry when fathers 'don ' t  give us  
brideprice for our wives' . Others sa id they sometimes get angry when thei r  
parents do not cook food for them and may react by kicking and destroy ing 
household property (saucepans and plates) . Some men explained that they 
become angry with their fathers over land or over business matters concerning 
coffee plantations and trade stores. They may argue or fight and sometimes a 
son damages his father's veh icle, or business, or even burns the house down, 
depending on the strength of his anger. In some cases the matter is taken to the 
Vi l lage Court or community leaders may try to solve it. However, most said 
that such injuries were settled amongst fami ly members through compensation 
and restitution for the damage. 
Some men destroy household property when they become angry with their 
wife or when they wish to punish a wife who has run away to her relatives in  
her attempt to avoid h is  ' violent '  attacks. Women a lso destroy household 
property and garden crops to express their anger i n  marital di sputes . An example 
was provided by one woman who said that her mother recently destroyed the 
bed, chairs, television, radio, and windows, and threw her husband's clothing 
out of the house after cutting it up. She did this because he was seeing other 
women and giving them money. 
Shaming 
The use of court as a response to injury 
Statements made by Bena men and women throughout this chapter indicate 
that in most cases they attempt to settle real or perceived injuries amongst the 
disputants and their relat ives and clans without resort to the formal court system. 
However, their statements also indicate that they choose to use the formal 
system ofVi l lage Court or Di strict Court when the inj ury received is considered 
severe, espec ially involving loss of blood or after serious i nsults or attacks on 
their reputation. They wi l l  also use the court system to exact payments of 
compensation when the offender has not been forthcom ing with what is seen 
as a reasonable settlement. 
Al though I was unable to obtain Vil lage Court stat istics I spoke to two 
Vil lage Court Magistrates and one Peace Officer. The Vi l lage Courts i n  Lower 
Bena at Monmegue and Siokie vi l lages meet two days a week. Both Magistrates 
report that they hear on average between five and ten cases per day. Generally 
the cases dealt with include adultery, assault  ( including marital fights, fights 
between men and fights between women over men), steal ing from gardens, 
pigs spoi l i ng gardens or pigs k i l led, young girls hav ing chi ldren wi thout 
bri deprice arrangements being made, tribal fights and sorcery. The two 
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magistrates observed that the most common cases dealt with in their courts 
are steal ing from gardens and disputes over pigs. 
Vi l lage Court Magistrate Mr Teve Famenena reported that he dealt with 
one or two assau lt charges per month laid by women against husbands . These 
cases were usually settled by the court ordering fines and compensation of 
amounts between K20 (US$ l 6) and K50 (US$40) depend ing on the circum­
stances . He noted that in  h i s  experience, alcohol is  often involved in domestic 
assault  cases . 
Summary 
Responses to injury among the Bena arise within two general contexts . The 
particu lar response to an i njury wi l l  vary according to the nature of the 
rel ationship between the injured person or clan and the aggrieved person or his 
or her clan.  Injuries occur between clans and districts (inter-clan) and within 
the clan (intra-clan). In the past, relationships with people from outside the clan 
tended to revolve around warfare, the development of reputations, sorcery and 
in a few cases trade. Relationships withi n the c lan were interdependent and 
required more attention to the maintenance of good feelings amongst individuals 
who depended on one another for group survival . Thus, acts of 'physical 
violence' withi n the clan, although they certainly occurred, were more restrained 
and aimed only to cause injury rather than death. Nowadays, warfare sti l l  occurs 
and sorcery and poison are used to 'bring people down' who are considered to 
be ' getting ahead' . Direct action is taken when responding to injuries both 
between close ki n as wel l as when respondi ng to disputes arising between clans 
and outsiders . The payment of compensation is a major factor in  the settlement 
of injuries in al l contexts except between close family members. 
Conclusion 
The material presented in this chapter in relation to the Motu and the Bena 
demonstrates that there are commonal ities in  responses to injury. Nevertheless, 
there are also strong contrasts in conduct. The Bena and the Motu l ive in the 
context of kinship relationships which are continual ly reaffirmed. Both groups 
need to express a sense of injury in a form which makes that injury explicit, 
thus requiring a response from others. The Bena act out their response to 
injury in an overt and direct manner. The Motu internalise the injury and then 
often follow ritualised behaviour, both to release anger and relieve the injury. 
Both the Bena and the Motu acknowledge responsibi l i ty for injury, the Bena 
through compensation payments and the Motu through confession . 
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Both societies place emphasis on prestige and reputation and are competitive 
in that respect. Both view the greater wealth and prestige of others as a potential 
threat to their own status and position. For the Bena, having 'a name' is a 
manifestation of strength, and to be strong means to possess resources and 
have the abi l ity to call upon the support of others and upon their wealth and 
resources. Strength also means having the power to act and to lead and it 
therefore has a physical expression . The Bena external ise their  anger through 
physical acts. In contrast, the Motu, for whom offence can induce i l l ness, choose 
not to act, and instead internalise their anger. A subsequent i l lness is seen as a 
physical expression of that choice. This antithesis highl ights what seems to be 
one of the basic differences between the two societies . The Bena, as one woman 
said to me, see themselves as a people who are ' known for what they do, not 
who they are' . The Motu feel themselves to be ' in the centre of a web of personal 
and spiritual relationships' (Kopi 1 979: 1 7) which are capable of imbalance at 
any time. 
Although the methods fol lowed by each society in  responding to inj ury do 
differ, the Bena being direct in  an often ' v iolent' display of strength, and the 
Motu indirect, for example through sorcery, the motivation appears s imilar. 
The common objective is to cause harm, mi sfortune or even death to the injurer 
in  an act of retal iation. An appropriate response from the inj urer i s  called for, 
such as an additional share of brideprice or a payment of compensation. This 
will appease the victim and stop the retal iatory process. 
The payment of compensation is  common to both soc ieties. Once again ,  the 
Bena act directly through offering and receiving a settlement which constitutes 
an expl icit admission of l iabi l i ty and an external recognition of the relationships 
involved. The Motu concept of compensation is different, encompassing an act 
of prestige-seeking through the di stribution of addi tional brideprice or funeral 
payments; it is s imilar to that of the Toaripi society in Gulf Province (Hasu and 
Morauta 1 98 1  : 32) in that the amount given is decided by the donor, not by the 
injured party, and that the size of the donation reflects the prestige of the donor 
and hence enhances his or her reputation. Seligmann ( 1 9 1 0) suggested that in 
the past vi l lagers paid compensation to other v i l lagers in the case of accidental 
death, obviating the need for fighting, but that compensation might be refused 
if the death was caused by an outsider and retaliation through warfare might 
follow. Nowadays, the Motu say they do not expect compensation unless i t  is 
ordered by the court. Despite the differences, both Bena and Motu methods 
operate to make expl icit the intentions of the wrongdoers . 
Both soc ieties have expectations of appropriate behaviour for men and 
women within marriage and between kin .  It is expected that people will conform 
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to those expectat ions and fai l ure to do so is a common cause of i njury. 
Responses to i njury reveal the nature and content of those expectat ions .  
Defending the expectations and abiding by them works to enhance a person 's 
reputation . Thus, when women fight over men, they are essentially fighting to 
defend and maintain expectations which place a high value on the integrity of 
marital and kin relationships. Some women now see the court system as a 
means of protecti ng the requirements of appropriate conduct, or adopt what 
are considered Christian methods of responding. Flouting these expectations 
can be a del iberate insult and provocation . If a woman were to fai l  or neglect 
to defend, she would not only lose the respect of other women but the respect 
of men because both would consider that the woman did not care sufficiently 
to act. Thus, women are obl iged to respond. In  the context of v iolence towards 
women in the fami ly therefore, both Bena and Motu women acknowledge that 
within certain well defined l imi tations,  it is correct to defend those values. 
Furthermore, when men fai l  to meet the prescribed expectations, they are 
censured through gossip, resulting i n  a loss of reputation and prestige. In l ight 
of the changes to Bena and Motu society, especially in  the urban areas, these 
expectations are continually under pressure and this exacerbates tensions within 
the family even further. 
This examination of responses to injury in Bena and Motu societies provides 
insights i nto expectations of conduct. The nature of responses to i njury, the 
motivation underpinning those responses and the process of reparation all reflect 
sanctions on behaviour which these societies emphatically defend and maintain .  
Discussion of mechanisms helps to render explicit the expectations of each 
soci ety. Modern i sation is shown not to have substant ively changed the 
mechanisms through which these groups repair injuries. There are commonal i ties 
in responses to i njury between the Bena and the Motu , but i t  is  also essential to 
take note of the differences, to appreciate properly the distinctive characteristics 
of each society's responses. 
This chapter has i l luminated some of the tensions and expectations which 
arise when Motu and Bena people respond to i njuries from i nside and outside 
the group. Establishing the social context of responses to i njury, particularly 
with regard to the complex ity of relationships i nvolved, i s  essential to any 
examination of Melanesian responses to i njury. It is  only by considering the 
range of responses that we can understand and appreciate any particular response. 
In a broader context there are impl ications for the State in the sense that an 
understanding of the underlying processes in the causation of injury and in the 
means of redress i ng that i nj ury g ive valuable i ns ights i nto the i nformal 
processes of soc ial control . General ly, the State would benefi t  from the 
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i ncorporation of that information i nto justice pol icy. Rather than s imply 
apply ing introduced systems of social control a more appropriate response 
might be formulated, derived from that insight and understanding. 
Notes 
I grateful ly acknowledge the support given for my research from the S muts 
Memorial Fund, the Wakefield and Lopez-Rey Scholarship  and the Social Sciences 
and Humanities Research Counci l of Canada. The co-operation and assi stance 
given by the many Motu and Bena men and women who kindly gave me their time 
and shared their stories is greatly appreciated. My gratitude also goes to Ms C. 
Ashton-Lewis of the Goroka Public Prosecutor's Office for al lowing me access to 
al l  Bena fi les between 1 984 and 1 995.  Both older and younger men and women 
were interviewed. Questions focused on both traditional and modern day responses 
to injuries or to perceived injuries .  In Hanuabada, al l  the o lder v i l lagers had 
memories from the 1 920s or 1 930s and had some sense of the old ways. Bena men 
and women were less clear about their age. In establishing the context of older 
people's experience, I attempted to ascertain their stage of l ife at World War I I .  
The dominant agent of change for both groups appears to  have been the Second 
World War. Tradi tions began to change more significally subsequent to the war. 
Therefore, I am dependent for contemporary accounts of traditional society on the 
writings of the original missionaries, anthropologists and explorers. Having first 
reviewed those works I was unable to ascertain the degree of famil iarity of those 
interviewed with tradition. The younger vil lagers were from a range of educational 
and employment backgrounds. Some were homemakers while others were employed 
in the towns. A number of women who had taken family matters to either the Vil lage 
Court or to the District Courts were consulted. 
2 Oram writes ' . . .  anti social behaviour, such as ki l l ing, fighting, theft, sexual assaults 
and adultery occurred in vi l lages . . .  A murder or assault might lead to retaliation, a 
wife and her lover be ki l led or beaten, male thieves assaulted and female thieves 
raped' ( 1 976:8). However, he offers no sources for this passage and it is not clear i f  
he i s  talking about Motu/Koitabu groups or whether he  i s  including other coastal 
groups within the Port Moresby region in this general statements. 
3 Official statistics col lected for Hanuabada vi l lages from the Port Moresby Police 
Sexual Offences Squad reveal that in 1 993 there were three reported rape cases of 
carnal knowledge. Between January and August 1 994 the records show only one 
rape case reported from Hanuabada. 
4 The types of behaviour toward kin that ancestors find offensive include, ' rudeness, 
sul lenness, meanness, disrespectfulness towards elders, negligence of the aged, 
the sick and the crippled, inhospitali ty, quarrelsomeness or other causes . . .  The 
ancestor may feel he i s  being neglected, that respect has not been shown him or 
that his  re latives have fai led to make rituals on appropriate occas ions '  (Kopi 
1 979 : 37) .  Fai lure to perform mortuary rituals appropri ate ly  would also incur 
ancestral anger and require atonement (Pita et al . 1 975 : 26). 
5 The common cold is not viewed as something which is caused by ancestors or 
sorcery and therefore not a matter for concern. Kopi suggests that, "common sense 
explanations are only accepted in circumstances without much emotional content 
and when the treatment applied to a sickness shows result" (Kopi 1 979:24). 
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6 Baba/au 's diagnose the cause of a person 's i l lness through ' i ntuitive insight' or 
dream ing with the spirit devasi 's assistance and through analysing symptoms. 
Once the cause i s  ascertained the babalau uses herbs, massage and the extraction 
of foreign objects from the body together with magic spell s  to affect the healing 
(Kopi 1 979 :52-60). Payments are given to babalau for their services, however the 
amount depends on the effectiveness of the cure. Those unable to cure those with 
prolonged i l lnesses are paid less ( 1 979 :26). 
7 Sorcery can be categorised into two types, vada or vadari (Kopi 1 979:46-5 1 ) .  
Vada is intended to ki l l  the victim while vadari is used to cause harm or injury. 
Meamea or magic spel ls must be combined with ' medicine' muramura to effect 
either vada or vadari. Traditionally various i ngredients such as certain types of 
leaves, roots, gi nger, bark, l ime, pebbles or human bones are mi xed by sorcerers 
(vada taudia or vadari taudia) to achieve the intended result .  
8 Between January and September, 1 994, Elevala Vi l lage Court heard cases which 
i ncluded destruction of property ( 1 3  cases, 7 of which involved fami ly members), 
adultery (6 cases),  sorcery (3 cases), insulting language ( 1 5  cases, 7 involving fights 
between women over men), assault ( 1 3  cases, i ncluding 4 i nvolving fights between 
women, 3 domestic assau lts by men against older male relatives, 2 cases of fights 
between sisters),  fighting (6 cases, 2 involving sons and fathers), and di sturbing the 
peace ( 1 2  cases) (Elevala Vi l lage Court records). 
9 Di scussion of injuri es within the family both for Motu and Bena appear only i n  
su mmary form and wil l  b e  given greater attention in another paper. 
l 0 In the Bena, land is owned by those who have cu ltivated gardens and who reside 
on it (as wel l  as those who have rights to the land but are not residing on it). Bena 
women cult ivate in  the name of their husband and a man might own seven or eight 
such gardens in his l ifeti me. The garden plots a man most recently cultivated at the 
ti me of his death were the ones which were passed on to his sons and these were 
c losest to the ham let where he resided at that time. Due to the abundance of land 
in the past, disputes seldom arose and those that did were adjudicated by proving 
who first planted a garden on the land (Langness 1 964 :47-8). Uncultivated land 
was viewed as clan land and could be clai med if someone took steps to cultivate it 
(Langness 1 975: 83). This view has changed with the advent of coffee gardens and 
cattle projects since land has become more valuable with the prospect of i t 's  new 
found cash earning opportunities. This wou ld explain the increase in land disputes 
which, according to all those i nterviewed, are common in the moden day. 
CHAPTER THR EE 
EVERYONE (OR NO ONE) A WINNER: 
GENDE COMPENSATION ETHICS AND PRACTICES 
Laura Zimmer-Tamakoshi 
Staggering land compensation claims,  armed rebel l ions a t  mine sites, and 
landowners wanti ng payoffs for each and every planned development-be they 
essential for the nation (e.g .  an expanded road system) or local ly useful (e.g .  
building pylons for the electrification of remote vi l lages)-have caused Papua 
New G u i ne a ' s  governmen t  a n d  bu s i ness  com m u n i t i e s  fru s t rat i o n ,  
embarrassment, even rage (Hyndman 1 994 ; Oliver 1 99 1 ;  Wesley-Smith 1 992).  
In this chapter I answer the question , ' Is it possible to both develop Papua New 
Guinea and satisfy local landowners' claims?' in the affirmative. I begin by 
examining land compensation beliefs, ethics and practices among Gende 
speakers l iving in the mountains of southern Madang Province and, in increasing 
numbers, in  the vicinity of a proposed nickel-cobalt-chromite mine in the Ramu 
region . Throughout the chapter, I argue that an understanding of the emphasis 
Gende place on achieving a balance of exchange in  all their relationships and, 
in  particular, the importance of this balance to concepts of personhood and 
individual worth is crucial if we are to make sense of what otherwise appears to 
be completely counterproductive and predatory behaviour, such as parents raising 
daughters ' brideprices in  order to offset losses in  other exchanges (thereby 
contributing to brideprice inflation and the bachelorisation of Gende society) 
or exacting exorbitant returns from migrant children (thereby breaking down 
capital accumulations that might be invested in businesses and alienating many 
of their best and brightest offspring). Among the Gende, fai lure to achieve 
balanced exchange relations, to prove oneself the equal ( if not superior) of 
others in  similar status positions, always results in loss (lost prestige, lost land 
rights, poor marriage chances), and shame and anger (one's own and that of 
one's disappointed exchange partners) .  Their society now wracked by inequal ity 
brought on by their involvement in the wider world system and its unequal 
d istribution of education, jobs and income, Gende men and women struggle 
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to balance thei r  exchange relationships and to create ways of reducing the 
inequal ity, or at least i ts negative effects on society. One such creation is  a 
paral lel exchange system involv ing card games which redistributes varying 
amounts of cash, from wealthier to poorer v i l lagers and townspeople, to be 
invested in productive enterprises ( including future card games) and dissipates at 
least some of the antagon ism between the haves and the have nots . An 
examination of the ethics of this card playing system is relevant in that it suggests 
ways local peoples and government and business agents can construct arenas of 
negotiation and exchange in  which there are fair play, mutual responsibil i ty, 
and profits for everyone-everyone, that i s, who abides by the rules and i s  a 
legitimate claimant for being a part of the 'game' . 
Death, pigs and land 
The most efficient means of delv ing in to the complex ities of Gende l and 
compensation practices is to examine the post-mortuary rituals and exchanges 
known as kwiagi and their relation to l and transfers between deceased and l iving 
persons .  Fol lowing a general description of kwiagi and their function in  l and 
d istribution, I outl ine a land dispute that turned deadly because of increasing 
competition over land and confl icting i nterpretations of 'tradit ion' and the 
relative worth and generosity of the two contestants. I then look at a second 
case in  which men from Yandera and other Gende v i l lages have been using the 
i nstitution of kwiagi to establish l and claims in their wives' clan territories, land 
which not coi ncidental ly i s  i n  the vicinity of a long-proposed n ickel-cobalt­
chromite mine site.  
Among the Gende, the most spectacular exchanges of wealth occur during 
large pig feasts known as poi nomu.  While many exchanges are reciprocal , with 
the hosts giving the same or just a l i ttle bit more than they had received from 
exchange partners at earlier poi nomu, aspiri ng and reigning big-men use poi 
nomu as showgrounds to demonstrate their generosity and superiority over lesser 
men and competitors by the l arge size of their personal networks and the amount 
of pigs and other wealth they distribute. To insure a successful poi nomu, the 
hosts must first settle any post-mortuary or other outstanding debts associated 
with recently dead clan members or their deceased wives. In the weeks before 
a poi nomu there are usual ly several kwiagi (death payment parties) given by 
different groups in the host v i l lage. With the explicit  i ntention of preventing 
ancestral i l l  wi l l  and mal ic ious in tervention i n  the poi nomu as wel l  as 'making 
women happy' ,  the main kwiagi hosts-most often the deceased's chi ldren 
and grandchi ldren-give l arge amounts of cooked pork and other gifts to their 
mother's brothers and father's mother's people. If their mother and father's 
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mother are still al ive, children will see to it that they too receive part of the 
giveaway in partial rec iprocity for their hard work and support of the deceased's 
interests. Depending on the nature of their involvement with the deceased 
when he or she was al ive and/or their interest in inheriting land used by the 
deceased (see below), father's s isters and their husbands may be kwiagi 
recipients or givers or both. 
A second function of kwiagi is the transfer of l and rights from the deceased 
to the kwiagi donors . The expected transfer is from father to sons with daughters 
retai ning use-rights unless they fail to make a significant contribution to the 
kwiagi and/or are 'bought out' by their brothers . Sometimes, however, either 
because they are not yet grown and raising pigs of their own or because their 
finances are already compromised, children are unable to host their parents' 
kwiagi in time for poi nomu and so must rely on others to help them. Such 
'help' may be intended as a loan or an outright purchase of land rights . In 
recent years, some of the more affluent Gende migrants and their v i l lage kin 
have great ly extended their land holdings in both the ir own and their mothers' 
and wives' clan terri tories by contributing large sums of cash to others ' kwiagi. 
In some cases, their assistance has been unwanted, the children of the deceased 
unable to match or better their helpers ' contributions because they have been 
less fortunate in finding work (or less provident) than their competitors. Suffering 
humiliation when they must lease land from their 'helpers' and, perhaps, knowing 
that there is l ittle l ikelihood they wiI I  ever recover the lost land rights by paying 
back the new landowners, the partially or whol ly d ispossessed ' v ictims'  may 
harbour deadly resentment towards the individuals who supplant them and the 
system that fai ls them. 
One such  i nd ividual i s  Andrew, who several years ago ki l led one of 
Yandera's most important big-men-Ruge Angiva-over a land dispute the 
two had been embroiled in for ten years previously and other tensions emanating 
from Andrew's jealousy of his older cousin's greater material advantages and 
authori ty. As Ruge's father was the eldest of several brothers-Andrew's  father 
being one of them-Ruge and Andrew called one another 'brother' in keeping 
with Gende kinship terminology. The dispute first erupted in 1 982, the year I 
began my Gende studies. Earl ier that same year, Andrew, who had been away 
from the vi l lage for thirteen years working as a mechanic for several large 
coffee plantations, returned to Yandera expecting that he and his second wife 
would plant gardens and coffee bushes on land his deceased father had set 
aside for him when he was not yet a youth . When Andrew returned to find one 
of Ruge's wives already using 'his land' , he appealed to his father's brothers 
to help him oust his cousin's wife from 'his land' . His uncles, however, were 
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indebted to Ruge and his wives for helping them with Andrew's father's kwiagi 
and, because Andrew had not kept up with his exchange commitments to them 
during his long absence from the vi l lage, unsympathetic to his pl ight. When 
Andrew frustratedly pul led out some newly planted sweet potatoes from his 
cousin's wife's garden, a fight broke out between him and Ruge, with the two 
men hitting and shoving one another and Ruge angri ly reminding Andrew 
that, 'We [Ruge and his father's brothers] have always looked after you and 
bought two wives for you. But you have not thought of us nor given us anything 
in return for our labours' . Eventually, after several more fruitless and violent 
al tercations, Andrew acquiesced when Ruge said they could 'share' the land 
and allowed Andrew's wife to make gardens on a portion of the disputed land. 
Andrew's hatred of his cousin simmered for years, however, as he was forced to 
adopt a submissive attitude in  his deal ings with other vil lagers in  order to remain 
in the vi l lage and, to get ahead of the game, accepted help from his cousin­
such as becoming the driver of a truck owned by Ruge's  oldest daughter 
(Zimmer-Tamakoshi 1 994 for more details on this case and i ts fatal conclusion). 
Andrew's misapprehension of his rights to i nherit land used by his father 
was based on a number of things. First, al though he was aware that wealthier 
vi l lagers and migrants were grabbing up vi l lage l and as the possibi l ities of 
developing it increased i ts value (one reason he returned home when he did), he 
seems not to have been aware of how far the process of land al ienation had 
progressed. Whereas in the past there was more than enough land for everyone 
who wanted to plant gardens and young men felt fewer pressures (unless they 
had pol i tical ambitions) to pay off older men and women who had helped them 
with kwiagi and brideprices, in  1 982 there were quite a few vi l lagers and former 
migrants (who had been unable to make a go of it in town) who were paying 
' rent' for the garden land they were using, often to absentee owners . Usually 
the rent was in the form of pigs which the owners then made good use of in poi 
nomu and other vi l lage ceremonies they might attend on their  visits 'home ' .  
The land in  question was not being used for  anything other than gardens, but 
having the use of i t  did allow Ruge to plant coffee on other l and he had. 
A second, not uncommon, misjudgement Andrew made, was to assume 
that his uncles would see the dispute from all sides, including his own, and, 
therefore, judge him less severely than they did. Many migrants suffer from 
the same fate as, often poorly or i nadequately paid, they struggle to make 
ends meet under expensive l iving conditions (e.g. having to pay rent for housing 
and buy ing all their food) and the i nflated expectations of vi l lage kin hoping 
for huge returns on their investments in  the migrants . From Andrew's point of 
v iew, he had at least partially repaid his uncles' past help by entertaining and 
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feeding them for months at a time whenever they and their fami l ies had visited 
him at his workplace. His uncles, on the other hand, conveniently forgot this 
expense whenever they accused him of fai l ing to reciprocate their 'generosity' , 
remembering only that they had not received tupoi (the return of the brideprice 
investment) from Andrew and his first wife or any other formal repayment and 
that, as a result, they had been unable to reciprocate some of their  own debts to 
yet other exchange partners. Ruge , himself a past migrant, had avoided this 
kind of no-win situation by returning to the vi l lage long before most of his clan 
brothers and, with the assi stance of his uncles (who gave him the needed 
brideprice and land), setting up each of his three wives and widowed mother 
to raise pigs not only to repay his own debts but also to redeem his clan brothers' 
debts and contribute pigs to their  brideprices, thereby indebting them to him 
(and his wives and mother) and laying the foundations for his future leadership. 
Needless to say, Andrew resented what he saw as Ruge's guile and unfair 
historical advantage over himself and others l ike him. 
Finally, in  spite of (or more likely because of) increasing economic and 
social stress, even mundane social interactions among the Gende are rich i n  
the rhetoric of  shari ng and reciproci ty, o f  vi l lage and clan members being 
'one family' who look after one another's welfare in the manner of 'caring 
parents' and ' loving children' .  It would appear that for a time, at least, Andrew 
accepted this rhetoric at face value, deluding himself into thinking that his 
return to the vil lage was going to herald the start of a more prosperous and 
happy time for h im.  Thi s  delus ion was d i rectly fostered by Ruge , who 
encouraged Andrew to return home to take part in future developments and, 
along with his new wife, to begin raising pigs to pay back his rather substantial 
debts to Ruge and others. At the time it was expected that a road would soon 
go through l inking Yandera with urban coffee markets, and Ruge fel t  that 
Andrew, with h is  ski l l  as a driver and mechan ic ,  would make a useful 
component in  his own economic strategies. Eventually a road did come through 
in 1 986 and Ruge's daughter then hired Andrew to work for her in an ill-fated 
coffee buying business. In 1 982, however, Andrew began to reali se that with 
no such opportunities then available and with insufficient land he could be no 
more than Ruge's  lackey, and he blew up. While Gende rhetoric defined him as 
Ruge's 'child ' ,  the truer situation he faced is expressed in Tok Pisin as boi, some­
one, usually a grown man, who works for someone else for little remuneration, 
in the past the mastas, now increasingly other Papua New Guineans. The fact 
that Ruge was neither his ' real ' father (someone in his father's generation) nor 
his 'father' in sentiment, but rather an older clan brother who had finessed hi s 
way to the top of his age category, served to i ncrease Andrew's  cynicism 
regarding his own s ituation and Ruge's motives . 
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That Gende land rights are fluid and today a source of competi tion is  
further i l lustrated by the case of lapun Gene ( 'old'  Gene) who cleverly used 
kwiagi to establ ish strong claims to l and in one of his wives' home vi l lages, 
located near Kurumbukare. Kurumbukare is  the s i te of a proposed nickel­
cobalt-chromite mine and by moving his family there and gain ing t i t le  to the 
land, lapun Gene hoped to be in a position to receive compensation for the 
land should Highlands Gold Limited begin mining in the area. The stage was 
set in 1 978 when the wife in question, Gene's first wife, left Yandera to make 
gardens near Kurumbukare. Chi ld less and w ith few obl igations (such as 
childwealth payments) to her brothers, this wife had bui l t  a store of credit in 
her home vi l lage (by contributing generously to local brideprices, poi nomu 
and kwiagi) such that she 'owned' quite a bit of l and. Hoping to take advantage 
of his wife's prosperity and with i ns ide i nformation (from the manager of the 
mining exploration camp in Yandera vi l lage) on the development possibi l ities 
of his wife's home area, Gene and another wife and their chi ldren joined the 
first wife early in 1 982. Soon after, Gene returned to Yandera to announce his 
retirement as Yandera's oldest and most i nfluential big-man and, along with 
Ruge (who aspired to Gene's status), to set the date ofYandera's 1 982 poi nomu. 
At his ret irement party, Gene received many pigs and a large sum of cash 
from his s isters and their sons. He also received g ifts of cash from nearly 
everyone in the v i l lage ( including myself) .  His sisters ' gifts were presented as 
tokens of apprec iation and as security for land rights in Yandera. Given what 
fol lows, however, it is l ikely that Gene's s isters (some of whom are married to 
Kurumbukare or other Ramu men) and their  sons were also attempting to 
counter Gene's efforts to lay claims on the Kurumbukare land. At a kwiagi 
held just before the poi nomu, Gene gave this accumulated wealth, along with 
many other pigs raised by his wives and daughters-in-law, to the brothers of 
both his deceased mother and his four wives (one deceased).  His purpose was 
to pay off all his debts to his maternal and affinal kin and, particularly in the 
case of his first wife's brothers, to i ndebt them to himself and his wives and to 
lay claims to any land they owned . With their l arge contributions, Gene's 
s isters and their children diffused his c laims, but only to a degree. Gene is  
now dead but many of his adult sons and grandchildren are l iv ing i n  the Ramu 
area, working to keep on top of kwiagi payments rel ated to his death and the 
land he laid claim to, and awaiting the development of the proposed mine. 
The losing game 
Since the Gende were brought i nto contact  with the outside world in 1 932, 
each much-touted 'development' has brought disappointment and disturbance 
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to Gende soc iety and not the hoped for prosperi ty for a l l  that m iss ion,  
government and local entrepreneurs claimed for their innovations. In reviewing 
these developments and their impacts on Gende exchange performances, I 
demonstrate the importance of balanced exchanges to Gende concepts of 
personhood and individual worth. Plac ing kwiagi, land transactions and other 
important l i fecycle and social exchanges in the historical context, I make sense 
of many Gende's fears that they are playing a ' losing game' and their often 
predatory and counterproductive reactions to those very real fears. 
When I first vis i ted the Gende in 1 982, fifty years after they began leaving 
home to work in other parts of New Guinea, the Gende were asking themselves 
whether they were 'pigs' or ' humans ' , and if they were 'humans' , why was i t  
that 'money ' control led their every move rather than they who bossed money 
l ike their ancestors had bossed pigs (Zimmer 1 984) ? What the Gende were 
concerned about was l abour m igrati on  and an i nabi l i ty to control the 
consequences of their involvement in  a cash economy. Ever s ince Western goods 
and cash were accepted i nto the Gende exchange system,  thei r  uneven 
di stribution among the local populace has been a factor in high rates of permanent 
and temporary labour migration.  By 1 982, d ispari ties in wealth and abi l ity to 
participate in the exchange system had become so vast that it was no longer 
poss ible to describe most migration as voluntary. While their plight can be 
in terpreted as a problem of inequal ity, the Gende saw i t  as a question of moral s 
and identity. 
Like other Melanesians, the Gende are engaged in a system of reciprocity 
and competi tive exchange which mediates kinship, marriage, land, prestige and 
personal identity. Within thi s system, ind ividuals reveal themselves to be more 
or less 'human' on the strength of their  exchange performances relative to others 
both within and outside their clan.  Men who are successful  in promoting the 
affairs of their clan through exchange are known as 'big-men ' or ' big-humans' 
(both are glossed as wana nambaio, wana denoting 'man' or ' human ' ,  nambaio 
meaning 'big' ) .  B ig-men often have two or more wives to assist  them in their 
efforts :  buy ing brides for younger men, g iv ing chi ld-wealth to chi ldren 's 
matri lateral kin, redeeming land lost to non-clan members, and ensuri ng the 
physical and spiritual wel l -being of a clan by sponsoring pig feasts at which 
large amounts of pork are given to other clans. Lesser men do the same things as 
big-men but on a smal ler scale. The range of their exchange relationships rarely 
extends farther than immediate kin and in- laws, and one or two big-men. The 
lowest form of men are cal led ' rubbish-men ' .  Lazy or too weak to attract 
wives, they have l i ttle wealth to invest in their clan, and must work and move 
around l ike women and pigs, in the service of real men . 
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While the Gende bel ieve a person's identity is absolute unless tampered 
with by sorcerers (Zimmer 1 985 :Chapter 4), they also say it is d ifficult to be 
certai n a man is what he seems to be. This  is not surpris ing given that a man 's 
status and moral worth is judged relative to others and is  dependent on the 
outcome of endless competi tions between members of his own and other clans. 
In any particular competition, some men , and even whole clans, may reveal 
themselves to be less than human, ' l ike pigs' or ' imperfect humans' . This happens 
when there is a serious imbalance in the exchanges of two clans, and the clan 
which is deemed less ' human ' is forced to rel inquish chi ldren to the winners 
(possibly the children's mothers' clan) in place of pigs. Ordinarily, it is individuals 
rather than clans who are in danger of making 'pigs' out of their chi ldren, and 
it i s  big-men (and their wives) who save the day by becoming ' fathers ' (and 
'mothers ' )  to chi ldren whose parents do not ful fi l l  their exchange obl igations, 
as wel l as 'guardians or owners ' of any land the children may have rights to . 
Women, too, engage in exchange and aspire to recognit ion as ' ful ly human ' ,  
'good persons ' ,  although cal l ing a man a 'woman' i s  a n  insult and tantamount 
to cal l ing him a 'pig ' . Women are metaphorically equated with pigs because of 
their c lose association with pigs, and the fact that they both move about at the 
whim of men . Or so men (more often a woman's husband and his clan members) 
say and l ike to bel ieve. Because of this and because post-marital residence i s  
often patri local, women-especially young women-are suspect creatures and 
must work harder than men to prove that they are not 'pigs' or inhuman sorcerers. 
Knowing this, a woman's kin wi l l  try to send her off in marriage w ith her own 
starter herd of pigs and, in many other ' 1ays, empower her to survive and succeed 
in her new family (Zimmer-Tamakoshi n .d . ) .  Moreover, a woman who pays 
backs her brideprice, raises many pigs for her husband 's clan and erases al l 
debts to her own clan for the chi ldren she bears her husband, is free to exchange 
pigs l ike a ' man' and to enjoy a measure of prestige as ' mother' of her husband's 
clan. She too, of course, i s  subject  to relative standards. 
In 1 932, Cathol ic missionaries were the first Europeans to enter Gende 
territory. Located on a trade route, along which shells and other valuables passed 
between the north coast and central highlands, the missionaries had l ittle trouble 
securing labour to bui ld a mission and airstrip in  exchange for shel ls and steel 
axes. Big-men worked alongside rubbish-men and boys in the hope of retai n ing 
their  positions as middlemen in the shell trade. Within a few years, however, the 
shel l trade collapsed as mission and government airl i fted tons of shel ls into the 
highlands . Soon, men were travell i ng far from home as m ission helpers, native 
pol ice and contract labourers on coconut plantations and the Bulolo goldfields . 
During World War II, Gende men served as carriers and orderlies for al l ied 
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forces in the Ramu Val ley. After the war, many headed south to the new towns 
of Goroka, Kundiawa and Mt Hagen, where they worked as cooks and domestic 
servants or joined construction gangs. 
The effects of this early migration were profound. Exposure to the wealth 
and power of the Europeans produced an ethnic inferiority complex which 
remains a factor in migration and efforts to achieve equal ity with the foreign 
big-men . The trappings of Western c iv i l i sation became symbols of progress in 
this direction , and migrants who di stributed Western clothing and mirrors to 
grateful v i l lagers were looked upon as the forerunners of a new breed of men 
who would replace a generation of 'pigs ' . 
In the late 1 950s and 60s, there was every i ndication that the changeover 
would be rapid .  In 1 958 ,  an English board ing school was opened by the 
missionaries. One of its graduates has a PhD and currently teaches history at 
the University of Papua New Guinea. Others include doctors, secretaries, bank 
clerks and even an acting director. In 1 964, a multi national company d iscovered 
copper near Yandera vi l lage. Local men were trained in a variety of capacities, 
and i t  was a Yandera man who first found gold at the Ok Tedi site i n  Western 
Provi nce. Other men, along with thei r  wives and chi ldren , poured i nto the 
highlands towns and coffee plantations to work as drivers, mechanics, hotel 
cooks and unski l led labour. 
It wasn ' t  long before the nastier s ide effects of migration and unequal 
involvement in  a cash economy surfaced. Abandoning gardens and pigs to chase 
after the el usive rewards of assoc iation with white men did not rel ieve men and 
women of their obligations to exchange partners . Some men, l ike Ruge, took 
advantage of this s i tuation by returning to the vi l lage to marry several wives 
and invest pigs wherever necessity was greatest. Men with less vision, l ike 
Andrew, returned home after years of ignoring their debts to society to find 
themselves dispossessed and the 'chi ldren ' of their ' brothers ' .  As d isparities in 
wealth increased, i t  was possible to be a rubbish-man even if one had pigs. For 
many individuals, migration became less of an option than a necessi ty. Men 
who had both money and pigs, because they were lucky enough to be the fathers 
and mothers ' brothers of wealthy migrants, or because they combined work at 
the min ing camp with helping wives in the gardens, put pressure on the fathers 
and sons of poorer fami l ies to migrate in order to balance their exchange 
relationships, or to be able to afford the inflated brideprices of girls whose 
fathers were trying to solve the problems of inequali ty in their own way (Zimmer­
Tamakoshi 1 993).  Al though coffee was planted as a cash crop, income from 
coffee never amounted to much unti l recently because the nearest markets 
were more than a day or two walk away over extremely rugged mountains.  In 
GENDE COMPENSATION ETH ICS AND PRACTICES 75 
1 986, a road connect ing many of the Gende v i l l ages with the Highl ands 
Highway was completed, and, although i t  is  impassable during much of the 
rainy season and dangerous at the best of times, it has afforded greater coffee 
incomes for some Gende famil ies . Around the same t ime a cardamon plantation 
opened up near Bundi providing work for hundreds of men, women, and even 
children. While it  brought prosperity to i ts workers, it was too far away for 
Yandera and other upper Bundi v i l lagers to l ikewise benefi t  from a steady 
source of income, and within months the brideprices Yandera famil ies were 
asking of plantation workers were skyrocketing in attempts to even things out, 
and plantation workers wondered if  it  was worth their effort as inflation rippled 
throughout a l l  exchange pay ments .  Several years after i ts inception the 
plantation was in decl ine as workers lost interest. And today, it is  more the 
poorest, landless fami l ies who work there. 
Added to the strain of inequal ity and inflation was the crippl ing effect of 
uncertai nty. Laid off in t imes of recession, or fired over confl icts with fel low 
workers, even responsible migrants played havoc with vi l lagers ' exchange plans. 
Work for the mining company was equal ly unpredictable s ince deposits rich 
enough to warrant ful l-scale operations have yet to be located .  The effect was to 
make v i l lagers reluctant to invest in any but the wealthiest famil ies, often at the 
expense of their own children and brothers. During a pig ki l l  in Yandera, a 
young doctor became the absentee owner of eleven tracts of garden land for his 
generosity to four uncles.At the same pig ki l l , less than half of all adult absentees 
contributed money or beer, and even fewer came close to satisfying obl igations 
to support the event, which was considered a failure by both hosts and guests . 
The relatives of non-partic ipants spent most of the month-long festivities at the 
edge of the crowd, seethi ng ,  or hid ing in their garden houses i n  shame. Several 
such famil ies left the vi l lage shortly after, to escape harrassment and accusations 
of sorcery. And many young men left, some with the honorable i ntention of 
helpi ng their unfortunate parents but with l ittle assurance they would find gainful 
employment, and others because they were considered deadbeats and told to go. 
In 1982, the social costs of i nequal ity were obvious and many. Each vi l lage 
had scores of ' missing persons' for whom there was no place in the system: old 
maids sti l l  hoping to find rich husbands; many young and middle-aged men 
without wives ; women who returned to their own vi l lages when their in-laws 
blamed them for their husbands' fai lures to make good in town ;  chi ldren who 
had never been in the vi l lage because their parents were afraid of sorcery attacks 
from men and women they had d isappoi nted ; unemployed school leavers 
ashamed to return home after their parents '  sacrifices to pay their school fees; 
and old persons wi l l ing to face urban poverty i n  order to get away from the 
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insat iable demands of creditors (Zimmer 1 987b and 1 990; Zimmer-Tamakoshi 
1 993) .  In 1 982 (and today ), less than a third of Gende males between the ages 
of 1 8  and 34 were married, an explosive situation made worse by the facts that 
their parents had supported the marriages of more eligible bachelors and that 
increasing numbers of Gende women were marrying non-Gende men from 
wealthier regions of Papua New Guinea (Zimmer-Tamakoshi 1 993 : 86-90) . 
Assoc iated with these changing marriage patterns are increases (both perceived 
and real) in inter-generational violence and domestic violence (Zimmer 1 987b 
and 1 990). With, for example, marriageable daughters an i ncreasingly valuable 
resource, confl icts between parents and daughters over a young woman's 
romantic aspirations can lead to her fl ight to town or her abuse at the hands of 
angry parents or other relatives-most notably brothers hoping to benefit from 
a girl 's brideprice (Zimmer 1 990; Zimmer-Tamakoshi 1 993).  
The loss of so many persons from the vi l lages and the tensions and violence 
that permeate their l ives does not sit wel l  on the Gende conscience. Caught in 
a bind between merciless competition, and a desire to be generous 'fathers' 
and 'mothers ' who bu i ld rather than destroy their clans, they are plagued with 
a sense of inadequacy and doubt. In the words of one old man , 'The Gende are 
l ike pigs. They think only of their own bel l ies while their children go hungry 
and are the cargo boys of men with money. Th ings were different in my father's 
generation. Those men were strong men who could fight all day and run up 
and down mountains without losing their  breath. They were good men who 
were always thinking about others . Their children never went hungry and they 
grew up quick. They even gave food to rubbish-men. It is different now. Now 
there are no men in our vi l lages, only a few. The rest of us are rubbish-men . 
Now money bosses us, and we throw away our children to get i t .  I f  money 
says, "You go there !"  we go. If money says, "You stay here !"  we stay ' . 
Everyone a winner 
While the Gende have experienced many trials and disappointments in  the 
years s ince they were first contacted and began participating in a cash economy, 
they have al so had triumphs of their own making in preserving internal social 
re lations and protecting their society from total breakdown and exploitation 
from the outside. One of their more clever innovations is a card playing system, 
described in detai l in other publ ications (Zimmer 1 986 and 1 987a) . The primary 
purposes of the system are to distribute cash from those who have to those 
who have not, thereby al leviat ing tensions engendered by inequal i ty and 
keeping the social relationships of card players alive and well .  What is tru ly 
ingenious about the system is that everyone can participate and no one ever 
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loses . Card games, as played by the Gende, operate as a parallel exchange 
system in  which losers in the regular exchange system can be winners and, 
moreover, take their winnings and invest them in regular exchanges (such as 
brideprices) or other income-producing i nvestments (such as tradestores). 
A closer look at the card playing system reveals that the Gende 's favorite 
games are tri-lip ( ' three- leaf ' )  and seven . Tri-lip is a version of blackjack 
which has the capacity of quickly breaking down large stakes and red istributing 
them among the players, who often go on-individual ly-to start secondary 
and tertiary games, thereby spreading the money over a wider network of 
players . On one occasion, for example, a prosperous young migrant who had 
missedYandera's 1 982 pig ki ll but had come home afterwards for the Christmas 
break in itiated a game of tri-lip, i nviti ng big-men from several vi l lages to be 
his opponents. After a day of play, he had ' lost' over K l ,000 received as part 
of his sister's brideprice. Not yet married but comfortably employed in a steady 
job in town, the young man viewed his ' gaming losses ' as an investment in  
future brideprice support (he  clai med he  was  i n  no part icu lar hurry to  get 
married) and a secure posi t ion in Gende society. The big-men took their  
winnings back to their own vi l lages and i n i tiated games of their own,  in  turn 
' losi ng' fairly large sums of money to select opponents. Many games later, 
the money was d istributed among hundreds of players ,  but by that time, a 
week later, the favorite game was seven, a much slower-paced rummy kind of 
game in which winnings were smal l and took more ski l l  (than luck) to achieve . 
Most Gende are qu ite proud of their card playing system, cal l ing it gutpela 
wok bilong mipela ( 'our good work ' ). At first dubious about players ' clai ms 
that nobody loses at cards and that it was a good way to spend a part of every 
day, over time I came to see that, from the perspective of regular and wi l l ing 
card players, they were right. Players whose luck is against them or who are 
not skil led at seven are supported by other players giving them smal l stakes to 
re-enter the game or helping them out in other ways, such as loaning them 
money or holding off on demanding returns on regular exchanges. Wealthier 
players sleep better at n ight, bel iev ing that others feel less hosti l i ty towards 
them and not fearing as much as they might  the sorcery attacks of those with 
less money and opportunities. Players look down on those few Gende who 
refuse to participate in the game network-al legedly because it is  against the 
law and church pol icy, turning their backs on them when they need help and 
taunting them for being selfish and uncaring.  Players reserve their greatest 
contempt, however, for persons who enter the game network to others . In such 
si tuations, regular players wi l l  gang up on the i nterloper, making sure they 
lose and forcing them to play wel l beyond their means .  
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Gende card playing, then, is a highly moral affair, informed by more general 
ethics of reciprocity and ' goodness' .  Among the Gende, a good person (wana 
mogeri) is generous, always thinking of others. A good person does not 'eat' 
his own wealth l ike a bad person (wana briki) but gives it to others who, in 
turn, wi l l  later think of the donor's needs.  Card players do the same things . A 
wealthy player, for example, wi l l  work hard to ' lose ' , not by throwing a game, 
but by persisting until his luck runs out or the other players, supporting one 
another's strategies and stakes, win .  For this he will be praised as a 'good­
man' , a 'big-man' , who makes money come ' al ive' as it moves from player to 
player in the game network, much the same way as pigs and more traditional 
forms of wealth circulate throughout the web of interpersonal relationships 
which constitute Gende soc iety. Just as the exchange of pigs and food sustains 
soc ial relationships and contributes to the wel l -being of others, so too does 
playing cards. This was borne out by a survey of interhousehold exchange I 
carried out after Yandera's 1 982 pig ki l l .  From the results of that survey, done 
during the rainy season and very lean t imes, I di scovered that card players 
who had won big during the Christmas card games showed a higher level of 
sharing than non-players. Winners bought bags of rice and canned fish and 
invited other regular players to share meals with them. They rarely invited 
non-players. When some of the greedier non-players showed up anyway, the 
hosts quickly hid the food, relying on child spys to warn them of the imminent 
arrival of freeloaders . 
While there are di stinct parallels between Gende card playing and their 
regu lar exchange system,  Gende card p lay ing goes a step further and 
complements rather than simply copies traditional exchange patterns .  The real ly 
'good' or clever thing about card playing-the neutral ity of the game network­
allows players of any sex, age, kinship or clan affi l iation to play with any other 
person, working out their own sol utions to the problems of inequal i ty and 
uncertainty as need dictates . Close relatives or spouses may play against one 
another, for example, as one or the other tries to balance some inequ ities between 
them. Often misunderstood by non-players, this flexibi l i ty nonetheless helps 
prevent i ncome differences from stopping the normal flow of wealth which 
upholds the sytem of traditional exchange relationships it  seemingly disregards. 
Thus, a woman in  need of cash to add to her brideprice repayment may chal lenge 
her i n-laws-even her own husband-to a card game, perhaps winning enough 
cash to invest in a smal l tradestore operation, through which she eventual ly 
earns the needed cash . By constructing such a card playing system, the Gende 
have shown themselves to be more in control of their l ives than they might 
otherwise have been . Many card players know this .  As one woman told me: 
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'We l ive in the bush and have no money, j ust pigs . Money comes [from town] 
and wants to boss (control )  us as i f  we were pigs. But when we play cards, we 
boss money. This i s  good' . 
Card playing is not the Gende's only ' good work' . Evidence that the Gende 
are concerned to promote the general welfare as wel l  as their own i ndividual 
purposes comes in many ways, one of the more dramatic being the 1 983 'Bundi 
Strike' (Zimmer 1 985 :Chapter 1 0) .  As satisfying and useful as card games 
are, the Gende know they cannot get at the root causes of inequal i ty. Early on 
the morning of 28 March 1 983 ,  a plane carryi ng invited national and provincial 
government officials landed on the tiny airstrip at B undi . Within minutes, several 
thousand Gende, many of them armed wi th axes and bows and arrows, 
surrounded the delegation. The organisers of the demonstration (dubbed the 
'Bundi Strike' ) stepped forward and del ivered a l ist of grievances and demands. 
Foremost was the request for sufficient funds to complete the road connecting 
Bundi with Madang and the Highlands Highway. Challenging the officials to 
treat them l ike 'men' or face the consequences, the Gende also threatened to 
secede from Madang Province in  favor of returning to the 'way of the ancestors' 
or join ing a neighbouring provi nce (Chimbu). Having di sbanded the local 
government counci l  and posted sentries at the district headquarters to prevent 
pol ice i nterference, the strikers' threats were taken seriously and the Gende 
Counc i l  received cheques from the shaken offic ials  for K25 ,000 (worth 
approximately US$37,500 in  1 983) and promises of more government support 
in the future. 
The i mmediate cause of what was an unprecedented d isplay of tribal 
sol idarity for the Gende, was a news broadcast earl ier in  March, in which the 
Madang regional member of the National Parl iament made the statement that, 
due to the lack of funds, i t  would take five more years, possibly longer, before 
al l sections of the Madang-Chimbu Road would be completed. Allegations that 
money that had already been set aside for the road had been mishandled or 
stolen by local officials ignited Gende passions. And after 20 years of working 
on the road with hand picks and shovels and seeing themselves fal l  behi nd 
other sections of the country i n  terms of development, the Gende stopped blaming 
one another for all their problems long enough to ponder on the ' treachery of 
the big money men, who took their taxes and their children and gave l i ttle i n  
return ' .  In  the same manner that partners i n  a card game set aside mutual 
antagonisms in order to defeat a common opponent, the Gende banded together 
to chal lenge the government to assist them in completing the long-awaited road, 
setting themselves i n  opposition to those who would deprive them of their 
earned rights, as responsible men and women, to control their own l ives . 
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Symbol ising development and the way back home for the hundreds of 
Gende vainly seeking prosperity in town, the Gende's dream of a road of their 
own insp ired them to call a time out from their dai ly activities (and games) to 
play for the biggest stakes of al l-their wel l-being and integrity as a people. 
Organ ised in l i ttle more than two weeks by several politically ambitious col lege 
graduates, the 'strike' appealed to both young and old, but for different reasons. 
Having spent more of their time shuttl ing back and forth between vi l lage and 
town, younger Gende seemed less impressed with the power of the Government 
and anxious to take the lead in  v i l lage pol itics and planning away from what 
they saw as overly conservative (and fearful)  older leaders . For their part, 
older men and women were afraid of losing gains they had made in the larger 
world (e.g. as church leaders, sounc i lmen) by challenging authority, but equally 
anxious as the young to have a road of their own so that, i n  the words of 
several older men and women : 'My granddaughter [who was born and rai sed 
in town] would not be ashamed of me and would be able to v i s i t  her 
grandmother without crying because her legs hurt her to walk a long way over 
the mountains' ; 'My son and his fami ly would come to see me more often' ; ' I  
would be  able to  make enough money to  pay back my brother for al l he  has 
done for me' ; and 'Our children would not have to leave home and become 
rascals ' . Such sentiments reveal a far less selfish side to most Gende than 
some of their behaviour might suggest. 
Discussion 
In the foregoing pages I have tried to show that while the Gende's unequal 
involvement in the cash economy and the failure of many Gende to fulfi l l  
the ir  exchange ob l igat ions have generated some very negat ive  soc i al 
consequences (such as the loss of land rights for some Gende and intra-clan 
violence), the Gende's  situation is neither hopeless nor is their exchange system 
to blame for the fix the Gende are currently in. The Gende's traditional exchange 
system is an intricate 'game' , designed to uphold and evaluate Gende soc iety 
and the game's players. As we have seen, i t  is a serious (sometimes deadly) 
game and the main arena in  which i ndividuals and groups demonstrate their 
humani ty and achieve val ues and rewards v i tal to both physical l ife and 
emotional wel l-bei ng .  Informing Gende exchange, however, and what gives it  
grace, is  an interest on the part of most players in  keeping the game going and 
in including as many successful players as possible, successful being men and 
women of good intentions and good actions. That today there are many Gende 
who are unable to play the game adequately, through no apparent fault of their 
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own, causes good men and women pain (and fear) and i s  a primary motive 
beh ind their  card play ing system . When a player ( l i ke Andrew) openly 
disregards the game and takes advantage of others ' leniency, however, or seems 
(as Ruge did to Andrew and to some other Gende) to want to promote 
themselves far above the rest, the Gende wi l l  resort to harsh measures to bri ng 
down such an opponent. 
That systems of exchange and compensation are moral systems, engaging 
the hearts and energies of their players and producing impressive and sometimes 
spectacularly frightening behaviour, is documented throughout Papua New 
Guinea and in  other parts of Melanesia. Papua New Guinea highlanders are 
renown for their fearlessness on the battlefield and their readiness to fight over 
a variety of insults and perceived injuries to their well -bei ng (Meggitt 1 977;  
Strathern 1 977, 1 992 and 1 993b). And the Kwaio of Malaita have waged a 
determ i ned and somet i mes armed struggle for over 1 20 years aga ins t  
encroachment on thei r  tribal autonomy (Keesing 1 992).  Yet, throughout 
Melanes ia the most respected tribal leaders are rarely the bravest fight leaders 
but rather men (and sometimes women) who manage a group's exchanges in  
ways that promote local peace and prosperity (S i l l i toe 1 979; Strathern 1 97 1 ;  
Weiner 1 976). The Kwaio's struggle i s  embued with righteous purpose : their 
ongoing demands for compensation redressing the brutality of British colonial ism 
(e .g.  the 'Malaita massacre' ) based on both a desire that wrongs be righted 
and a desire to establ ish a basis for negotiation and to put the K waio and the 
government on the same footing (Akin 1 995), or in the same 'game' . Even the 
Tauade Papuans, described by Hallpike as hostile and given to violence for 
violence's sake, reserve their highest respect for peacemakers, skil led in oratory 
and exchange, and with a capaci ty for love and compassion to balance the 
darker side of Tauade passions and revenge (Hal lpike 1 977 :239). 
S imi lar evidence for a b ias towards peaceful solutions and fai rness al l 
around are to be found in the Law and Order l i terature. In his introduction to 
the Law Reform Commission monograph, Customary Law in Papua New 
Guinea,  Scaglion ( 1 983) characterises customary law as flexible and chang ing, 
and designed to ensure equ i table sol ut ions through the i nvol vement and 
consensus of al l the relevant parties .  The same conclusions are drawn by Gordon 
and Meggitt, who v iew the social ends of Enga l aw and col lective violence as 
primary in Engan considerations ( 1 985 :  1 3 ) .  These insights into the nature of 
traditional legal and exchange systems have carried over i nto debates and 
studies on contemporary Law and Order and development issues in the region:  
Scagl ion,  for example, favouring Vi l lage Courts styled along the l ines of 
traditional legal systems with their stress on participation, consultation, and 
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compromise ( 1 983 :v i i) ;  Polume and other writers i n  the 1 7th Waigani Seminar 
col lect ion, Choices in Developmen t Planning (Hughes and Thirlwell 1 988), 
l ikewise cal l ing for more involvment of local landowners in  any developments 
concerning them, seeing such i nvolvement as both beneficial and in keeping 
with Somare's 'Eight Goals' for the development of Papua New Guinea (Polume 
1 988 :207) ; and Filer ( 1 993) reflecting on the futi l ity of any mining venture 
that does not consider i ndigenous l andowners as a force to be reckoned with .  
From these examples and the Gende material I can now expand upon my 
affirmative answer to  the  question, ' Is i t  possible to both develop Papua New 
Guinea and satisfy local landowners' claims?' First, anyone wishing to negotiate 
land deals with the Gende must consider the wider social and ethical meanings 
of land 'ownership' and exchange for the Gende, and be prepared to join the 
game as soc ial ly responsible players. As sophisticated and moral players, 
company representatives might, for example, set up l and tenure compensation 
boards, staffed equal ly with local leaders , company personnel and government 
officers. Members of this board would dec ide on just compensation terms and 
the mutual and varied responsibil ities of all participants. Local leaders would 
mobi l i se the cooperation of l andowners and help i n  identify ing the actual 
landowners in the vicinity of a proposed mine (tht is ,  persons who have earned 
the right to certain l ands through the appropriate exchanges) . Company 
representatives would promote fair play by giving proof of understanding local 
processes and demonstrati ng a wil l i ngness to help al l 'good' Gende to prosper 
Uust as the company is expecting the Gende to help them to succeed). In other 
words, what is being negotiated is not a simple business contract but a social 
commitment and, ideal ly, a 'win-win '  si tuation . The role of the Government is 
also to recognise the legitimacy of local compensation and exchange ethics and 
to assist businesses through recommending local ly experienced anthropologists 
and other experts to act as consul tants or to set up education programmes for 
members of the land compensation boards. 
Second , important considerations i n  any successful negotiation experience 
are, first, for al l sides to recognise that 'winning' is not everything unless all or 
a significant number of players also benefit and, second, that today 's winners 
may be tomorrow's  losers, and vice versa. Big-men l ike Ruge achieved their 
statuses by considering the needs of many persons and not only their  own 
ambi tions. Although Ruge benefited (in land) as a result of Andrew's fai lures 
and losses and had no obligation to continue an active relationship with Andrew, 
Ruge was astute enough to real ise that Andrew might regain the i nit iative one 
day and so continued to i nclude him in  his close network of exchange partners 
and in his (and his daughter's) business projects. That Andrew and many other 
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Gende never came c lose to winning as much as Ruge and his fami ly did in the 
development 'game' was extremely unfortunate for both them and Ruge. For 
this reason, any company who wishes to work in the area would do well to 
keep these kinds of pressures and disappointments in mind when they do set 
up negotiating teams, paying attention to the Geode's  entire si tuation-not 
only their immediate relations with the company-if they are to understand 
and respond correctly to the reverberations of social and exchange imbalances 
coming from within and without the company 's immediate zone of influence. 
An effective land compensation board could be helpful in this regard, including 
in its scope the need for ongoing social  impact studies and more general 
observat ions,  assisted when necessary by outside mediators and trai ned 
observers. 
Final ly, while it may be a 'scary ' proposition for some company personnel 
to engage in a more hol istic and personal way with local landowners (the reverse 
is also true ! ) , examples l i ke the Bundi  S trike and, more perti nently, the 
Bougainvil le and Ok Tedi crises (Hyndman 1 994; Ol iver 1 99 1 ;  Wesley-Smith 
1 992) suggest that it may be the only way to play the 'game' . While the Geode's 
' strike' netted them only a portion of their demands, they were energised by the 
Government's recognition and wi l l ingness to continue cooperating with them. 
At Ok Tedi ,  on the other hand, obvious, and to the Papua New Guinean workers 
and landowners, painful status distinctions between the Europeans working or 
l iving at the mine site and themselves have fueled resistance to the company 
and added to increases in compensation demands, again and again (Hyndman 
l 994:Chapter 7). And on Bougainvil le,  environmental destruction of a kind 
unenvisaged by the l andowners and, from their perspective, i nadequately 
compensated for by the company has for years resulted in  extreme distrust of 
the company on the part of many Bougainvil leans, the breakdown of company­
landowner relations and the cessation of business. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
LANDOWNER COMPENSATION : 
POLICY AND PRACTICE 
To ny Po wer 
This chapter attempts to uncover the Papua New Guinea Government pol icy 
regarding compensation in resource based developments .  In l ieu of any 
comprehens ive s tated pol i cy or phi losophy in any government p lan n i ng 
document, to the author's knowledge, an empirical approach is taken to uncover 
and analyse and i ntuit and extract pol icy from actual practice . This is  the 
methodology employed by Justice Barnett in his celebrated enquiry i nto the 
Forest Industry in Papua New Guinea. Barnett argued that if it is in actual practice, 
then this in itself indicates pol icy, stated or otherwise. 
In this chapter compensation i s  used in  the simple meaning of the word : as 
the payment or provision of some benefit to someone i n  return for the provision 
of something or other. In  resource based industries the obvious beneficiaries of 
such compensation are l andowners since virtual ly al l resources i n  Papua New 
Guinea are on privately owned land. This chapter wi l l  deal primari ly with min ing, 
petroleum and forestry, though the same approach could be taken to some aspects 
of fisheries, power and water supply and basic infrastructure. 
Certain facts and underly ing principles associated with the 'Melanesian 
world view' need to be kept in  mind to appreciate compensation in  Papua New 
Guinea. Papua New Guinea is made up of thousands of smal l scale societies 
lumped together willy n i l ly by colonial intervention a hundred years ago. In 
20 years of independent nationhood not a lot has been done to create a real 
sense of nationalism apart from the external symbols of flag, anthem, parl iament 
etc. The imposition of colonial rule and the emergence of statehood at Independ­
ence did nothing to recognise and address the fundamental and long establ ished 
Independence of the small scale societies, the land groups .  The colonial power 
had l imited understanding and l i tt le time for ful l  consideration of the over­
whelming diversity of Papua New Guinea. National poli ticians since i ndepend­
ence have assumed that their government has legitimacy simply because the 
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trappings are there, handed to them on a plate by Austral ia. The author has 
learnt from many years firsthand experience at the v i l lage level that the 
legit imacy of the National Government is superficial and tenuous . This fact is 
demonstrated in  a tragic and spectacular manner in Bougai nvi l le .  
Th is reference is outlined in  detail since i t  underl ines a fundamental attitude 
towards compensation demonstrated by landowners in all deal ings with the 
State or government-approved investors in all projects in Papua New Guinea. 
The S tate claims the right of eminent domain over al l land and water in Papua 
New Guinea. The State c laims ownership of all mineral s and petroleum in 
Papua New Guinea. Landowners do not accept this, or at least have great 
difficulties in reconcil ing this to their anc ient world view. How far the S tate 
goes in reconci l ing this c lash of views wi l l  emerge in this chapter, not by 
virtue of any philosophy but by dint of practice. 
Direct deal ing in land by outside investors with landowners is prohibited 
by Section 73 of the Land Act (Land Act, Chapter 1 85 ,  Revised Laws of Papua 
New Guinea 1996) .  However the Mining Act and Petroleum Act al low foreign 
companies to deal direc tly with landowners in the control led si tuation of 
government issued exploration and development l icences (Mining Act ,  Chapter 
1 95,  Revised Laws of Papua New Guinea 1 992; Petroleum Act, Chapter 1 98 ,  
Revised Laws of Papua New Guinea 1982) .  Forest legislation puts many more 
foreign companies into the field under the guise of ' forestry ' and the real i ty of 
non-renewable t imber extraction . A competent Department of Min ing and 
Petroleum controls and monitors foreign investors, which for the most part 
are consortia of transnational companies, here for the long haul ,  and partly 
regulated by themselves, their partners and their home governments . The Forest 
Authori ty, try as it might, so far fai ls to regulate adequately forest companies 
that are not self regulated, not transnational , not here for the long haul and 
replete with instances of regulatory non-compliance. These factors set the 
cli mate for compensation. 
Existing practice 
The analytical method used in  this chapter i s  as follows : 
• any aspect of practice that could be construed as relating to compensation 
wi l l  be detai led; 
• 
• 
• 
from this an attempt wi l l  be made to intuit the underlying pol icy and 
phi losophy; 
the responses to these activities by other stakeholders such as provinc ial 
governments, developers and landowners wi l l  then be examined; and 
fi nal ly some recommendations wi l l  be made for changes to pol icy, 
practice or legislation . 
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Mining and petroleum projects 
Table 4. 1 i l lustrates the types of exchanges that flow from production and the 
sale of non-renewable resources . The numbers are different in mining projects 
where d ifferent tax regimes apply but the same conditions exist i n  regard to 
types of cash flows, types of benefi ts and stakeholders. 
Participation by the State 
The Figure 4 . 1 scenario is  based on the assumption that the State owns the 
mineral s .  The State attempts to secure the best revenue scenario possible for the 
benefit of the country as a whole. The State thus sets taxation types and levels, 
royalty rates and negotiates state equity. The State then has set up some sharing 
mechanisms with other stakeholders . 
Participation by Provincial Governments 
1 .  Royalties are identified as a provincial government revenue. 
2. Spec ial Support Grants (SSG) are made to resource provinces as budget 
support for i n frastructure development .  (Both royal t ies and S S G  are 
related to the concept of a Derivation Grant being a revenue source for 
the provinces, spel led out in the Organic Law on Provincial Governments). 
3. Infrastructure grants or m ini ng grants are made to provi nces to assist 
them to provide goods and servi ces to the project landowners and to 
faci l i tate the development and operation of the project. 
4 .  Provincial governments are provided with a share of the state equity. 
Participation by landowners 
1 .  Landowners enjoy the promise of equity sharing in the resource project by 
way of shareholding in the state nominee company, e.g. Petroleum Resources 
Kutubu (PRK) for the Kutubu Petroleum Development Project. 
2 .  Landowners enjoy the benefit of infrastructure i n  their district constructed 
with funds from SSG and by the developer under the heading Mitigation 
Projects and under the Tax Credi t  Scheme. 
3. Aided and abetted by the State the project  l andowners now receive at least 
20 per cent of the royal t ies accru i ng to the provinc ial government .  
Landowners negotiate for an  addi t ional share dur ing the pre-project  
negotiations cal led the Forum Process. For example, the Kutubu land­
owners receive 40 per cent of the royalties from Kutubu petroleum and the 
Southern Highlands Provincial Government retains the 60 per cent remainder. 
4. Landowners get the following benefits from the developer: 
• Mitigation projects (usually  social i nfrastructure such as schools, aid 
posts, v i l lage roads). 
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Figure 4.1 Compensation in mining and petroleum projects 
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Participation by developers 
The Developer is required to extract the resource and sel l it on the world market. 
Taxes of al l kinds ( including a 50 per cent tax for petroleum projects) added to 
the equity for State nominee should mean the State receives 60 per cent of 
every kina of export income. The developer receives the other 40 per cent to 
pay back the huge capital invested and to return a profit to investors. The 
developer is required to provide a range of benefits to the i nhabitants of the 
project area as a normal part of operating expenses. The Tax Credit  Scheme 
al so involves the developer in  constructi ng infrastructure in the province to an 
agreed sum for agreed projects in l ieu of tax . 
Forestry projects 
By way of  co ntPlst the forest i ndustry presents  a d i smal  p ic ture for 
compensation, particularly from the point of view of the landowners whose 
forest patrimony is exhausted , to be replaced, so far, by no sustainable industry. 
Participation by the State 
The State admits that land is privately owned in Papua New Guinea and that the 
trees belong to the landowners . The State prohibits landowners from harvesting 
their forests other than by way of the Forestry Act (Forestry Act, Chapter 2 1 6, 
Revised laws of Papua New Guin ea 1 991 ). The State acquires control of the 
resource and parleys its extraction and sale. The State, frustrated by lack of 
income tax receipts from forests operators, has introduced a turnover tax in the 
forum of a species spec ific export tax ranging from 20 per cent to 46 per cent. 
Participation by landowners 
The State has made provisions for landowners to be involved in forestry projects. 
Companies have been formed by l andowners and these have secured a variety 
of business activities associated with the forest operator. Landowners receive 
royalties for timber harvested. Efforts are under way by the Forest Authority to 
draw down a premium (being part of the stumpage belonging to tree owners), 
to be paid to tree owners in  a project area in  the form of additional social and 
physical i nfrastructure. 
Participation by provincial government 
Provincial governments are entitled to a Derivation Grant pro-rated to 1 .25 per 
cent of the value of export logs leaving the province. 
Participation by logging companies 
Logging companies are required to provide social and physical i nfrastructure 
as part of their permit conditions. Logging companies are also required to adhere 
to certain environmental guidel ines. 
Underlying principles 
Eminent domain 
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The State clearly is  exercis ing i ts rights of eminent domain over the land of 
Papua New Guinea by way of i ts declaration of ownership of minerals and 
petroleum. 
Distributive justice 
The State fu lfi l l s  its responsibi l i ties under the rubric of di stributive j ustice 
using revenue derived from each resource project to find general development 
throughout the entire country. 
Melanesian distribution 
The State recogni ses the expectations flowing from Melanesian landownership 
concepts in  giving special recognition to the landowners of resource projects. 
Fiduciary responsibility 
The State has advised that at least 30 per cent of landowners' cash income from 
royalties must be devoted to a trust for future generations. The provis ion of 
goods and services rather than cash to landowners is also seen as the exerc ise of 
fiduciary responsibil i ty. The same is true of the Implementation and Monitoring 
Commi ttee of the Fi nance Department. 
The State's massive intervention in the privately owned National Forest 
Estate is presumably justi fied under this heading. 
Enlightened self interest 
The developer promotes the wel l-being and development of the project area 
inhabitants and attempts to create a community of interest with them to protect 
the operation of the project. 
Evaluation 
Mining and petroleum projects 
Like many th ings that were set up with admirable foresight i n  Papua New 
Guinea, when it comes to implementation, serious deficiencies occur which 
deny the i n tended resu l t .  B latant theft and corruption at the prov i nc ia l  
government level in  some provinces have denied landowners their expected 
and entitled share of benefits. Tne Monitori ng and Implementation Committee 
of the National Department of Finance and Planning does not have the resources 
or the mandate to take a tough l i ne with the provinces. The result  is that today 
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the provi nc ial governments owe the l andowners m i l l ions of kina worth of 
projects . 
B latant theft and corruption in landowner companies has s imi larly denied 
the flow of benefits to the Landowner Company shareholders. Some LANCOs 
have been set up in such a way that benefits would flow to a select few and not 
to the majority grassroots. In others (in petroleum projects), every effort has 
been made to align shareholding to Incorporated Land Groups (ILG), but thi s 
sty le of LANCO has not been i n  operation long enough for adequate evaluation 
(Land Group Incorporation Act, Chapter 1 47, Revised Laws of Papua New 
Guinea 1992). Even with the heavy hand of the developer and ILG shareholding, 
LANCOS can sti l l  be run corruptly because the lack of education of the share­
holders leaves them in a position of relying on the very leaders who are corrupt. 
Provincial attitudts 
In some provincial governments both pol it icians and bureaucrats show a strong 
feeling of resentment and jealousy towards project area people, even when 
their provincial budget is  ful l  of project related revenue that other provinces 
do not enjoy. This leads the bureaucrats to shrug off responsibi l i ty for the 
del ivery of goods and services, and leave i t  to the developer, even though they 
are told t ime and time again that the developer does not have this responsibi l ity. 
In some cases this attitude adds to the 'couldn' t  care less' att i tude regarding 
the required sharing of SSG funds i n  the project districts. 
National attitudes 
The National Government has for a long t ime appl ied a double standard to 
resource projects. Mining and petroleum projects are exposed to a great deal 
of regulation and effective monitoring by a reasonably competent Department 
of Minerals and Petroleum. These companies are performing well w ith 1 00 
per cent compl iance, to the best of thei r  abi l i ty. Even i n  the controversial 
matter of environmental damage they are comply ing with the conditions of 
their  permits . Any deficienc ies there may be are the respons ib i l ity of the 
respective government departments as the standards were set during overal l 
negoti at ions  at project i nception . The Department of Env i ronment  and 
Conservation i s  less active, but st i l l  monitors act iv i ties ,  through handfed 
information suppl ied by the mining and petroleum industry. 
The Departments of Labour and Employment and Foreign Affairs also 
receive total cooperation regarding work permi ts ,  train ing and local i sation 
from the m ini ng and petroleum i ndustry. Thi s  is  not to say there are no 
defi c ienc i es in these matters , but the defic ienc ies come from corporate 
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phi losophies, deficient from Papua New Guinea's point of view rather than 
from any intention of the multinationals to avo id compliance. 
Forestry projects 
The forest resource industry on the other hand is seriously deficient from 
almost every point of view. The majority of forest industry partic ipants are 
reai ly only logging companies, since very few have invested in processing or 
fostered a resource that is sustainable .  The Forest Authority is endeavouring 
to persuade major participants to establish processing faci l i ties and harvest 
sustai nably. There does not seem to be any shin ing example so far. One 
participant who has been in  Papua New Guinea for years, and who has replanted 
and processed timber, is now under siege in the courts by frustrated landowners 
aggrieved by environmental damage. 
The majori ty of forest industry partic ipants are not multinational companies 
and are not joint ventures so they are not self regulating . Some act as though 
they are not here for the long haul but only so long as there is  sti l l  untouched 
forest to cut. They do not have a good reputation for compl iance with their 
conditions of permit .  Almost dai ly there are news reports of breaches of laws or 
permit  condit ions,  inc luding those rel ati ng  to immigration, employment ,  
Investment Promotion Authority registration, environment and mitigation. Some 
certainly do provide some soc ial infrastructure and social benefits to the project 
area people. 
The state's fiscal arrangement in  taking a large sl ice by way of export tax is 
a sensible fiscal measure to make the logging companies pay. The State sti l l  
loses by way of  fraud but has taken measures to  reduce thi s by  contracting a 
surveil lance company to quantity survey log exports . 
Unfortunately the heavy export tax is at the expense of the resource owners 
who are not getting the returns for their trees that, for example, land-owners in  
Austral ia or  Switzerland would get. This tax could possibly be  construed as 
unconstitutional by way of being unjust deprivation . Landowners are the big 
losers in the logging business . Their forest and their environment is  degraded 
and they do not get anything l ike a fai r  return.  If there is no sustainable 
development replacing the forest then clearly the returns are not fair. At the 
very least the State is fai l ing in i ts fiduciary responsibil i ties. 
The forest industry landowner business arrangements also suffer from the 
same weaknesses as those in the mining and petroleum industry. The silent 
majority of owners do not receive the benefits that they are due, and the few 
managers and directors of the companies manipulate the system for their own 
benefit. Some logging companies actual ly  promote inequity by fosteri ng a 
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group of so-called leaders, usually as company officials, who corruptly receive 
benefits in return for bl ind acceptance of the logging company 's pol ici es that 
are not to the advantage of the resource owners . The Forest Authority, through 
the Forest Management Planning Project, has made a big effort to address 
these issues but progress is  slow and indeed a lot more needs to be done to 
close the gap between talk and action . 
The problem with successive governments and min isters is that private 
greed stands in the way of good government. Too many so cal led leaders do 
not want the Forest Authority to work wel l .  Certain management improvements 
have been put into place only to wither on the v ine due to budget constraint. 
How can you have a legit imate budget constraint i mposed on a so-called 
Statutory Authority that is  responsible for hundreds of mil l ions of export funds 
and many mi l l ion� of revenue? An authority which has assumed fiduciary 
responsibi l ity for bi l l ions worth of kina from resources owned by the rural 
citizens of the country. 
Recommendations 
1 .  Forest  revenue systems sho u ld  be scru t i n i sed by an i n ternat io na l  
organ isation, such as  the Food and Agriculture Organisation of  the United 
Nations, to report on the actual return to Papua New Guinean tree owners 
as compared with tree owners in developed countries. 
2 .  Constitut ional lawyers should examine the l egal i ty of the export tax 
imposed on logs. (The tax should be col lected by the State on behalf of 
tree owners . )  
3 .  LANCOs should be recognised under the Companies Act  as  a special 
species of company. Shareholdi ng must be confined to ILGs from the 
specific project area; primary ILG shares must not be traded; audit must 
be compulsory. Such compan ies would have certain privi leges and certain 
responsibil it ies. 
4. Further to this the State should expand its fiduciary responsibi l i ty towards 
l andowners of resource  projects to ensure that LANCOs and other 
landowner associations follow the letter of the law. This could be done by 
requ iri ng some form of state representat ion (by perhaps the Fi nance 
Department  or I nvestment Promotion Authority or S mal l Bus i ness 
Deve lopment  Corporat ion)  on  LANCO Boards .  Corrupt,  so ca l led 
landowner leaders (LANCO executives), should be prosecuted speedi ly. 
Trusts for future generations should be establ ished and monitored. 
5 .  The Monitoring Committee of the Departments of Finance or Planning 
(the Infrastructure Committee) should have sweeping powers to ensure 
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that provinces which fail to execute their responsibil ities towards project 
landowners entai led by receipt of SSG funds be speedily corrected . 
6. This Committee should al so have a purview of forestry projects and 
offenders should be speedi ly corrected . Clear penalt ies for breach of 
permit conditions should be spelled out and easily implemented. Perm its 
should place the onus on the resource extraction company to report 
progress towards defined milestones. 
Some of the above recommendations have impl ications for law reform. 
Others could be accompl ished by determined administrative reforms. Law reform 
is suggested to try to give the ini tiatives some continuity that may not flow from 
administrat ive measures . 
The mos t  i mportant  cons iderat ion  from th i s  i nves t ig at i o n  i s  the 
overwhelming evidence that resource owners or landowners or  landholders in 
Papua New Guinea, for a variety of reasons are not getting the returns that 
they should be . If they do not convert their patri mony i nto sustai nable 
development, then the more development that takes place, the less developed 
they w i l l  be .  This  wi l l p lace great stra ins  on a country that is al ready 
overburdened by law and order problems. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
1WO SIDES OF THE COIN: THE CASE OF FORIBTRY 
Hartmut Ho lzknecht 
It is  appropriate, some years after Papua New Guinea's Independence, to  look 
back at developments in the country s ince 1 975, to take stock of the current 
situation and to analyse l ikely future developments. In terms of the theme of 
this volume, i t  has become an i ncreasingly noticeable trend in  Papua New Guinea 
that demands for compensation in a wide range of modern sectors rarely, i f  
ever, l i nk  these demands with the partner to  rights (the other side of the coi n) ,  
namely ' responsibi l i ty ' . 
That such a l i nkage has val idity is shown most clearly i n  Papua New Guinea 
customary social control systems (e.g. Epstein 1 974; Tuzin 1 976). In the modern 
context, such expl icit customary l i nkage between protagonists in a potential 
compensation si tuation is to an i ncreasing extent bei ng ignored, is gradually 
vanishing. This development has consequences, amongst other things, for social 
control and Law and Order, as well as for controlled and productive resource 
management. 
The aim of this chapter is  to explore some aspects of the two sides of this 
'coin '  i n  the context of the exploitation of forest (and, by implication at least, 
other) resources in Papua New Guinea. The background to the industry and i ts 
current s ituation wi l l  not be set out i n  great detai l  here s ince this has been done 
in some recent publ ications (Holzknecht 1 995a and b ;  1 996; Holzknecht and 
Kal i t  1 995) and has been a subject of  major national and i nternational attention 
over the l ast few years. It will also become c lear why i t  w i l l  not be possible to 
set out detailed case studies here to illustrate particular points. 
A recap i tu l at ion  of the n at ional goals  and d i rect ive  pr i nc ip les ,  as 
promulgated in the 1 975 Constitution, is  fol lowed by a summary of some 
i mpacts of  forestry exploi tation in Papua New Guinea .  I then cons ider 
characteristics of the articulation between aspects of societal change. The 
chapter concludes with a discussion. 
National goals and directive principles 
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The preamble of the Constitution of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea, 
1 975,  declares, inter al ia :  
WE, THE PEOPLE OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA . . .  
• acknowledge the worthy customs and traditional wisdoms of our people 
-which have come down to us from generation to generation 
• pledge ourselves to guard and pass on to those who come after us our 
noble traditions and the Christian principles that are ours now 
AND WE ASSERT . . .  
• that all power belongs to that people-acting through their duly elected 
representatives 
• that  respect for the d i g n i ty of the i nd i v i dua l  and commun i ty 
interdependence are basic principles of our society 
• that we guard with our l ives our national identity, i n tegrity and self 
respect. . .  (Papua New Guinea 1 975 : 1 ) . 
The Constitution then sets out the 'National Goals and Directive Princ iples' 
(complete detai ls for each of these are set out in the Constitution): 
1.  Integral human development 
We declare our first goal to be for every person to be dynamically 
involved in the process of freeing himself or herself from every form of 
domination or oppression so that each man or woman will have the 
opportunity to develop as a whole person in relationships with others . . .  
2. Equality and Participation 
We declare our second goal to be for all citizens to have an equal oppor­
tunity to participate in, and benefit from, the development of our country . . .  
3. National Sovereignty and Self-Reliance 
We declare our third goal to be for Papua New Guinea to be politically 
and economically independent, and our economy basically self-reliant . . .  
4 .  Natural Resources and Environment 
We declare our fourth goal to be for Papua New Guinea 's natural 
resources and environment to be conserved and used for the collective 
benefit of us all, and be replenished for the benefit of future generations . . .  
5. Papua New Guinean Ways 
We declare our fifth goal to be to achieve development primarily through 
the use of Papua New Guinean forms of social, political and economic 
organization . . .  (Papua New Guinea 1 975:2-5) 
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This  is fol lowed i n  the Constitution by a s tatement of 'Basic R ights ' and 
'Basic Social Obligations' .  Parts of the latter relevant to this d iscussion include: 
WE HEREBY DECLARE that al l persons in  our country have the following 
basic obl igations to themselves and their descendants, to each other, and to 
the Nation :  
(a) t o  respect, and to  act i n  the spirit of, this Constitution ;  and 
(b) to recogn ise that they can fu l ly develop the i r  capab i l i t ies  and 
advance thei r  true i n terests only by act ive part icipat ion in the 
development of the national community as a whole; and . . .  
(d) to protect Papua New Guinea and to safeguard the national wealth, 
resources and envi ronment i n  the in terests not only of the present 
generation but also of future generations; and . . .  
(f) to respect the rights and freedoms of others, and to cooperate ful ly 
w i th others in the i nterests of i nterdependence and sol idarity . . . 
(Papua New Guinea 1 975 :5-6). 
These 'National Goals and Directive Principles' set out, in an ideal but 
nevertheless clear fashion, a number of approaches and expectations, not only 
for the State but also of i ts  citizens. The State's contract with its cit izens at 
least impl ies that i t  wi l l  always act in the best i nterests both of the State and 
its citizens, and that its laws, i nstitutions and due processes wi l l  protect c i tizens 
from exploitation and i ntimidation .  
In the cold l ight of h indsight it  i s  quite c lear that i n  many ways these 
ideals ,  goals and principles have been breached rather than observed, especially 
over the last 10 to 1 5  years. A number of questions arise as a consequence: 
What went wrong? What happened to these ideals, these goals and principles 
when subsequently translated into practice? How has it happened that a number 
of customary resource rights have been taken over and manipulated by a few 
individuals for their own benefit? What (and whose) rights and responsibi l i ties 
are involved i n  these changes and what avenues for redress and/or compensation 
do explo ited communities and i ndividuals have for foregone benefits from 
this kind of resource development situation? Where was the State while these 
developments were taking place and why was i t  not able to act in the best 
interest of i ts c i tizens, g iven that it had enshrined a number of quite explicit  
national goals and principles i n  the National Constitution, and therein given 
specific recognition to customary r ights (including resource rights)? 
The case of forestry 
Forestry development and exploitation in Papua New Guinea is a particularly 
appropriate context in which to examine some societal developments and the 
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associated inherent confl icts. Issues of compensation usually do not ari se at 
th i s  level ,  although the manipulation and exploi tat ion of the r ights and 
responsibi l i ties of a large percentage of Papua New Guinea's resource owners 
by a quite small group of individual beneficiaries suggests that perhaps some 
thought be given to such an approach. This section summarises some of the 
changes in the forestry sector. 
The tempo of forest exploitation has increased dramatically since the early 
1 970s, with i ncreasi ngly rampant and w idespread corruption ,  evasion of 
taxation and other statutory requ irements (through then standard practices 
such as transfer-pricing, misdeclaration and undervalu ing of the species being 
exported, inadequate governmental monitoring (Barnett 1 992)). Other practices 
included major environmental destruction through bad logging activi ties and 
non-ex istent minimum standard logging practices, non-sustainable logging 
activities, no attent ion paid to or interest shown in  ensuring adequate forest 
regeneration and consistent practices to cheat and manipulate resource owners 
(often through a client ' landowner' company) .  
In May 1 987 the Government set up a Commission of Inquiry into Forestry 
Matters under Judge T. Barnett to review the operations of the timber i ndustry 
and to investigate a number of the allegations of widespread impropriety and 
corruption . Concerning forestry activities in New Ireland Province, for example, 
Barnett wrote : 
It wou ld be true to say, of some of the companies, that they are now roaming the 
countryside with the assurance of robber barons; bribing politicians and leaders, 
creating social disharmony and ignoring laws in order to gain access to rip out and 
export the last remnant of the province's valuable timber (Papua New Guinea 1 989a). 
S ince  the Barnett Inquiry reports and recommendations were handed to 
government there has been a delayed but now general tightening up of the 
industry, including the following: 
• Apri l 1 990: World Bank-sponsored Tropical ForestAction Plan Roundtable 
meeting out of which was developed the National Forest and Conservation 
Action Programme (NFCAP). 
• A new National Forest Pol icy was unvei led in 1 99 1 .  I n  spite of this  policy 
being focused almost exclusively on production forestry, and therefore not 
broad based, it did expl ic i tly have a stated focus on 'sustainable yield 
management' . 
• Out of this pol icy a new Forestry Act was developed and approved by 
Parliament in 1 99 1 .  The gazettal of this Act in 1 992 repealed the old Forestry 
Act, the Forestry (Private Deal ings) Act and the Forest Industries Council 
Act. At the last minute a clause was inserted i nto the Act exempting current 
logging projects from the requirements of the new Act. The National Forest 
Services came under a new statutory authority, the Papua New Guinea 
Forest Authori ty, which was established and began operating in  1 993 .  
98 COMPENSATION FOR RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 
• 
• 
The new Forestry Act gave expl icit recognition and preference to customary 
resource owners and sets out a procedure for the identification of such 
persons and groups using an innovative piece of legislation, the Land Groups 
Incorporation Act 1 974. This Act essential ly gives recognition and a modern 
legal identity to appropriate customary groups (Fingleton n .d . ;  Holzknecht 
1 995b;  Holzknecht (ed . )  1 995 ; Power 1 995).  
Previous to this period of i nquiry and institutional change at the top, so­
called ' landowner companies' were being formed in order to become the 
l icensees for logging projects .  Such a company then usually brought in an 
overseas based logging firm to undertake logging and marketing activities 
in  an area. 
A landowner company was typically formed around a provincial or national 
pol itician or a former (or present) senior public servant. This leading figure 
and his faction or i n-group then became the principal (sometimes the only) 
shareholders i n  the landowner company, also holding the executive management 
and board of director positions. In approaching the government and the (then) 
Department of Forests and pressuring to be granted the timber permit, such 
landowner companies put themselves forward as being truly representative of 
all the resource owners in an area. As one of many examples, i n  the Arawe 
area of West New Britain Province there were at one time three ' landowner 
companies' claiming to represent all resource owners in that area, each with 
its attendant foreign logg ing contractor. 
• 
• 
These landowner company management bodies and boards, i n  most cases, 
persuaded by various means (but usually by many promises) the majority 
of people with rights to the forests to go along with plans for logging.  
These bodies and boards then become a protective front  between the logging 
firm on the one hand and the majority of the people in the project area on 
the other. The loggers do bus iness only wi th the l andowner company 
management and board who are also, typically, the recipients of the loggers' 
largesse, gratefulness, bribery--call  it what you wi l l .  This kind of patron­
cl ient relationship is  well-known and documented in detail i n  other countries 
and often in relation to resource exploitation. 
Management and board members i n  turn manipulate and exploit their own 
people for their own and the loggers ' benefit-in other words, they always 
side with the logger because that is where their current  income is derived. 
This  same cl ique also controls the use of and benefits from the funds which 
come into the landowner company but, i n  turn, i s  continually financial ly 
manipulated by the logging firm. International and national travel (among 
many other benefits )  are typica l ly  offered to management and board 
members as i nducements by the logging company, but costs subsequently 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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subtracted (often at a premi um) from fees or royal ties payable to the 
landowner company. 
Other provincial and national personnel (some very senior i n  provincial 
government, some provi ncial police and their staff, some senior as wel l as 
jun ior forestry officers, etc . )  become actively and progressively entangled 
in  these logging webs as the logging companies' needs expand. For i nstance 
the need for approvals, for the waiving of legal requirements of various 
kinds (but especial ly in  environmental and labour requirement matters), 
turn ing a bl i nd eye during i nspections of export logging ships, suppressing 
complaints from resource owners concerning envi ronmental and other 
damage due to logging ( including charging i ndiv iduals in court to try to 
decrease their i nfluence with their fellow resource owners). The l ist could 
go on and on. 
In fact, the s i tuation i n  the logging and log export i ndustry s ince the 
completion of the Barnett Inquiry can best be summarised as being much 
more blatant and greedy in its disregard for the law of the land (in different 
sectors in both the customary and formal legal spheres) and in the buying of 
influence. Logging companies have now branched out i nto newspaper 
ownership, into operating wholesale and retail outlets, i nto real estate and a 
host of other business activ i ties .  It is not by coincidence that measures related 
to establ ishing stronger controls over foreign loggers and their activities i n  
Papua New Guinea have always had great difficulty i n  being approved by 
the required majority i n  National Parl iament; in this way the patron-cl ient 
relationships also affect the workings of government. 
S ince the establ ishment of the Papua New Guinea Forest Authority, a great 
deal of work has been carried out to retram foresters, to put into place new 
requirements, procedures and appropriate methods to work with resource 
owners . Nevertheless, it should be clearly noted that none of these new 
requirements for sustainabi l i ty and for i nvolvement of resource owners 
through properly representative organisations can be forced upon current 
logging projects which are specificall y  exempt from such requirements ; 
they apply only to new projects. Even the i ntention, as set out i n  the Forestry 
Act 1 99 1 ,  to require all l andowner organisations to register with the Forest 
Authority, indicating their proper representativeness through membership 
l ists (etc . )  has been vehemently opposed by puppet landowner organisations 
(set up and funded by loggers) and others . 
S ince commercial logging and log exporti ng activities began i n  Papua New 
Guinea, gradual ly increasing under the Australi an colonial admini stration 
and exponent i al l y  s i nce then ,  there has always  been an underly i ng 
assumption that the Admin istration (and thereafter the State) undertook to 
purchase the timber rights i n  any particular part of the country and then to 
secure the services of a commerci al logging operator to 'develop' that 
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resource, in the best interests and on behalf of the people of that area and 
country as a whole. In turn it was to have provided for the people of the 
area access to services and infrastructure such as schools, medical aid­
posts and roads .  
In the 1 970s and 1 980s, government agreements with logging companies 
stipulated that specific services and infrastructural improvements which met 
certain establ ished standards (e .g . for roads) had to be provided . However, 
other than having perhaps a forester or two in place, government has abrogated 
its direct responsibil ities to the people in favour of commercial interests. It has 
purposely withdrawn from such natural resource development projects and in 
so doing has allowed such companies to become 'quasi-government' bodies in 
conjunction with their normal commercial activities. In whose interests were 
and are these resource projects developed if government does not play its expected 
ro le i n  bei ng an in termediary between resource owners and commerc ial 
interests? The State has al so not fulfil led other aspects of its proper role in 
acti ng for i ts citizens, for instance the proper and ongoing monitoring of such 
commercial activities in  remote, and not so remote, parts of the country. 
The notes set out above attempt to give the reader a sense of current and 
developing tensions, the ferment and the agendas of different interest groups 
in the Papua New Guinea forestry sector. 
Problems in societal articulation 
Developments in the forestry sector in Papua New Guinea, needless to say, 
did not take place in a vacuum, but against distinctive historical processes, 
moving from colonial times to the end of the colonial era, into Independence 
as a nation-state ; moving from a communi ty ' s  focus on the i n tegrated, 
traditional , local and/or regional level to an orientation in the world outside 
these spheres, moving from a predominantly subsistence, barter economy to a 
gradual but inexorable encompassment by capitalism and the cash economy, 
even in the most remote parts of the country. 
Pre-contact local economies w ith their cri tical d iv is ion of production 
between different communities, with ownership of rights to real property, and 
with di stribution systems through trading partnerships and ceremonial (usual ly 
competi tive) exchange, dispersed local products throughout a region. Key 
elements of such systems depended on ki n and quasi-kin relationships through 
which leading personalities control led production and circulation by control l ing 
individuals and groups of people  i n  various ways. 
People manipulated kinship systems in  order to gain access to important 
aspects of the production and circulation of goods, by using strategies such as 
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the arrangement of marriages and adoptions, committing themselves virtually 
as cl ients to a particular leader-patron. The articulation between these various 
spheres of daily l iv ing and acting produced various patterns of group structure 
and process, leadership, economic activity etc . Such articulations were not 
fi xed but were responsive to changes in each soc iety and its environment, 
al though i t  seems that in pre-contact times such changes were small and 
relatively slow (Carrier 1 992). 
With the imposition of colonial administration, the gradual changes i n  many 
such a traditional power-wealth control nexus had important effects in rural 
communities. They became increasingly oriented towards the world outside: 
increasingly dependent on government support and the i ncreasingly penetrative 
capi tal ist economy. The old articulated local and reg ional systems of local i ty, 
production, ki nship and c irculation were gradual ly replaced as the loci of 
significant sources of wealth moved out of the region and out of the control of 
vi l lage societies (Carrier 1 992 : 1 33) .  
Colonisation and i ts effects did not directly change the underlying ideologies 
of kinship and ownership. Nevertheless, there were major changes : leading men 
were able over time to exert less control over younger men by control l ing 
marriage and affinal arrangements or exchange and trading relationships. New 
systems of weal th production, through education, migration and remittances 
(Pomponio 1 992 ; Carrier and Carrier 1 989), gradual ly replaced the old while 
sti l l  retai ning the idiom and structures revolving around kinship. Note that each 
community or group of communities has responded and is  responding in its 
own ways to being i nfi l trated by capital ism, ways in which it accepts or resists 
such influences or uses them for i ts own purposes (LiPuma 1 995) .  
Through this sti l l  continuing process of change and rearticulation of systems, 
commoditisation of certain  elements of Papua New Guinea culture and environ­
ments has gradual ly emerged, elements to which in the past no specific or direct 
value was ascribed since they were always avai lable and accessible for use. 
Forest resources are a case in point . In most Papua New Guinea societies, 
it is only economic trees (for example, breadfru i t  trees, nut trees such as 
Canarium and Terminalia spp . ,  canoe trees, betelnut palms, pandanus) which 
are owned by individuals .  They plant and look after them and al so have the 
right to pass the ownership of them on to particul ar persons on their death. 
Heavily forested areas wil l  fall within the territory of a particular group, usual ly 
a c l an ,  al though people from other groups in the community may, w i th 
permission, hunt or garden or collect wi ld foods or housing materials or other 
products from these areas . 
There was never a reason i n  the pre-colonial past for forest areas to become 
commoditised and they were not seen from this point  of v iew during most of 
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the colon ial period; they were basically a 'common good' , a common resource, 
with rights to specific economic trees owned by i ndividuals, but the remainder 
of the forest accessible to everyone holding direct or temporary usage rights. 
As the country of Papua New Guinea became increasingly drawn into the world 
economy, and external values were placed on t imber species. Resource owners 
i ncreas ingly became targeted by foreign interests seeking access to these 
resources, whi lst being undermi ned by entrepreneurial local and national 
interests wanting to arrange such access for outside exploitation for personal 
gain .  
Papua New Guinea tropical timber species have become increasingly sought 
after on world markets as export restrictions, or total log export bans, have 
progressively come into force in other t imber producing countries to the north . 
Early logging activi ties during colonial administrations required loggers to leave 
in place tree species which were l isted on a schedule attached to the logging 
agreement, these usually being the economic trees i n  terms of subsistence in an 
area. Loggers who breached this aspect of the agreement were required to 
compensate tree owners according to a scale of compensation values fixed by 
the Valuer General, and thi s practice continues today (although on the official 
scale of compensation, values remain very low).  
Discussion 
The data above have set out a number of aspects showing how the forestry 
sector has developed and changed over the years and how it can serve as a 
particularl y compel l ing case study of the progressive d isengagement of rights 
from responsibi l it ies, 1 both by the State and by local and national leaders 
(detai ls of specific cases and examples have not been presented for cautionary 
reasons). 
Pol icy reform and the implementation of new procedures and measures 
set out in the 1 99 1  Forestry Act, which were intended to bring about more 
State control of the sector (Holzknecht 1 995a and b) are now gradually havmg 
this effect. However, i t  must be clearly understood that these reforms are in 
real ity so far having l i ttle broad impact on the ground, since the Act al so 
exempted all existing logging projects from adopting the reforms-the new 
legis lative requirements apply only to new projects .  In addition, the new forest 
pol icy as a whole suffers from being directed almost entirely towards large 
scale commercial logging operations, ignoring the whole range of forest values 
and forest uses for soc iet ies which by and l arge are sti l l  mai ntained by 
subsistence agriculture and the regular use of a very wide range of forest 
derived products . 
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Also of concern is that government policy makers and implementers sti l l  
have not understood the ramifications of the constitutional endorsement of 
and support for customary resource tenure and use systems whereby control 
l ies in private hands. This cannot be changed by legislation at thi s stage i n  
Papua New Guinea's history. A particular impl ication of  resource manage­
ment remaining under resource owners ' control is  that more i nformation and 
unbiased advice has to be made available on a regular basis to customary 
resource owners. A re-empowerment movement needs to be implemented, if  
not by the Government, then by non-government organisations and resource 
owner representatives themselves (which could also have a number of quite 
dramatic and long term effects) .  Current practices and approaches to resource 
exploitation i n  Papua New Guinea (not just in forestry but also in sectors such 
as agricu l ture, fisheries and the management of water resources) are not 
acceptable to the m ajor i ty of resource owners who have been duped , 
manipulated and l ied to by thei r  own leaders for personal gain-wealth, power 
and influence-and to aid foreign resource exploiters . 
There have been only two major changes i n  thought and approach i n  the 
forestry sector. The first stems from a legis lat ive commitment to pursue 
sustainable development and sustained yield management of forest resources. 
What exactly this means in practice has not yet been properly operational ised. 
Some consequences of this commitment include that new (or revamped old) 
projects will need to be much larger in  area i n  order for an adequate cutt ing 
cycle to allow natural regeneration to take place. This means that disparate 
groups of resource owners will  have to be able to work together i n  the same 
framework agreement for a project, i n troduci ng heightened possibi l ities for 
friction and dispute. 
The second group of changes relate to the proposals for more active 
i nvolvement of resource owners. Thi s  is to be ach ieved through targeted 
awareness programmes and by i mplementation of the Forestry Act's preference 
for resource owners to be organised through the procedures set out in the Land 
Groups Incorporation Act 1 974. The procedures set out in this innovative and 
much neglected legislation formal ly identify customary social units (e .g.  the 
c lan)  which control access to customary land and other resources; the Act 
gives this uni t  recognition and standing under modern Papua New Guinea 
law, subject to certain conditions pertain ing to i ncorporation, registration and 
operation (Holzknecht 1 995a, 1 996;  Holzknecht (ed . )  1 995) .  
Neither the Forestry Act of 1 99 1  nor any of the other resource-related Acts 
of the National Parl iament attempt to recreate the previous traditional l inkage 
between rights and responsibil i t ies .  This  l inkage is necessary precisely because 
of the nexus between action and consequence in customary bel ief and practice, 
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which appl ies in many respects up to the present, and the spec ific recogni tion 
of such custom and practice by the State through the National Constitution 
(Donigi 1 994) . 
Does the d isregard for this l inkage and nexus, and its regular flouti ng, 
consti tute accidental or premeditated negligence on the part of the State and on 
the part of Papua New Guinea's local and national leaders?What kind of redress 
do resource owners have, either as individuals or as groups, if actions taken by 
· the State or by particul ar individuals (from outside or within these communities) 
infri nge, or even ignore, the customary rights of others? 
These are particularly pertinent questions if individuals or groups have not 
been party to negotiations establ ishing a resource exploitation regime, or if 
they have been opposed to it all along . If a part of the community, for whatever 
reasons, opposed a proposed logging project, why was it not able to put a stop 
to the project? What happens to community members who lose their resource 
birthright through no fau lt of their own and for no benefit of any kind? 
This chapter is not the place to answer such questions. My purpose here has 
been to present data relating to the conjunction and disjunction between rights 
and responsibil ities, mainly in a forestry context (although wider social ,  political 
and economic issues in development clearly loom behind this narrow context) 
and to tease out some of the connections between actors and developments 
which have taken place. These disjunctions in real ity highl ight themselves, yet 
plans have proceeded regardlessly and have been implemented, usually with 
very widespread social ,  environmental and economic disruption following hard 
on the heals of project ac tivities. 
The questions remain to be asked again and again .  Does only one side of 
the coin I have been describing have value? Is only one side of the coin legal 
tender? Can the two sides of the coi n ,  represent ing community involvement in  
and control of  its own natural resources for the benefit of the community as  a 
whole, compete with the individual ism, power, influence and self-centeredness, 
represented by only one side of the coin? 
Note 
1 Some aspects of these developments have i nteresting resonances both wi th the 
'enclosures of the commons'  (which began around the 1 5 th century in England , 
continuing well into Tudor ti mes) and with the takeover by the Teutonic knights of 
the Baltic ti mber and fishing trade (around the 1 3th to 1 5th centuries), and with 
the consequences of some of these and related series of historical events (also, for 
example, Hardin 1 968, McCay and Acheson 1 987, Ostrom 1 990) .  
CHAPTER SIX 
CHEQUES AND BALANCES : COMPENSATION 
AND MINING IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
Richard Jacks on  
Compensation issues are o f  daily and immense practical significance i n  Papua 
New Guinea. The breakdown of compensation arrangements on Bougainv i l le 
almost brought the whole country to i ts knees whilst recent court action against 
Ok Tedi Mining Limited (OTML), if  successful, will have enormous repercussions 
not merely for the north Fly area but for the national economy as a whole. In 
this chapter I wish, however, to focus on some of the underlying i ntellectual 
issues involved in 'compensation for resource development' and leave i t  to 
others to work out better practical arrangements. 
I bel ieve that three concepts need to receive rather basic consideration before 
any ongoing, satisfactory compensatory systems can be put in place: 
• What is the purpose of compensation? 
• What and to whom, at different moments in time, is a resource worth? 
• The art of mining;  note that I bel ieve that mineral exploration (and 
exploitation to a lesser degree) is  very much more of an art than a precise, 
technology-based science than is  commonly bel ieved. 
My basic point is that the values assigned to resources themselves change their 
nature over time relative to d ifferent i nterest groups. They can never be 
universally defined at any one moment in  time for any set of different i nterest 
groups. Over time their definition becomes an impossibil i ty. Thus compen­
sation for resource loss cannot itself be fixed as in, for example, a Valuer General's 
handbook of kina values. 
I shal l try, in this chapter, to examine some aspects of the changing concept 
of compensation in Papua New Guinea; to highl ight, with the use of Papua New 
Guinea examples, the ways in which resources change in value over time; and 
to show how the i nexactitude of mineral exploration makes it  virtual ly i nevi table 
that any pre-mining agreements on compensation must always remain open to 
renegotiation. 
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Key issues 
Compensation: bringing back balance 
Over the years I have come to be extremely harsh with any of my students who, 
at the start of an essay, insist on defin ing the terms in their subject title (usually 
with the help of a grossly oversimplified dictionary) .  But here I wish to commit  
that same s i n  del iberately, and poss ibly more appropriately, s i nce l egal 
draftspersons, above al l other writers, always start off any Act or Statute with a 
long l ist of precise definitions (which, incidentally, worry me; how can precisely 
defined laws serve imprecisely behaving humans?). 'Compensation' in i ts original, 
and continuing underlying, sense means 'to bring matters back into a (previously 
assumed) balance' . In the mechanical world i t  meant, amongst other things, the 
additional of weights on either side of a fulcrum or to the motor device of a 
clock (the pendulum) so as to achieve a new or restored balance. 
In social terms th is mechanical defin ition retains, I think, great usefulness 
even if it is not a perfect analogy. Melanesian societies have long used care­
fully calculated levels of compensation as a means of maintaining (or restoring) 
soc ial and political balance in, and between, societies . Such compensation did 
not always succeed in its objective. There i s  ample evidence of theft of land, 
wars of extermination and outright i nvasion which no amount of compensation 
could prevent (or rectify) amongst Melanesians, even before the great colonial 
and neo-colonial land and resources grab. Moreover, even discounting the many 
cases where compensatory mechanisms were rendered entirely i neffective, it i s  
axiomatic that even when such mechanisms d id  create rel ative harmony they 
did not always restore the previously existing situation, s ince if that had been 
the case how could any form of social change have occurred? Thus, it seems to 
be futile to expect compensation to act as a complete restorative; even in pre­
colonial society it appears to have acted as a brake on too rapid a process of 
change, even though in day-to-day affairs i t  worked remarkably well as a means 
of retain ing social cohesion. 
In some ways, changing soc io-pol itical c ircumstances, brought about by 
the i ntrusion of non-Melanesian forces into Papua New Guinea, have been 
grappled with by modern Melanes ians so as to i ncorporate new forms and 
methods into pre-ex isting compensation processes. A colourful ,  if  fairly trivial , 
example might be the poles to which paper money is now pinned as an integral 
(and decorative) part of many peoples' brideprice (or 'compensation for loss 
of labour and reproduction ' )  ceremonies. 
However, the 'pendulum' analogy is also inadequate for several reasons. 
First, because adaption to socio-pol i tical c ircumstances, in all societies, is 
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always slower than the rate of change i n  those circumstances themselves. For 
example, most nations which have deregulated their financial markets, thus 
allowing capital to move instantaneously and freely around the world, sti l l  act 
as if their pol itical leaders 'controlled '  a closed off national economy. In a 
completely different area, demographic change usually leaves social custom 
in  its wake. For example, as medical services improve so the l ife expectancy 
of women increases faster than that of men, and women begin to outnumber 
men in the population . Yet marriage patterns ( including male polygamy and 
males marrying females younger than themselves) and the role of women in  
soc iety continue to reflect an era when demographic c ircumstances were quite 
different .  In those areas of Papua New Guinea most affected by m in ing 
developments, objective economic changes have been so rapid and so large 
that it is not surpris ing that even dynamic ' traditional ' values have not been 
able to digest such changes within pre-existing sets of behavioural codes. 
Min ing i s  tending  to force the pace of soci al change at a rate which i s  
unacceptable t o  many communities. 
A second reason why the 'pendulum' analogy i s  inadequate arises out of 
the fact that for compensation to work, just as i n  any sort of trade, a set of 
equivalent val ues have to be agreed upon between parties i nvol ved in  any 
situation generating the need for compensation . Such a set of equivalents is 
extremely difficult to establ i sh if one party's  values are pri ncipally assoc iated 
with use and the other' s are those of exchange. 'Use values' ,  in simpl ified 
terms, are the values put on objects, ski l ls ,  behaviour which are consumable 
( ' used ' )  by their creator/producer; 'exchange val ues' are those values put on 
objects, ski l ls ,  behaviour which, whilst of no direct use to the producer, can be 
exchanged, bartered or, most frequently, sold to others who do have a direct 
use for them. The process of exchange then provides the producers with the 
wherewithal (usual ly cash) to obtain goods which are of direct use to them. 
Obviously, as global trade expands so exchange values have spread at the 
expense of use values . Subsi stence or semi-subsi stence societies are , by 
definition,  dominated by use values ; the commerci al world deals only i n  
exchange values. 
The s i tuation i s  complicated by the fact that in almost all Melanesian 
societies many items 'cannot' have an exchange value-and land is  the most 
obvious of these-even inside a particular society. User rights may, and often 
are, exchanged or granted much to the confusion of outside anthropologists or 
geographers or employees of m ining companies trying to work out to whom 
any set of rights over one parcel of land belong. But such systems cannot easily, 
or sometimes ever, absorb the idea of 'everything has a money price' which is  
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the hal lmark of global capital ist society. Mineral exploitation poses especial ly 
severe confl icts in  compensation because i t  bri ngs together what are often 
extremes of use and exchange values. Because many mines are located in 
what were , previous to operations, extremely remote areas they are often, 
therefore, impacti ng on societies with l imi ted knowledge of commercial 
practices, immobile use values and very l i mited markets . By contrast the 
companies operate on a global scale in which their product and input process 
vary only marginal ly from one part of the world to any other at any one moment 
in t ime. 
Under such circumstances anything resembl ing the pre-mining balance 
cannot possibly be achieved by any form of compensation . Even if operations 
were closed instantly and restoration work then thoroughly undertaken, the 
shock of new knowledge to prior socio-pol it ical systems cou ld never be 
removed. In such circumstances therefore, if  compensation is taken to mean 
restoring a previous balance then it is hardly conceivable that it could occur. 
Even if it means creating a new balance then such a balance must entail trauma, 
for the pre-existing system, in many areas, will have been rendered inval id by 
the incoming operations and it wi l l  always take years or generations for that 
socio-political adjustment to be made. 1 
In short, therefore, I remain pessimistic that, in the face of the massive 
changes wrought by modern min ing investment in areas of, at best, semi­
subsistence societies, compensation can do anything to restore a pre-existing 
balance-even if  any such balance in fact existed. The best it can hope to do is  
create a new, mutually acceptable balance. 
The fact that mutually intel ligible value equivalences so rarely exist between 
vi l lages and mine operators also means that where attempts are made by one 
side in the argument to accommodate the values of the other within its thin king, 
those attempts often result in what are seen as grotesque demands by the opposing 
party. The Bougainvi l le Revolutionary Army (BRA) demanded of Bougainvi l le 
Copper Limited (BCL) more compensation than the total value of the copper 
mine's production throughout its l ife,  for example. To BCL this was entirely 
grotesque. But to the BRA, BCL's activities over the years had been equally 
grotesque. 
Slippery resources 
The si tuation is not made any easier when it is remembered that not only is  
any attribute, thing, product or  other resource not  universal ly accepted by al l 
societies at any one moment in time, but that what is a resource now (to any 
one society) may not be a resource in future. There are many reasons for rapid 
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changes i n  resource evaluation and these wi l l  be examined shortly. However, 
before that I wish to give a local, rather dramatic set of examples and to make 
a general point. 
The first example, of mineral in terest, concerns the quarries of stone prized 
for the making of axes in the highlands area of Papua New Guinea in pre­
contact times. Hughes ( 1 977) showed how these l imited supply poi nts of a high 
value commodity, often s ituated in ,  what are today, remote locations became 
focal points of trade routes and all the socio-pol it ical paraphernal ia  which 
accompany trade. The landholders of such areas who control led such resources 
were sought-after individuals-marriages were arranged so as to give outsiders 
privi leged access to the axe stones. Of what value is the previously highly valued 
resource today? A second, much more speculative example may be of interest: 
how do we know that gold, for example, wi l l  be a highly prized metal in  future? 
There is no particularly essential use for gold and certainly no rationale to justify 
i ts current price. Gold is valuable not because it is useful but because people 
beli eve it is valuable. What if, tomorrow morning, the world woke up and 
col lectively decided that the price of gold should reflect i ts actual use? Almost 
every gold mine in  the world would c lose down since gold, to al l intents, would 
no longer be a resource. A third, real example :  exactly what are the copper/gold 
resources of Ok Tedi?  No one knows, for reasons to be discussed below ; what is 
certain  is  that in  1 979 the mine's feas ib i l i ty study suggested that the total 
mineable gold content of Ok Tedi was 1 1 .2 mi l l ion troy ounces and there were 
2.76 mi l l ion tonnes of mineable copper. At the end of 1 989, after six years of 
min ing, there were estimated to be 1 1 .0 mi l l ion troy ounces of gold and 3 .7 
mi l l ion tonnes of mineable copper at Ok Tedi .  Ok Tedi 's resources had actually 
increased with mining .  Exactly why is an i ssue we will address shortly. 
These examples raise the general issue: if compensation is to be paid for 
mineral resource extraction, but what is  or is not a resource can fluctuate so 
wildly, how can any forecasts of compensation ever be made or levels of future 
compensation negotiated with any certainty ? 
Let us briefly run through some of the things which can cause variations in  
resource values. Essentially the three broad, i nterlocking influences are : social 
values, technology and world prices. That changes i n  social values alone can 
render what was a valuable resource valueless can clearly be i l lustrated in many 
areas of Austral ia where bans on the extraction of minerals and other prev ious 
resources from areas determined by society i n  general to be worthy of 
preservation for environmental reasons, have rendered such minerals worthless. 
Coinc idental ly, such changes i n  social values i n  Austral ia  have caused the value 
of, for example, Ghana's mineral resources to be upgraded . Thi s  is because 
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several smaller Austral i an min ing companies, seeing their future threatened 
by ecological preservation orders at home, have shifted their activ ities overseas 
and many have moved to Ghana to sites previously considered worked out and 
worthless. Two general points arise out of thi s which I think are rarely if ever 
considered seriously : if  soc iety should be paid compensation when a resource 
is  extracted , should a potential or resident 'extractor' be paid compensation 
when their resource is rendered valueless by social action? Or, i f  an 'extractor' 
through its activ ities gives value to what was previously considered worthless 
by a society, what, if  any, compensation should the 'extractor' have to pay to 
that society? 
One reason why Australi an mining companies have found Ghana's mineral 
resources attractive,2 aside from reduced environmental ist pressure, was that 
whilst Ghana has been a major min ing area for hundreds, even thousands, of 
years its mining was based, s ince 1 880, on deep shaft underground min ing 
whose products, rather crudely extracted, generated large quantities of tai l i ngs. 3 
Fifty years ago extraction technology meant that only ores with high metal 
content could be considered useful resources. So, for example, ores with less 
than 5 per cent copper content, especially i f  not in  easi ly accessible locations, 
would be ignored. The technology of extraction has today progressed to the 
point where Ok Tedi went ahead in 1 983 under the assumption that i ts average 
copper content (or 'grade' ) was a mere 0.67 per cent-and in one of the (then) 
remotest locations in  the world. Austral ian companies i n  Ghana today are not 
interested in deep mining but in  opencast surface extraction of low grade ores 
or the reworking of tai l ings from previous mining eras. Technology has made a 
resource of what was earl ier societies' 'waste' product. This ,  by the way, is a 
reason why, quite aside from any environmental considerations, it i s  highly 
desirable that all mining operations retain tai l ings 'waste' rock as close to site 
as possible. It was an argument forcefully put by Pintz ( 1 984) in the Ok Tedi case. 
However, while improved technology means that what was 'waste' (unusable) 
has now become a resource (useable) in the global market place and whilst 
things which were not resources i n  earl ier years, because the technology to 
make them useful did not exist, now have become resources, the advance of 
technology also means that vastly larger quantities of waste and tai l i ngs are 
now being produced. In mini ng-as I suspect is true i n  almost all modern 
commerci al act ivities-the problem is not that resources are running out; 
technology i s  creat ing new ones al l the t ime. The real problem i s  how to 
dispose of greatly i ncreased volumes of waste. Whi lst human i ngenuity has 
consistently shown i tself capable of avoiding a Malthusian resources/population 
cris is ,  i t  has not paid sufficient attention to the issue of waste disposal . 
The art of exploration geology 
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A third problem for matters of compensation l ies i n  the very nature of geological 
exploration. Many people outside the min ing i ndustry (and some with in i t) 
think that when a min ing project actually starts production, after years of 
exploration, the min ing company knows accurately what mineral s are i n  the 
ground and where they are. If this were so then it would be entirely reasonable 
to assume that, since the extent of the resource was known, the main problem 
in  assessing how much of its value should be devoted to compensation would 
rest in  factors considered above, that is, fluctuations over time i n  the resource's 
monetary worth. Unfortunately, thi s  assumption, held by many, is  not valid :  
when a min ing project starts operations, exploration has only discovered the 
roughest outl i nes of the ore body. The degree of accuracy of geolog ical 
knowledge prior to m ining does vary with the type of ore body-one which 
has high value concentrations i n  small spaces, if hit  by a dril l  hole, will be 
more known than one with diffuse distribution and patches of higher grade 
ore . Nevertheless, in almost no mining project is the qual i ty of ore known 
before min ing commences. 
This raises at least three questions : 
• Why does the company not know more beforehand? 
• How on earth does the company know whether to proceed? 
• What effect does this inaccuracy of prior knowledge have on companies? 
The process whereby an orebody is 'proved' appears at first sight to be 
extremely sophi sticated. Certainly i t  uti l ises high-tech methods. However, 
essentially i ts methods are simple. In the early phases of exploration samples 
of soi l  and stream water are taken. If analysis of these shows interest ing results 
then more detailed sampli ng of the geochemical and geophysical characteristics 
of the area both by ground survey and remote sensing (by satel l ite or a ir  
photography) usually  follows . If these surveys also show i nteresting results ,  
the exploration geologist  may then bring i n  dri l l ing equipment and take rock 
core samples, to 200 or 300 metre depths, at a couple of locations. If these, i n  
turn, are ' interesting' the exploration geologist hands over to  a project geologist. 
The former wanders off into the bush (exploration geologists are wi ld creatures) 
to start again on soil and stream samples i n  a new area. The project geologist 
then maps out a series of dril l  holes i n  a grid arrangement. Each dril l  hole, 
usual ly, i s  located at one corner of a square with 320 metre (say) s ides. 
Thus each dri l l  sample is  320 metres from the next. The dril l  core itself 
abstracts from the earth a tubular section of rock whose d iameter may be 5 
centimetres or so and whose length depends upon the project geologist's guess 
as to how deep the best ores are located. The key factor, for the purposes of the 
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present argument, is that the diameter of the core is 5cm and thus it has a 
surface area of 3 . 1 4  x (2.5)2 (Pr2) or around 20 square centimetres. Remembering 
that the dri l l  holes are 320 metres apart, thi s  represents a sample of 20 square 
centimetres of an area of 32,000 x 32,000 square centimetres or of 1 i n  50 
mil l ion. This is an incredibly tiny sample :  imagine a pol i tical pol l ster using 
such a sample size to forecast an election result .  
Of course, if  this dri l l ing is ' i nteresting' i t  i s  also possible that a denser grid 
of dri l l  holes is establ ished . However, it is very unusual for such a grid to have 
holes closer than 20 metres apart over a significant area.  A 20 metre grid would 
give a sample of 1 in 200,000. Even though this i nformation is by no means al l 
that the project geologist has to go on, it sti l l  means that the interpretation of the 
nature of an orebody prior to i t; mining is in many ways more of an art, depending 
on the experience and i ntel l igent guesswork of the project geologist, than it is a 
true science where al l  is exactly known.4 The orebody is only known very 
crudely when the decision to mine is taken . It is the job of the min ing geologist 
to keep on exploring within the site once the operations have started. 
How then does a min ing company take the decis ion to proceed? With 
difficulty and caution, is the answer. Though others may be cynical , the cry of 
the miners that theirs is a risky business is sti l l  correct. Whi lst poli tic ians, 
landowners and environmental ists want firm guarantees that this or that wil l  
defin i tely happen,  or not happen ,  the mi ners are faced wi th fundamental 
uncertainty. Levels of taxation, royalties or compensation agreed to before 
mi ning commences are almost certai n to be reveal ed as too generous or 
inadequate as operations progress.  Almost everyone seems to be agreed that the 
earl iest Bougainvi l le mining agreement turned out to be too generous to the 
company. One doesn ' t  hear many people arguing that the early OkTedi packages 
were too hard on OTML; but I think a rather good case could be made for 
arguing that they were too generous to the Fly River Provincial Government, 
especial ly when one considers what others have gained (or not gained) from 
the project. 
The effect of this uncertainty on min ing companies interests me. Companies, 
in  coming to agreements, are understandably conservative; they do not wish to 
commit themselves to large outgoings when the size of their resource i s  so 
vague. This can make them appear stingy at best and, if the project  turns out to 
have better resources than was at first thought, dupl ic i tous at worst. More 
interesting, however, is that one might have thought that such companies would 
aim to get contracts with governments which were flexible, al lowing for 
renegotiat ion at regular in tervals for part icular c lauses, i f  not the whole 
agreement, so as to al low for re-evaluations of the resource. This  does not 
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appear to be the case i n  Papua New Guinea where many agreements, especial ly 
those on compensation, have locked companies i nto a contractual cage in  
which, i t  seems, they are quite happy to stay. 
Compensation as an indicator of strength in governance 
A feature of mining ventures in  almost all parts of the world is that they are 
located, very frequently, in remote areas. Unl ike many other businesses which 
can disappear into virtual anonymity in capital cit ies, mining companies are 
usual ly the dominant, if not the only business in thei r  region of operations. It is  
absolutely essential to the success of min ing operations i n  such locations that 
they get on well with local people who wi l l  be their day-to-day neighbours 
throughout the l ife of the project. It is no use having a sealed agreement with a 
government hundreds of m iles away, whose agencies i n  the m in ing area are 
weak or absent and whose implementation powers are nugatory by comparison 
with the pressures local organisations are able to bring to bear. 
Events at Mt Kare and Bougainvi lle in Papua New Guinea i n  recent years 
show just how false is the notion that local people are powerless and mining 
companies al l powerful when their interests confl ict. These events, and many 
more less dramatic ones, also i nd icate how feeble the National Government 
real ly is  in terms of brute imposition of its pol itical will or, alternatively, how 
weakly developed that pol itical wi l l  is in the first place. This is a harsh thing 
to say but, in spite of the overt and i ndeed brutal force exerted by Papua New 
G u i nea to part i a l ly rec apture B ouga i nv i l l e ,  i t  i s  accurate i n  i t s bas ic  
assumptions . In  essence, local communities demand and government, to  greater 
or lesser degree, accedes in all areas where large m ines operate for the s imple 
reason that government needs, or believes it needs, the m iners more than local 
people do. In the early 1 980s, Mr Isidore Kaseng, then a North Fly activist­
later Premier of Western Province-used to point out, with great effect, that 
he could easily keep on eating sago if OkTedi didn't go ahead, but Port Moresby 
could not. There is always, it seems to me an 'Isidore Kaseng' i n  every min ing 
project because there is always thi s  imbalance i n  need. 
What does differ is the abi li ty of central government to exert the physical 
control necessary for its needs to be met. In Ghana, a mi li tary dictatorship 
redrafted the country 's mini ng laws a decade ago. In doing so they el iminated 
the right of local chiefs ( ' stools ' )  to receive royalty payments-a right that 
had always before been present in such laws. But Ghana's newspapers were 
not, thereafter, fi l led with threats from local Isidores to close thi s  or that, for 
the simple reason that their capaci ty to object was muzzled by the law makers' 
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abi l i ty to muster physical force on i ts side-and have society accept i ts ' right' 
to so impose i ts laws. In  the redrafting of Ghana's laws no specific levels of 
compensation were mentioned (at least, not in 1 99 1  ); these were left for 
individual operations to arrange. In one instance, that of a nationally owned 
d iamond mine, the devaluation of the cedi and the lack of any revi sion of 
decades-old compensation schedules, meant that the owner of a mature orange 
tree uprooted by the m iners (and s ince the mine is  operated by scraping off 
large areas of al luvial gravel many such trees were being removed) would receive 
one-fortieth of one US cent in compensation for the destruction of each tree. 
Yet the diamond min ing areas did not secede from Ghana (however much they 
might have disl i ked this s ituation) . This, of course, is not held up as an example 
for Papua New Guinea to follow. In  fact even in states wi th very much more 
central authority than Papua New Guinea (but less than i n  Ghana) governments 
often have great d ifficulty i n  implementing their part of bargains made with 
i nvesting min ing companies ; the Phi l ippines for example, finds i ts agreements 
d ifficult to i mplement on the ground partly because lack of funds seriously 
impedes i ts regional or provi ncial officers from carrying out the functions 
assigned to them under such agreements. So Papua New Guinea i s  far from 
bei ng alone i n  i ts government's seem ing i nabil i ty to enforce negoti ated 
agreements. 
So what . . .  ? 
So, then, what processes can be put i n  place to improve what many feel are 
anarchic compensation condit ions i n  Papua New Guinea? In some ways 
experience has led to several steps forward already. For example, the develop­
ment forum concept introduced by the N amal iu Government seems to have had 
several advantages, principal ly that of making sure that local and provincial 
leaders and thei r  v iews are embedded in the negotiation process prior to 
development. This, it seems to me, relates to one essential principle for any 
compensation process which i nevitably ari ses out of the pol itical geography of 
min ing i n  Papua New Guinea: g iven the day-to-day relationships between 
mining companies and local people, the latter must be part of the negotiation 
process from exploration onwards.  This is not radical nor even l iberal ; it makes 
good business sense since it is  evident that in Papua New Guinea a m ine wil l  be 
less than optimal ly  profitable i f local people's needs are not addressed and their 
satisfaction assured. 
A second principle, which is, I believe, equal ly in the in terests of all parties, 
is that compensation must be site specific.  That is, s ince qui te different values 
are put on the landscape and environmental products in different parts of Papua 
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New Guinea so too the monetary compensation awarded should vary. Eventually 
this ' use val ue compensation '  w i l l  evol ve i nto a regular exchange value 
compensation but in  the first years of a new mining venture compensation 
payments must be tied to local usage. 
A third pri nciple I would support is that of flex ibi l i ty in the form of 
agreement rev iew (as far as compensation is concerned) on a b ienn ial 
basis-with the proviso that compensation levels could fal l ,  as wel l  as rise, 
as a result of such a review. 
A final principle might be that compensation should be aimed at specific 
targets, for example, that i t  should be adequate to bring the provis ion of 
infrastructure (health, education, power, water supply provision etc .) up to a 
given level . Such a level should be relative to the rest of Papua New Guinea. It 
is c lear to me, at least, that the very idea of compensation for mining in Papua 
New Guinea is not aimed at bringing back into balance old relationships but at 
developing new ones. It is very important that those new relationships be carefully 
considered as part of the mine planning process. 
Notes 
On the l ighter and brighter side, one might note that when Placer Pacific was making 
its plans for the Porgera operation in 1 986 local residents, with the help of inside 
information, frequently planted 'compensation gardens' where none had been before 
on land they knew was the l ikely site of infrastructure for the mi ne's development. 
Thus, the balance is not inevitably ti lted in  one direction. 
2 I nteresti ngly, there is a direct connection between the Papua New Gui nea and 
Ghanaian mining industries in their legal aspects . Aki lagpa Sawyer, previously 
Professor of Law at the University of Papua New Gui nea, had a major role, on his 
return to Ghana around 1 985, in  the re-development of Ghana's mining laws. These 
bear a striking resemblance to Papua New Guinea's laws in this area. 
3 'Tai lings' are the product left after al l the metal that can be, has been extracted. 
'Waste' is that material at a mine site which is not processed because its mi neral 
content i s  considered too low to make such processing worthwhi le, but which must 
be mi ned if the processable ore is to be accessed. 
4 A well-known mining industry joke goes as fol lows:  The Board of Directors of a 
min ing company had a dispute about what 2 x 2 came out as . So they called in the 
dri l l ing supervi sor and asked h im. His reply was, 'Why ask me? I didn't go to 
university like al l the geologists' . So the geologist was called and he responded, 
after a lot of thought and sketches with coloured penci ls, ' It's somewhere between 
2Y2 and 5Y2. (The story goes on that the mining engineer thought the answer was 
3 .978999 and that when the geophysicist was asked he locked al l the doors, closed 
the curtains and whispered to the Board members, 'What would you l ike i t  to be?' .)  
CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE PRINCIPLES OF COMPENSATION IN THE 
MINING INDUSTRY 
Jo hn Burton  
The purpose o f  this chapter i s  to cover the basic elements o f  compensation 
in  relation to the mining and petroleum industry in  Papua New Guinea, a subject 
that has spawned a surprisingly thi n  l iterature s ince 1 990, which can be taken 
as both the end of the 'old' era when it was final ly real ised that Bougainvi l le 
would be shut for some t ime, and the start of a ' new' one, with production 
starting at Porgera, the first of several major projects to get underway since the 
construction of Ok Tedi in the early 1 980s. 
Interests of previous writers 
A review of compensation i ssues at the end of the 'old' era was that of Togolo 
( l  989a and b ) ;  his emphasis was on revenue sharing arrangements and on matters 
of provincial pol icy ; he was himself a provincial planner. In retrospect, Togolo's 
work can be read with a fair amount of nostalgia, for i t  concerns an i nstitution 
in Bougainvil le-the provincial government-most notable at other projects 
as a non-participant and an i rrelevance, and at worst an argumentative thief 
(see below). 
Another author of the same period was Corren ( 1 989) who, as an employee 
of Bougainvi l le Copper Limited (BCL), was a co-recipient of the Apri l 1 988  
Ona-Serero letter which demanded Kl  0 bill ion compensation for the damage 
caused by the Panguna mine i n  Bougainvi lle, and i ts  translator into Engl ish. It 
was his v iew ( 1 989:22) that ' the demands appeared to have been bolstered by 
an environmental study conducted by Appl ied Geology Associates of New 
Zealand . . .  the report was sympathetic in many ways to the Landowners and 
called for i ncreased compensation' . In other words, Corren bel ieved that impact 
studies could essential ly 'create' landowner demands for compensation (he 
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was certainly not alone within the industry) .  A companion view to thi s, which 
I mention later, is that greed among landowners is blamed by some for causi ng 
a breakdowi.·1 in community cohesion ; I hope to dispel this .  
A good deal of l i terature has arisen out of the Bougainvi l le crisis i tself (for 
examaple, May and Spriggs 1 990), but only recently have speakers at seminars 
begun to focus on the detai led impl ications of Fi ler's ( 1 990a) contention that 
vi l lage societies are not easi ly able to redistribute new forms of wealth, and that 
this fai lure continues to disillusionment and social breakdown.  Indeed, one writer 
has fought so vigorously agai nst this point of view that vital parts of the debate 
have been in danger of sinking without trace (Griffin 1 990). However, Filer's 
proposition now seems much better establ ished than it did after he first presented 
it and it is now time to turn to what prescriptions might be offered for the future. 
Compensation : the details 
Compensation is a broad topic and, as wi l l  be seen, has a narrower than usual 
meaning in rel ation to the Papua New Guinea Mining Act. However, I am 
concerned here with compensation in its overal l  sense, that is, payment by 
way of a fixed rental of land under traditional ownership, for the sharing of 
profits, if any, with landowners, and lastly (the narrow meaning) payment as 
means of recompensing landowners for the loss or the alteration of the natural 
state of their land . 
In general , min ing lease agreements cover land used for mining, but in 
practice there are also impacts outside the various ki nds of mine leases. It wi l l  
be seen that there i s  no d i scern ib l e  d i fference in approach between 
compensation deal ings within a lease and outside one,  say in  the case of a 
pipel ine leaking outside i ts easement or some unexpected bush impact at a 
distance from a set of mine leases . 
A thornier problem is how to relate to claims from people who are neither 
the owners of land within leases ( ' the l andowners ' )  nor of impacted land, 
l ivestock or property outs ide leases. It might be said that these ' pol itical' 
c la ims have no standing, but evidently some consideration must be made 
because provincial governments in  Papua New Guinea have historically laid 
claim to up to 95 per cent of royalty payments earned off l and in customary 
ownership. Thus, if provincial governments can do this, why not community 
governments, or even non-governmental progress associations? Does the power 
to do this reside only with the State and, if so, which particul ar manifestation 
of the State? 
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The law 
Early mining in  Papua New Guinea, di scussed by Nelson ( 1 976) and Davies 
( 1 992), took place with scant reference to landowner i nterests. It i s  extraordinary 
to us today that when the technical manner in which the Edie Creek leases 
were pegged was referred to a Royal Commission, no mention whatsoever 
was made of native ownership (Commonwealth of Austral ia  1 927). But in  
Papua, at  least, legislation mentioning compensation for l andowners (Nelson 
1 976 :Tables 1 and 1 4) dates to the Mining Ordinance of 1 907, which 
. . .  requi red any person about to mine on land 'owned and occupied by natives ' to 
inform the warden,  who assessed the probable damage, collected the money and 
held i t  for later payment to the owners of the land. The warden was to prevent any 
mining l ikely to cause ' substantial damage' u nti l the owners of the land and property 
gave their consent (Nelson l 976:Table I ) . 
These provisions were incorporated i n  New Guinea legislation i n  1 922 and 
1 928 and, in  more specific form, are essentially the basis of Part VII of the 
Mining Act 1992 , 'Compensation to landholders' .  
The key section i s  1 54, 'Principles of Compensation' . Subsection (2) contains 
the description of what may amount to a complaint: 
. .  . landowners are entitled [to] compensation for 
(a) being deprived of the possession or use of the natural surface of the land; 
(b) damage to the natural surface of the land ; 
( c) severance of the land or any part thereof from other land held by the 
landholder; 
(d) any loss or restriction of a right of way, easement or other right; 
(e) the loss of, or damage to, improvements ; 
(f) in the case of land under cul tivation, loss of earn ings; 
(g) disruption of agricultural activities on the land; and 
(h) soci al disruption . 
Subsection (6) adds land outside leases : 
Where any land or improvements, adjoining or in the vicinity of the land the subject 
of a tenement, is or are injured or depreci ated in value by the exploration or mining 
of the tenement, the landholders of that land are entitled to compensation for all loss 
and damage sustained . . .  
One mine and its leases, Ok Tedi, has i ts own legis lation in the form of the 
various Mining (Ok Tedi Agreement) Acts. It  may be that specific provisions 
may apply over and above Subsection (2), but where a situation is  not covered, 
Subsection (2) wi l l  apply (or the s imi lar wording in use prior to the 1 992 Act) . 
The Sixth Supplementary Agreement at Ok Tedi steps outside the leases to 
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deal with i mpacts on the river system below them, but there is no difficulty in  
arguing that responses to  any circumstances not foreseen by this agreement, 
or interpretations of parts of i t ,  should follow and be consi stent with the 
principles expressed in Subsection (6). 
A fallback for aggrieved landholders, in  the unlikely event of a failure to 
interpret damage outside leases as covered by Subsection (6) would be to 
bring a complaint in the civi l  courts on the grounds of a simple wrong being 
done. However, this would certainly be against the spirit of the Mining Act, 
which cal l s  firstly for an agreement to be arrived at by the tenement holder 
and the landholders or, fail ing that, the Mining Act's prescription that the 
min ing warden decide what level of compensation is appropriate. As a last 
resort, the parties may lodge an appeal with the High Court. 1 
This means that the first principle of compensation at and around mines i s  
that i t  i s  a matter for negotiation, though within the confines of  what the 
Mining Act allows landholders to claim for. 
Unfortunately, legislation does not set out the procedures to be followed in 
evaluati ng a claim .  Subsection (3) merely states : 
Where applicable, compensation shall be determined with reference to the values 
for economic trees publi shed by the Valuer General .  
There is inconsistency here because the things mentioned earlier, the 'deprivation 
of the surface of the land' , ' loss of earnings' , ' loss of a right of way ' and 'social 
disruption' are not things given compensation values by the Valuer General . 
' Compensation ' versus royalties 
The Mining Act's discussion of compensation uses the narrow sense of the 
word, exc luding royalties and occupation fees. However, practice in Austral ia  
and el sewhere makes i t  clear that the distinction is quite b lurred in  terms of 
the overal l package .  Royalties can be used as the pri nc ipal means of 
compensation . Rates vary enormously (McGi l l  and Crough 1 986) from a top 
of 50 per cent of profits in a smal l mine on Indian land in North America-set 
in advance, this did not apparently deter the miner-to flat rate payments or 
lows in the 1-4 per cent of production range. 
For example, North Fl inders Mines entered an agreement with the Central 
Lands Council (Northern Territory) to pay A$55,000 every six months, with a 
bonus if the price of gold stayed over A$400 an ounce for the period, up to a 
maximum of 1 .5 per cent of the value of production. An up-front payment was 
also made, but separate 'compensation' (as understood in Papua New Guinea) 
was not paid (Howitt 1 99 1 : 1 24). 
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In the Ranger agreement, up-front monies of A$ l .3m were paid in stages, 
followed by royalties set at 4.25 per cent, the initial recipient being the Northern 
Land Council (Levitus 1 99 1 :  1 56, 1 59). 
At Argyle (Western Austral ia), CRA signed an agreement (the Glen Hi l l  
agreement) giving the traditional owners regular payments for the mine l i fe in 
return for the dropping of opposition to continued mining and exploration . 
CRA did not term the payments 'royal ties' but framed the package in terms of 
a 'good neighbour' pol icy (Di l lon 1 99 1 ) .  
I t  should be  noted that the Papua New Guinea royalty rate of  1 .25 per cent, 
pre-dating all of the above, set in  relation to Panguna was adopted as the standard 
rate for other projects until 1 995 . The precise origin of the figure i tself is unknown 
to me, but it seems to have been an arbitrary choice.2 Landowners at al l projects 
have now negotiated a larger cut of royalties than the 5 per cent (of the 1 .25 per 
cent) then obtained, indicating that the fixed legislative distinction between 
' compensation' and 'royalty' does not provide the latitude needed in practice 
for negotiating landowner packages . (In 1 995, landowners at Lihir won a change 
in the rate to 2 per cent of production.)  
Occupation fees as a part of ' compensation '  
While royalties depend on  the value of  what i s  mined, occupation fees depend 
on the unimproved value of the project land. Consequently, occupation fees are 
probably best seen as one half of a two way bet; they guarantee an income even 
if the price or mi l l  output fall below what was predicted. Also, as already seen, 
agreements typically reached in other countries may have a flat rate component 
and a production or profit related component. 
The principle difficulty with occupation fees as paid in Papua New Guinea 
is that only ad hoe arrangements guide the valuation of project land. The fees 
have been set at extremely low rates in the past-starting with A$ l .OO an acre 
in Bougainvil le for prospecting in 1 966 (Bedford and Mamak 1 977 : 1 2) and 
only reaching K20 a hectare in 1 989 (Papua New Guinea 1 989b )-on the dubious 
assumption that 'unimproved' bush land has a very low value in monetary terms 
even if badly damaged or lost for good. Higher rates have been set since 1 989. 
The size of a lease and the density of settlement (or ownership) can affect 
the usefulness of an occupation fee i ndependently of land valuation as a means 
of providing an equitable compensation package to l andowners. A Special 
Min ing  Lease (SML) may be qu i te compact, as at L ih i r  (proposed at 
approximately 1 ,200 hectares) , or displace very many people, as at Porgera 
(approximately 500 households were relocated). In these cases, the guaranteed 
income that occupation fees provide may be comparatively low even if the 
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occupat ion fees average K60 or  more. It w i l l  be  noted that the rates for 
occupation fees at Porgera do not form a part of the Porgera Agreements 
(Derkley 1 989); they were arrived at later. 
At Ok Tedi  the combined SML and several Leases for Mining Purposes 
(LMPs) are about the same size as the whole of Lihir i sland, but have many 
fewer owners than the examples just used . In 1 99 1 ,  occupation fees amounted 
to nearly K650,000 and must have provided i ndividual owners with incomes 
of over K550 a year and, logically, fami l ies with total i ncomes in the range of 
K2,000-K3,500. The predominant factor here is not particularly the land 
valuation, but the sheer size of the leases . 
Alas, these basic comparative calculations do not seem to have been made 
within the i ndustry in discussing agreements. Mine managements are from 
ri val companies and, except in a few instances of i ndividuals moving from 
one to another, have a natural tendency to stress the differences in their sty les 
of negotiation. The 'miner's culture' i s  the ethic of exploration-they go i t  
alone. It has to be  said that this is  rarely pul led up  by  the Papua New Guinea 
media  who, not noted for their use of their own cuttings l ibraries and sound 
archives, invariably focus on one mine at a time. 
This tendency, and the physical differences I have just discussed, make it 
inevi table that what may be termed ' structural equal ity' has arisen between 
different agreement packages in terms of the contributions of different kinds 
of benefits. Figure 7 . 1  shows the value of the packages at Porgera in 1 99 1  and 
at Ok Tedi as it  was in 1 985 and after a renegotiation in 1 99 1 .  
Compensation for damage and loss 
Whereas compensation for damages, loosely conceived, is  a common enough 
topic covered in  the national media, the matter of what actual procedures 
should be used for calculating compensation at resource projects has received 
very little attention by commentators. This is regrettable, because compensation 
payments dominated the package of benefits to the leaseholders at Porgera 
during the peak year of construction (Figure 7 .1) ,  whereas the public focus 
during the Namaliu  and Wingti administrations was on quite different things : 
the issue of state ownership of sub-surface minerals and how much equity the 
government should buy or be given by project developers. Long after the end 
of construction at Porgera, compensation payments, then for dump leases, by 
far exceeded the contribution of royalties to landowner benefits. 
The lack of debate on compensation procedures means that there i s  l ittle 
guidance on how to interpret the legislation as it may apply to new or unexpected 
c ircumstances. As seen above, the Mining Act only mentions compensation 
for economic trees;  i t  offers no help with ' social d isruption' and the l ike. 
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Figure 7.1 Structural inequality between projects under different agreements 
and at different stages (n.b. Ok Tedi 1 985 at constant 1 992 kina) 
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Co mpensation 
Bedford and Mamak ( 1 977) give the ful lest discussion of compensation matters 
on Bougainvil le .  Between 1 966 and 1 969, at least 350 cases were heard in the 
Mining Warden's  Court. In one example they give, the plaintiff won cash 
compensation for loss of crops, cash compensation to buy rations for 22 months 
while waiting for a new garden to grow, and restitution in  the form of CRA 
Exploration (CRAE) agreeing to prepare a garden site ( 1 977:3 1 ). However i n  
Benggong v s  Bougainville Copper a test case was argued u p  to the High Court 
of Austral ia. In his original determination, the mining warden arrived at a figure 
of A$35 per tree based on an extended discussion of Martin Benngong's 
anticipated earnings from harvesting the cocoa. However, he then ordered the 
amount for his 1 1 0 trees to be paid over a period of 42 years, at A$7.70 a 
month. BCL believed the warden to have exceeded his powers i n  doing this and 
initial ly won a reversal in the Supreme Court of Papua New Guinea. However 
Sir Garfield Barwick and three judges allowed an appeal by the Public Solicitor 
on behalf of the mining warden (Bedford and Mamak 1 977: Appendices 1.6, 1.7). 
Barwick's judgement was in relation to the m ining warden's powers, not 
to an i nterpretation of the law concerning compensation per se. Nevertheless, 
the case had the practical effect of forcing BCL to negotiate higher rates of 
compensation for coconut (A$ 1 5), and cocoa and coffee trees (A$ 1 3 .50) . 
By 1 974, BCL had paid out aboutA$ 1 .8 m  in  various kinds of compensation 
payments (but not including resettlement costs) .  Bedford and Mamak were able 
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to find payment records for A$ l .6 m il l ion.  It is puzzl ing that they say this 
worked out at  about A$ 1 0,000 per person over the period 1 968-74 ( 1 977 :57-
8), but as th is may have been per claim on behalf of a group it seems l ikely 
that individual receipts would have been much di luted after d istribution at 
group level . 3  
Cases at Porgera 
Compensation payments are well documented at Porgera, because the practice 
has been for company staff to carry out l ands work on behalf of the government 
and write up al l claims on Department of Lands letterhead, lodging copies for 
signature at the District Office in Porgera. 
The amounts paid are higher than at other projects by a considerable margin .  
Banks (G. Banks 1 993 : 1 2) located 6 1 9  payment records for 1 992 and these 
ranged from K l  .50 for an occupation fee i n  a remote part of the (high altitude 
bush) Wai le Creek LMP to K520,000 for the loss of 40 hectares of forested land 
required for a waste dump. The twelve largest payments accounted for Kl .5 
mi l l ion, which was more than half the total amount paid in that year. The peak 
year for compensation was 1 99 1 ,  with K8.77 mi l l ion paid out, and the total 
paid to m id -November 1 992  was K22 ,679 ,9 1 9  (Banks  1 99 3 : Table  6 ;  
F. Robinson pers . comm.  1 994) . By 1 995,  the payout o n  al l claims had risen 
to K35 mi l l ion (Banks 1 996) . 
An examination of the K520,000 claim shows that 27 recipients s igned for 
the money, with senior men receiving K l 0,000-K20,000 amounts, and other 
family members, K500-K4,000 amounts. In addition , K330,000 seems to have 
been disbursed in two cheques for group purposes . The survey plan and claim 
form clearly indicate 'bush area' and a s ize of 40 hectares paid at a rate of 
K l 3,000 per hectare (Department of Enga 1 992a). 
The Porgera Special Mining Lease is  covered by a compensation agreement 
(Placer 1 988 ;  cf. Derkley 1 989); the 2228 hectare SML is broken down into 
several usage categories : areas of nuisance only, cleared l and, damaged land, 
and lost land . In the terminology of the agreement, progressive rates for ' l and 
compensation' wi l l  apply for the l ife of the mine to each category, appl ied on 
top of a basic K5 per hectare 'occupation fee' . (I wi l l  lump these together i n  
discussion under 'occupation fees' . ) In  the first year the inclusive rates were 
in the range K l 5-K60 per hectare. 
This ,  of course, was separate from compensation for loss of economic 
crops, trees and improvements. According to Banks ( 1 994 :Table 4) 60 per 
cent of the SML was untouched by the mine up to 1 993 .  But about 1 2  per cent 
(266 hectares) was lost completely. The typical rate of compensation paid for 
un improved bush was K l 5 ,000 per hectare ; where land was under active 
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cult ivation and had many crops and improvements, the rate rose as high as 
K35 ,000 per hectare. 
Compensation outside leases 
As already discussed, the question of compensation outside leases ( ' tenements' ) 
is met by the Mining Act. The Act prescribes negotiation first, then recourse 
to the mining warden if agreement cannot be reached between company and 
landowners . 
Clearly then, attention should focus on negotiat ions .  Three principal matters 
would seem to ari se: 
the question of damage to crops, economic trees and harvestable resources; 
the question of damage to bush and the surface of the land, considered 
as the environment which harbours the above; 
the question of whether benefits already provided by a min ing company, 
e.g.  the erection of classrooms or the allocation of money to publ ic roads, 
should count towards the terms of an eventual settlement. 
Crops, economic trees and harvestable resources 
These th ings are generally c lassed as ' improvements' to the land, though there 
are some grey areas . Compensation is not hard to calculate where the losses 
can be quantified . An inventory of the damaged crops, economic trees and 
harvestable resources must be made and a scale of payments drawn up. 
However, when losses occur outside leases there are technical areas of difficulty. 
A notable problem is that, being outside the normal ambit of impact moni tori ng 
programmes, the evidence-the damaged crops, trees, river bank graves etc .­
is quite l ikely to have disappeared by the time a company or government 
officer makes an investigation. For example, documents in  the District Office 
at Tabubil show that complaints of damage to certain gardens in  the Ningerum 
area occurred up to four years before the mining warden issued a j udgment 
concerning them in 1 992;  al l affected crops would long have perished when 
the warden began his del iberations. 
In this case, a logical substi tute for not being able to see the fresh 
damage at first hand would be to estimate the value of lost crops in a garden 
by valuing another garden of the same type, with crops growing i n  it , and to 
pay an average rate on the bas is  of area. At Ningerum in 1 992 the mining 
warden adopted a figure of K270 per garden, a flat-rate figure that : (a) fai ls to 
specify a benchmark area in hectares for ' a  garden' ;  and (b) does not distinguish 
between types of gardens contain ing crops or fruit trees of widely differing 
val ues . If the warden did no see the inequal ity in  this, there is  no doubt that 
v i l lagers did, as on 8 August 1 992, within three days of the payments, those 
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who were underpaid, or not paid at all ,  erected a roadblock on the Tabubil­
Kiunga highway. 
In my own work in the Ningerum area I d iscussed the value of flood 
damaged sweet potato gardens at a pl ace wi th in  the Ningerum stat ion 
boundaries (i .e. on government land) called Al ice Farm : 
In one part of the land that was not affected by the flood, 8 1  mounds were found in  
a 1 0  metre x 1 0  metre square. Nominally th is  i s  8,  1 00 mounds per  hectare, but 
allowing for wasted space a realistic figure might be 5 ,000 mounds per hectare. The 
Valuer General's rate for matured sweet potato is K2.00 per mound, giving a value 
of K 1 0,000 per hectare of mature crop. Another way of looking at it i s  to take a yield 
esti mate of 15 tonnes per hectare. To be worth K I 0,000, this harvest wou ld have to 
fetch a market price of 66 toea a k i lo (Burton 1 99 1 :27) .  
My discussion postdated the Porgera compensation agreement (Placer 1 988) 
but predated the avai labi l i ty of actual examples of the agreement i n  action , as 
discussed above, so I was forced to give a fairly lengthy justification (Burton 
1 99 1  :27-8) .  But as the actual figures from Porgera show, my calculations were 
quite accurate for the value of crops on land as i ntensively gardened as Al ice 
Farm was. 
In relation to the mining warden 's judgment, a modest sized garden might 
be 0.25 of a hectare (or 0.5 of an acre). A quarter hectare plot of sweet potato 
would be worth in the vicinity of K2,500. Another type of garden with other 
ki nds of crops, typical ly taro and bananas in this area, would have a different 
worth . But i t  is  sti l l  hard to imagine any kind of garden with a value as low as 
K270 if circumstances allowed the crops to be counted and the m ining warden 
followed the Valuer General 's rates properly, or i fhe had had sufficient experience 
and knowledge to carry out a s imi lar exercise to the one I did in 1 99 1 .  
The conclusion I draw is that the inexperience of the min ing warden, the 
lack of training specifically in compensation matters, and weak (or non-existent) 
co-ordination between the mining warden and the project l iaison officer (these 
are in different branches of the Department of Mining and Petroleum) at Ok 
Tedi was lett ing both v i l lage people and the project developer down .  No 
advantage was to be gained from low and long delayed payments ; on the 
contrary, poor attention to procedure in the Kilometre 96 area (of the Tabubil­
Kiunga Highway) was the cause of a serious confrontation with landowners. 
Cases at Panguna 
The subject of compensation for loss of fish and for pol lution in rivers adjacent 
to the Panguna project in  Bougainvi l le  was first raised in the warden's  court in 
1 970. The plaintiffs, a clan, wanted an annual payment for loss of fish i n  the 
Kawerong River because such a loss would be felt for as long as the river was 
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pol luted, even by those not yet born as the resource was one 'held in trust for 
future generations' . Negotiations between the Public Solicitor and BCL hinged 
on how much fish was in the residents' diet ,  the expected price of tinned fish to 
replace it, etc . ;  a payment formula was arrived at and accepted i n  1 97 1 ,  backdated 
to 1 968 and with a review in 1 973 .  A similar annual compensation agreement 
was reached for the Pinei River in  1 974, backdated to 1 970 and with provision 
for annual review (Bedford and Mamak 1 977 :  Appendix I . 1 0) .  
Compensation for damage to  bush land was refused by  CRAE after 1 966. 
The company 's legal adviser argued that 'natural growths' on the land were 
part of the 'unimproved value' and therefore could not be compensated for. But 
again, essentially fol lowing the principle that bush not actual ly  in  use by an 
i ndividual for some more speci fic  purpose belongs to future generations, 
arguments for bu�h compensation carried weight from 1 97 1 .  A figure to apply 
was deferred until an occupation fee could be settled. When a prel iminary 
valuation of A$50 an acre was agreed upon, this was expressed as a fee over 40 
years ofA$ 1 .25 an acre, orA$3.09 a hectare. (A final settlement was not reached 
for years after this . )  
Cases at Porgera 
Outside the leases (as they existed at that time), Sull ivan et al . ( 1 992) considered 
how a high sediment load and the red discolouration of the water i n  the Porgera 
and Lagaip rivers might be compensated. They recommended a Tai l ing Disposal 
Easement in the upper half of the Porgera River, with an annual lease payment. 
The purpose of the proposed easement was to allow access and monitoring as 
much as to help al l ay community fears of impact. 
In arriving at this recommendation, Sul l ivan et al . cited Ok Tedi Mining's 
Lower Ok Tedi-Fly River Development Trust as a precedent wi th money bei ng 
paid as replacement for the assessed average annual income of vil lagers prevented 
from gardening their land by the deposition of sediment. In point of fact, Sul l ivan 
et al . were in error here , as the stated reasons for payments of Vi l l age 
Development Fund (VDF) money by the Ok Tedi Trust did not include the term 
'compensation ' ;  the publ i shed data also show that the amounts g iven out are 
different by an order of magnitude to true mining compensation. In the end at 
Porgera, a modification of the recommendations was adopted, with a one-off 
payment of compensation being the main benefit, as I understand it (G. Banks, 
pers. comm. 1 994) . 
Cases at Ok Tedi: natural versus artificial hazards 
At Ok Tedi, the river system has also borne substant ial min ing impacts, s imi lar 
to the case at Porgera of Maiapam Creek (below the Ana we plant s i te), the 
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Pongema/Porgera River it flows i nto, and the Lagaip River below that . Along 
the Ok Tedi ,  also known as the Al ice, land used for gardening has been affected 
by over-bank floodi ng,  tributary creeks have experienced a backwash of 
sediments and, in some cases, the pattern of is lands and anabranches in the 
river has changed. Alice Farm, mentioned earl ier, is one of the largest channel 
changes ; a small creek I mapped as Ok Taviblad in  1 99 1 ,  on Ningerum Station 
land, has now become a main channel of the Alice here. Other changes of 
vary ing importance can be found the length of the Ok Tedi, beginning above 
Tabubi l .  
I t  might b e  reasoned that landslides ( i n  this area the 1 977 O k  Kam and the 
1 989Vancouver Ridge failure are examples), natural erosion and natural channel 
migration happen frequently, that nature is  capric ious, and humans i nvest effort 
in areas subject to such changes only at high risk. However, this l ine of argument 
should be tempered with observation.  For example, a cluster of is lands i n  the 
Lower Ok Tedi have remained in a stable position for a minimum of 70 years, 
as we can see they were named and sketched in the present posi tion by Leo 
Austen in 1 922, and in reference to navigation in the Upper Fly, consultants 
ruled out 'channel avulsion' as a l ikely change (OTML 1 988 :36). S imi larly, 
some vi l lagers maintained cemeteries at certain points along the Ok Tedi (e.g. 
at Km 96, where claims for loss were met by the mining warden); i t  would be 
i nv idious to argue that they were reckless in  their choice of burial ground. 
The point here is  that most arguments about causes and factors i n  unexpected 
environmental events/disruptions wi l l  be based on historical observations or 
sources we cannot select in advance (the evidence used in Blong 1 982 :chapters 
10- 1 4  exemplifies this). There are few absolutes in assessing the meaning of 
these observations (if there were, we would rarely be surprised by 'accidents' ) .  
For the mining i ndustry, the pol icy impli cations are that a responsiveness to 
circumstances is essential and that better mechanisms need to be in place to 
allow timely negotiations to occur, following the precepts of Subsection (6) of 
the MiningAct, than are currently provided for. My arguments in the next section 
add to this .  
An asymmetry of value: value without valuation 
At several points the question of damage to bush, and what are sometimes 
cal led ' spontaneous growths' ,  and damage to the surface of the land arises. 
There may be some doubt as to what resources to include in this .  Are stands of 
sago not actually planted by a knowable person and 'spontaneous growths' ? 
An interesting class is that of landscape features created or brought i nto their 
present state by cul ture heroes. The Kiomgwam sacred sago stand near 
Ningerum in  the origin myth of the Awin  Grupe clan i s  a case in  point: the 
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myth says a n ight-hawk dropped a stone from i ts talons at this place and a 
woman called Suwe came out and founded the clan (Burton 1 993a:90). At 
least three approaches would seem open: (a) to ignore any possible distinctions 
between different kinds of culture hero (e.g . semi-human, human, super-human, 
etc . )  and treat all as human ancestors whose property and works can be 
inheri ted, (b) to ignore the culture heroes as legal identi ties and to consider 
the oral history which deals with them as a form of documentation of ownership 
or ' tit le deeds' for l iving people, or (c) where physically substantial enough, 
to treat culture hero sites under national cultural heritage, or even environ­
mental, legislation (in practice the resources have never existed to do this) .  
Theoretical ly, a dist inction could be made between 'spontaneous growths' 
on the surface of the land, such as the casuarina seedl ings which are col lected 
for replanting from the sandbanks of rivers in many parts of the highlands, 
and those whose harvest or manner of exploitation plays a role in their renewal. 
However, this would be invidious. Land theorists are unanimous in  highl ighti ng 
the importance in all i ndigenous tenurial systems of the trusteeship which 
owners are charged with to take care of thei r  land and pass it on to their  
descendants i n  a form fit for the i ndefinite reproduction of thei r  society. In 
Papua New Guinea, a legal pointer i s  the Kawerong River case where a resource 
'held in trust for future generations'  was compensated with annual payments, 
not in  a once and for all settlement. 
Sul livan et al . ( 1 992) say that in the case of the i ntense colouration of the 
Porgera and Lagaip Rivers, ' there is no actual monetary value of the ameni ty 
lost through the tai l ing discharge' .  This is true in the sense of a sale or rental 
valuat ion, but ' no value' cannot thereby be i nferred .  There is  an asymmetry of 
valuation in these matters: where there is a saleable or rentable value, the Valuer 
General has issued a valuation;  where there is none, and no valuation has been 
issued, it  is  i ncorrect to assume a zero value and a consequently low level of 
l i abi l i ty for damage . 
The Valuer General 's s ilence on the societal worth of native land is more a 
reflection on the vagueness i n  Papua New Guinea's constitutional laws on the 
subject of what must be supposed to be minority rights-the term ' minority ' 
being an awkward approximation for ' small ethnic group with sl i ght economic 
participation ' . Many parts of the Fly system, the upper part of which i s  affected 
by mine impact, have unusual features in the overall context of Papua New 
Guinea land use systems. Large tracts of sparsely populated bush l ay between 
the mi l i tarily weaker Awin and Yonggom of the Upper Fly and Alice area, and 
the head-hunting Boazi ,  Zimakani and Suki of the Middle Fly, thus creating a 
buffer of safety for the former and definitely saving them from local extinction.  
A historical demonstration of this comes in the form of the massacre of the 
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'Weridai '-probably the Warida clan of the modern day Aduru vi l lage in the 
Lower Fly-who lost 56 people in two Suki raids in 1 926 and 1 93 1 ;  the 
survivors fled east into the estuary leav ing their original home area uninhabi ted 
(Wi l l iams 1 936;  Hides 1 938) .  S imi l ar raids in the northern part of the river 
system are known to oral h istory, but are undocumented in a formal sense 
because they lay too far beyond frontier of contact. 
In terms of modern land usage, the area is  essential ly un-valuable because 
of the lack of land use; in traditional t imes it was, we can say, invaluable, also 
because of the l ack of land use. On many other counts, of course, it would be 
very hard to separate the nature of the l and from the essential way of l ife of 
any of the peoples of the Ok Tedi and Fly rivers, whether Yonggom, Awin,  
Ningerum, Boazi ,  Zimakani ,  Suki or Kiwai, or any of the people of the other 
min ing and petroleum areas : Porgera, Lihir, Kutubu and so on . 
All  thi s  might seem so obvious that the discussion has no point to it .  B ut i n  
the case o f  a t  least two prospect areas, Mount Kare and South East Gobe, the 
lack of recent land use lies at the heart of l andowner disputes. At Mount Kare 
this led to considerable v iolence. At South East Gobe, investigations continue. 
Areas of complaint 
There is  a good deal of difficulty in col lecting accurate, informed material 
because the natural incl ination of the project operators is to act with commercial 
secrecy where matters to do with the detai l of payments and accounting are 
concerned . Nevertheless, sufficient data are avai lable to show that, exempting 
the obvious that compensation packages should be reali stic ,  adequate, and 
comprehensive, the principal areas of complaint surrounding compensation 
packages i n  Papua New Guinea fall i nto four categories : 
• 
• 
benefits are insufficiently well targeted at the i ndividuals, groups and group 
leaders who 'own' the losses compensated for and i nsufficient checks 
and balances are built into the method of distribution at v i l lage level ; 
safeguards are not in place to guarantee the pol itically weaker sections 
of the society (e.g .  women, the young, and those temporarily absent) 
their rightful share of benefits ;  
• the balance provided for by agreements on royalties, lease payments, 
compensation-for-loss, and sundry other i ncome sources al lows 
structural i nequali ties to bui ld up between projects ;  
• the project agreements provide for a particular distribution of benefits 
to landowners, the district, the province and the national economy 
as a whole, but they are based on false assumptions about pol i tical 
and economic behaviours at each l evel .  
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Individualised or group benefits ? 
First, a compensation package m ust pay attention to detail ,  ensuring that 
benefits reach the right people.  In the first instance this is making a correct 
land investigation or valuation of damage; this is done much better at current 
projects than at earl ier ones, though, as I have shown ,  there are notable 
exceptions. But this task done, there is a striking disagreement among mining 
companies as to whether the benefits, of which there is more than one way of 
calculating and paying out, such as certain kinds of rental s, business spinoffs, 
and clan land compensations, should be paid to groups or to individuals .  There 
is a Catch-22 here . On the one hand, if payments are made to groups, the 
company can be accused of being paternal istic for not trusting vi l lagers with 
their own money. On the other, if it pays to individuals it can be accused of 
'divide and rule' tactics, and of breaking down existing clan structures. 
By and large, l i aison officers have encouraged the former for business 
development purposes, feel ing that i t  i s  better to bring development to the 
vi l lage as a whole and general ly advising landowners that by pooli ng their 
money it can be invested for future benefit .  It may also be true that this has 
general ly fitted in with the desires of the big-man style of vi l lage leader, whose 
natural sphere of action is the orchestration of group l abour and wealth 
production . Thus it has been conven ient to interpret this favourable conjunction 
of circumstances as a true representation of ' what people want' . 
However, group payments are i nevitably the territory of the trust account 
and the thorny issue of using community leaders as signatories.  As was notorious 
in Bougainvil le and also at Ok Tedi ,  in the case of the missing Special Support 
Grant mil l ions (see below), money designated for community benefit runs the 
gauntlet of numerous hazards. The signatories to trust accounts can succumb 
to the various forms of Bumbuism,4 in  which they knowingly divert community 
resources for their own benefit. Even if honest and well mean ing ,  they may 
innocently become the target of intense back-biting and even physical attack, 
because, as Fi ler says, i t  is too much to expect customary means of redistribution 
to be able to cope with the stresses of deal ing with the new wealth (Filer 
1 990a:90) . Lastly, knowing the potential problems of deal ing with their own 
money, trustees may hand it over to a hired business manager, and this has 
also met with failure in recent times, perhaps most ruinously in the col lapse of 
lpi l i  Porgera Investments' construction business. 
Understandably, the experience of most projects in  the last 5 years has 
been an increasing desire for payments to individuals .  Many company lands 
and l iaison officers are confused over this. As I mentioned in the introduction, 
some within the industry blame personal greed among landowners for their 
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desire to take their money out o f  community schemes, thus, i n  this l ine of 
opinion, frittering away what was a reasonable lump sum of compensation 
in to small amounts which cannot be invested i nto any worthwhile project. 
This may be true, but I hope I have shown that the cause is  often quite the 
opposite of what is supposed; it is a justifiable lack of faith in group schemes. 
A second point is  the al legation that once sol idary societies are caused to 
fragment i nto smaller and smal ler groups, each with i ts own spokesman . But I 
understand thjs as a symptom that the original 'groups' of people selected to be 
treated together were not solid entit ies at al l ,  but only appeared united when i t  
was useful to  lobby together i n  a certain phase of  negotiation. Once that phase 
ended, the unity van ished too. This is clearly seen at Hidden Val ley, where three 
landowner vi l lages, Nauti , Akjkanda and Minava, merged to act as one legal 
entity, ' the Nauti ' ,  in a 1 988  court case. With the case won, the al l iance of 
constituent groups has broken up, first i nto the original three v i l lages, and 
then into the patri l i nes within the main groups within the v i l lages. The society 
has not changed at al l-it simply did a contortion act for the purposes of the 
court case. 
Safeguards for the weak and politically disadvantaged 
It is wel l-recognised that all forms of land development run up against the 
problem that customari ly land is  not easi ly commoditised. However, this i s  
what occurs i n  min ing .  The beauty of  the i nal ienabi l i ty of land i s  that the 
scope for loss of control in traditional usage is strictly l imi ted. A subsequent 
generation can be fairly confident of inherit ing it, for example. In some areas, 
land could change hands under custom, but in most ethnographic instances 
the exchange was for something else just as inal ienable. Thus, in the Middle 
Fly land could be g iven to obtain a 'si ster' who could be g iven in exchange for 
a wife (Busse 1 987 :35 1 ) ; in  the Lihir custom of erkuet, a l and parcel could be 
given in  compensation for the customary strangl i ng of a big-man's widow 
(Kabariu 1 994) .  Land, if i t  could be exchanged at al l ,  general ly fitted into 
systems of 'restricted exchange' . Only rarely could land be acquired by straight 
purchase in  trad itional Melanesia (for example, Schoorl 1 993) .  
The d i fficu l ty in m i n i ng is that l and is swapped for a package of 
commodities normally handled i n  several different contexts, not  one of them 
resembl i ng the restricted exchange of tradi t ion-money, business advice,  
relocation housi ng, schools, cl inics, roads and the l ike. It i s  a common lament 
that money from mining vani shes : 'mani bilong gold i no save pas long skin ' ,  
a n  Engan with Mount Kare experience once told me. Obviously, this kjnd of 
money is different in  nature from that which creates lasting obligations, such 
as is  contributed to school fees or brideprices. 
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The impl ications for the weak and pol i t ical ly di sadvantaged, such as 
women, the young, the unborn, the disabled, 's i sters' chi ldren' ( in patri l ineal 
soc iet ies) ,  s ing le  mothers, temporary absentees ,  sect ions of l andowner 
communities historical ly indentified as migrants, and more, are profound. 
Mi ning pol icy intends that the package of benefits is  an adequate replacement 
for lost land in perpetui ty, just l ike real land. 
The currently disadvantaged wi l l  always have a share in the use of land ; 
they cannot be dispossessed or cheated out of i t .  However, if the immediate 
beneficiaries of a mining package, foremost the vi l lage leaders and resident 
male family heads, do not behave as they would with real land-l iteral ly, to 
guard it ' rel igiously' -the assumption is violated . It should not be surpri sing to 
say that i n  practice they behave as they do with the same commodities that have 
come from other sources ; current consumption is conspicuously the norm (Banks 
1 996). The weak have indeed been cheated if i nsufficient is left over for them 
to use later on. 
In the very large payments at Porgera I referred to above, a prominent 
landowner leader received K 1 2,6 1 0  under his own fami ly but also K l 0,000 in  a 
payment to another part of his subclan .  If, as I suspect, he was simply a ' road 
person' ( i .e. he helped organise the claim), his right to the extra payment i s  
customary, but nonetheless inequitable .  Another claim  for K l 00,880 shows eight 
members of a fami ly received amounts of: K25,220; K20,000; K 1 5 ,000 (x 2) ;  
K l 2,6 1 0  (x 2) ;  K300 and K 1 40 (Department of  Enga 1 992b) . The last fami ly 
member, an infant, received not an eighth of the total but a seventh of 1 per 
cent .  Does th i s  mean that of the orig inal ,  approx imately eight,  hectares 
compensated for, the infant would one day have needed about 1 00 square 
metres of real gardening land? I think not. 
Without better facts and more cases to scrutinise, I can only al lege that 
these kinds of internal distributions are unfair, but anecdotal evidence does 
suggest that the strong and vocal do indeed get b igger helpings than the weak 
or si lent. 
What safeguards are currently used to guarantee the rights of the weak? 
Unfortunately, few enough . The Children's Trust Fund at Porgera sets a good 
example, assuming that i t  is  wisely managed in the longer term, as does the 
method of distribution of annual lease payments at Ok Tedi .  Here, fami l ies 
are paid directly, not through c lan leaders . But beyond this, i t  i s  general ly 
considered the landowners'  business what they do with their own money. Is 
this a correct attitude? I do not think so, if  there are better structures that can be 
put i n  place to ensure fairness and foresight. At  the Kutubu Project ,  the 
formation of Incorporated Lands Groups (ILGs) i s  a step in the direction of 
regularising, or perhaps inventing, ways of coping with i ndividual rights w ithin 
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a group framework. The concepts are proven and backed by legislation ( cf. 
Power 1 99 1 ;  Fingleton 1 99 1 ;  B urton 1 993c) and the watch-word of ILG 
management is that democratic decision making must prevai l .  
Al l  the same, as  ILGs have not been tested against a wide enough range of 
local organisational forms, there is sti l l  doubt as to their universal appl icabil i ty. 
For example, the legislation has in mind situations where the groups used to 
form ILGs w i l l  be bounded ent i t ies ( ' groups ' )  w i th non-over lapp ing  
memberships ( 'clans' , ' subclans ' )  that have primary land management functions. 
It is  not hard to find ' network ' as opposed to 'group' societies and, in the latter 
case, arrangements where groups form and reform with such ease, that they 
would seem l ikely to defy establ ishing ILGs with stable memberships. Elsewhere, 
I have put forward a general ised model for establ ishing and reviewing rights to 
land and benefits in the form of a 'Lands Trust system' ;  my model can al low 
ILGs to be incorporated but other representational systems are possible (Burton 
1 994) . Time wil l  tel l how effective ILGs really are, notably in the forestry sector 
where they are most widely used. 
Structural inequalities: a policy free zone 
My third area of complai nt is that structural inequal i ties are al lowed to bu ild up 
between projects, as I have discussed more fully above. This has certainly not 
been addressed adequately at a pol icy level . The mining i ndustry has been keen 
to complain that cabinet, or the Prime Minister acting alone, has made up mining 
policy on the fly thus creating instabi l i ty by constant rule changes. But at the 
same time, almost no advice appears to be taken by the different teams of 
negotiators on the best means of achieving equali ty between projects in terms 
of the shape of what is  on offer. On the contrary, the i n it iative appears to be 
whol ly with landowners. This  is not surprising, given that a project developer 
may claim to have spent more than A$ 1 00  mi l l ion on a big prospect prior to 
deciding to mine it .  At this point ,  the logic of the situation is that it is too late to 
negotiate in the true sense of the word . 
The political scene 
Much of what has gone before i s  actual ly underpinned by false assumptions 
about the pol itical and economic behaviours of the various levels  of government 
a project must deal with. This may sound trite, considering the few remain ing 
expectations of government i n  Papua New Guinea. However, in the 1 970s the 
National Planning Office was charged with designing the way the Ok Tedi 
project should become embedded in  the regional economy and administrative 
structures about it (Jackson 1 977). In this case impl ic itly optimistic expectations 
were made by all parties of the abi l i ty of the Fly River Provincial Government 
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(FRPG) to take on extra, mine generated revenues and bring about 'development 
for everyone else ' . Why should this not have been so, when al l pol i tical figures 
praised the project and said how much they would l ike to have i t  go ahead, so as 
to bring the first taste of development to areas which had seen none before? 
In fact, the FRPG was doomed from the start, with no expertise of i ts own 
and no incl ination to seek out and take notice of expertise avail able elsewhere 
in the country. It was soon suspended and the North Fly managed directly from 
Waigani .  On the resumption of provincial government in 1 988 ,  a Five Year Plan 
drawn up by i ts public service departments was abandoned on pol i tical grounds 
before one year had elapsed. By 1 992, all copies of the three volumes of the 
study had been lost by the Daru offices, and no plans were in train to begin a 
new one. A second period of suspension followed after senior figures had taken 
possession of a K3 mil l ion Special Support Grant cheque and disposed of i t  
outside the budget (Times of PNG 10 October 1 99 1 ) .  
Reviewing the project a decade after work started, Jackson remarked, 
Darn town is  very little different in appearance today from what i t  was ten years ago. 
There are no material s igns of any great expansion resu lt ing from i ncreased 
admjnistrative spending . . . ( 1 993 : 60). 
The [FRPG] has had a very poor record of overall expenditure and a worse one of 
productive expenditure: there is very little to show for the high level of financial 
support it has received from National Government and royalty payments to date . . .  
( 1 993:  1 45).  
With no participation from the province, and consequently no outreach by 
district services, it was not long before the mine became the focus of complaints 
related to the lack of development, except in the immediate vicinity of Tabubil 
in  the Star Mountains .  
In Enga, the provincial government had at one t ime the nucleus of a qual ified 
staff; as a less developed area it was the subject of a long-running and thorough 
planning study (Carrad, Lea and Talyaga 1 982). B ut by 1 990, when the first 
gold was poured at Porgera, any pool of talent that it once may have possessed 
was l argely dispersed and l awlessness stood to reverse almost all of Enga's 
previous gains. When the provincial government bui ldings were destroyed by 
arsonists in  1 993,  coinciding with the inception of the Infrastructure Tax Credit 
Scheme (ITCS), which made i t  financial 1y attractive to mining companies to 
build i nfrastructure l ike roads and schools, the installation of Placer as the de 
facto service provider in  Enga seemed complete. 
S im i lar tales of provinc ial and distric t  services dying away wi th the 
inception of mining projects abound from the other provinces. The net effect 
is to al ter significantly the balance of benefits flowing to mine and non-mine 
parts of provinces in  a way that was not anticipated-or even promised not to 
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happen-at the time of project negotiations. This means that substantial parts 
of the agreements fail to make sense, or l ater on seem downright inequitable. 
In the Ok Tedi case, the imbalance has become so profound i t  has threatened 
the viabi l i ty of the project at a poli tical level . OTML had evidently sensed thi s 
by 1 990, when it made a decision to extend benefits to v i l lages outside its leases 
and formed the Lower Ok Tedi-Fly River Development Trust, giving it a budget 
of around K3 mi l l ion a year to spend on water suppl ies, aid posts , c lassrooms 
and the l ike. At Porgera, the logistics of supplying the m ine by road were 
threatened by roadblocks even before production began, and community 
relations programmes were extended far down the Enga Highway to cope 
with thi s .  
How does thi s  bear on compensation matters? Should these voluntary 
company efforts be recognised in some form in the formal negotiation of 
packages of mine benefits? The answers to these questions must be pol itical 
ones. A practical d iscussion, indeed, cannot easi ly be made. For example, if  
provincial negotiators were to announce that they would be scal ing down services 
as soon as a new project got underway, they would immediately inval idate their 
own mandate to negotiate. But s ince thi s  i s  precisely what has happened, 
discussion might profitably turn to the loss of sovereignty and self-determination 
that occurs when responsib i l ities that are those of government are surrendered 
to min ing and petroleum companies. 
Conclusion, and an omission 
Total fairness in the d istribution of benefits within l andowning communities 
and beyond them in the wider community, what I have argued here to be the 
basis of 'fair compensation' , has yet to be met at any project. It may wel l be that 
min ing by its nature w i l l  always overwhel m local pol i t ical structures i n  
developing countries. However, I hope to  have shown here that there are more 
to compensation issues than 'how much? '-a vast amount of effort needs to be 
i nvested on matters of d istribution and the better safeguarding of rights than 
has previously been thought necessary. 
The key omission in this chapter has been the question of equity as an 
inclusion in the benefits package obtained from a mine project, such as was an 
option at Porgera and as has been won in greater proportion by the Lihir 
landowners very recently. As noted above, shares in  profits have been a part of 
some projects i n  North America and Austral ia for some time. The advent of 
landowner equity i n  Papua New Guinea m ine agreements may well shift the 
balance of benefits in a new direction ; exactly how remains to be seen. 
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Notes 
I wrote this paragraph in an early draft of the paper in August 1 993, long before 
the lodging of writs i n  the M elbourne cou rts by aggrieved Lower Ok Tedi 
landowners. I have decided not to edit it with the benefit of hindsight. The topic of 
the weakness, indeed the possible negligence of the mining warden(s), deserves 
fu ller treatment elsewhere and placement within the context of a wider discussion 
of the State's  abi l ity, or perhaps refusal, to adopt the role of a regulatory watchdog 
for the mining industry. 
2 At an Austral ian National University semi nar in 1 994, C. O' Faircheal laigh said i t  
origi nated at  South Australian and Northern Territory projects and was then copied 
across to the Bougainvi lle project. 
3 CPI adjustments must be taken into account before compari ng BCL' s  figures with 
those for more recent projects. 
4 Bu mbu was a despotic Luluai in M orobe Province who stole Australian suppl ied 
rations from his own vil lagers after World War I I  and ran various profiteeri ng rackets 
until discovered and disgraced (Hogbin 1 95 1  ). 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE IMPACT OF COMPENSATION AND 
RELOCATION ON MARRIAGES IN PORGERA 1 
Susanne Bo nnell 
Construction of the Porgera Gold Mine i n  Enga Province officially began in 
May 1 989 with the granting of the Special Mining Lease. Prior to this the Porgera 
Landowners Negotiation Committee and Porgera Joint Venture (PJV) held 
lengthy negotiations which culminated in the s ign ing of a Compensation 
Agreement (January 1 988) and a Relocation Agreement (September 1 988) .  
The Compensation Agreement specified the items for which PJV would 
pay and the payment rates for these items. The rates paid for loss of economic 
plants exceeded those establ ished by the Valuer General . Nearly K20 mi l l ion in 
compensation had been paid to landowners by the end of 1 99 1  (G. Banks 1 993) .  
The Relocation Agreement contained the details of other payments and 
benefits to landowners l iv ing in the area of proposed mining activ ity. This  
inc luded providing those affected landowners with improved housing. This 
relocation programme was of a massive scale, unprecedented in  Papua New 
Guinea mining history. The first landowners moved i n  February 1 989, and by 
early 1 993, 420 famil ies had moved into relocation houses. 
This chapter examines the i mpact of compensation and relocation on 
marriages of the Ipi l i  people of Porgera between 1 989 and 1 993 . 
Marriage survey 
Marriage problems have been a central concern of the Porgera Women's  
Association since the association began i n  mid- 1 989. The main concern was 
the i ncrease in polygyny (a form of polygamy in which a man has more than 
one w i fe ) .  Problems rel ated to the pol ygyny i ssue inc l ude:  men us ing  
compensation money to  'buy'  new wives ; deserted wives and chi ldren of 
polygynous marriages ; adulterous relationships which lead to polygyny ; and 
the Vi l lage Courts not following custom regarding polygyny and divorce. 
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It was already assumed: 
1 .  that polygyny had increased as a result of compensation money paid 
by the PJV to landowners ; and 
2.  that most of the new wives were non-Porgeran . Many Porgeran men 
received l arge amounts of money from the Mount Kare gold rush as 
well as compensation money from the PJV. However, it was general ly 
fel t  that Kare gold rush money was spent on l oose women whi le  
compensation money was used to 'buy' new wives. 
A marriage survey was conducted to shed some l ight on these assumptions. 
The sample for the survey was the first 1 00 relocated married men . If one 
excludes widowers and single males, this represented approximately 25 per 
cent of al l relocated men . Informants were asked : 
1 .  How many wives did you have before relocation (which roughly equates 
to the time when the large compensation payments were made)? 
2.  How many wives did you marry after relocation? 
Notes were made as to the place of origin of each wife, of the death or divorce 
of any wife and of wives who deserted their husbands. 
Polygamy 
Meggitt ( 1 957) reported a 30 per cent polygyny rate for Porgera in 1 957 based 
on a sample of 4 1  men . Kyakas and Wiessner estimated a 20 per cent to 25 per 
cent polygyny rate for Enga Province in 1 992, and Banks' survey in Porgera i n  
1 993 reported a figure of  8 per cent (however, a s  this figure is for  households 
and not marriages it is not comparable) . 
The results of the survey indicate a dramatic i ncrease i n  polygyny from 1 9  
per cent before relocation to 4 3  per cent by mid- 1 993 (Table 8 . 1 ) . Between 
Table 8.1 Types of marriage before and after relocation 
Type of marriage 
Monogamy 
Polygyny 
Serial monogamya 
Polygyny/monogamyb 
Single 
Total 
Percentage before 
relocation 
75 
1 9  
5 
1 00 
• Having more than one wife, but only one wife at a t ime. 
Percentage after 
relocation 
4 1  
43 
8 
7 
1 00 
b At one time had more than one wife, but at the time of survey had only one wife.  
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1 989 and 1 993 a further 7 per cent had been married to more than one wife, 
but were now in  monogamous marriages due either to divorcing a wife, or 
wives, or to a wife or wives leaving the marriage (meri i ranawe). This means 
that at one time between 1 989 and 1 990, 50 per cent of the men in  the sample 
were practising polygamy. 
The 1 00 men in the sample had a total of 1 35 wives prior to relocation and 
acquired 75 new wives between 1 989 and mid- 1 993, making a total of 2 1 0  
wives. This means that the average number of wives increased from 1 .35 to 2 . 1 
in approximately 3 years. It is probable that this polygyny rate wi l l  decrease as 
there is an increase in the failure rate of marriages contracted after relocation.  Of 
the 1 35 marriages contracted prior to relocation, 1 5  ( 1 1 per cent) fai led : 1 3  
d ivorces and 2 wives who ran away. Of the 75 marriages contracted after 
relocation, 1 5  (20 per cent) fai led : 2 divorces and 1 0  wives running away. Nine 
of the post-relocation wives who left their husbands were non-Porgerans .  
I n  the past polygyny was crucial for a man to acquire big-man status. 
Polygyny may also have had a practical function when the male death rate was 
high due to warfare. The economic basis of polygyny is the cul tivation of sweet 
potato to increase the number of pigs. This required the efforts of women to 
garden .  More wives meant more sweet potato could be cultivated to feed more 
pigs. Pigs were the essential means in the past for a man to increase personal 
wealth and prestige. However, even in the past the fai lure rate of polygynous 
marriages was high because of conflict stemming from the different interests of 
men and women. 
For a man, marrying more than one wife was one of the roads to success . . .  For a 
woman, having a co-wi fe meant sharing her husband with another woman, sharing 
the fami ly's garden land and sharing the family's  pigs to be given away in  exchange 
between her relatives and those of her co-wife. The road to success for men thus 
divided the possessions and territory of women. Only wealthy leaders, ski l led in 
handling social and personal relations were able to manage lasting polygynous 
marriages (Kyakas and Wiessner 1 992: 1 54). 
Today highland men sti l l  wish to achieve b ig-man status through the practice 
of polygyny, but the cash economy has led to the distortion of the practice of 
polygyny which has had a further adverse impact on women and the fami ly. 
Cash provides the means to l iteral ly buy wives. Men now marry for sexual 
purposes rather than the more economic purposes of the past. In Porgera men 
could only acquire second or additional wives i f  the first wife agreed or if she 
fai led to have chi ldren.  In addition there is  now a very strong argument that 
men are using the Vi l lage Courts (an introduced i nstitution) to rewrite custom 
in their favour. This is made possible because women have no traditional voice 
in the publ ic arena. 
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Today throughout the highlands cash is being used for brideprice payments, 
ei ther directly, or indirectly as when cash is used to buy traditional wealth. 
When cash only is used for marriage, Porgeran women classify that as an inferior 
marriage and say contemptuously, 'Emi i baiem long moni tasol' ( 'He paid 
only money for her' ) . 
The churches have had no success in  attempts to decrease polygamy. In fact 
a significant number of Porgeran pastors and other church leaders have entered 
into polygamous marriages since 1 988 .  
As women have increasing freedom today to marry men of their choice, 
one may well ask why they agree to marry men who already have a wife or 
wives. A woman may either truly desire a man or merely want a rich husband 
with the idea that he w i l l  oust the prev ious wife or wives (the Western 
col loquial ism ' gold digger' is particularly apt in  Porgera) . This  may well work 
until the next wife comes along . 
Women, although often victims, are not without power. A strong first wife 
can i nfluence a husband to leave his second wife .  For example one woman I 
knew left her husband after he took a second wife. She moved in with relatives 
with their children until (she said) he came to his senses. The new wife was felt to 
be no threat as she was 'lazy and only after money ' .  In this case the first wife won. 
However the more common result in Porgera is the abandonment of the 
first wife (and her children) and/or increased domestic violence. Porgeran 
women also say that when a husband wants to take a new wife and get rid of 
the old one he wi l l  beat her so that she wil l  leave and return to her relatives. 
According to custom, if  the wife leaves, the husband does not have to refund 
the brideprice. 
Although Porgeran women have been very vocal in their condemnation of 
polygyny, in pri nciple they are not total ly opposed to i t  (in spite of their professed 
Christian values) if the husband fol lows custom and looks after all his wives 
and children. I only met two women in polygynous marriages in Porgera who 
indicated they were happy with their situation . Both these women were first 
wives who maintai ned their prestige and were in charge of the subsequent, and 
much younger, wives. I do not know what the co-wives thought of the situation . 
The relocation house adds further stress to the polygynous fami ly. Often 
there is a dispute as to which wife occupies the relocation house. If more than 
one wife occupies the house this  frequently leads to disputes between co-wives. 
This unhappy situation is  common . In 1 989, I tried unsuccessfully to convince 
a badly beaten woman to come with me to the hospital . She refused, as she said 
if she left her new relocation house, her husband would move in his new wife. 
She sti l l  has the house, but her husband lives el sewhere with his other wives. 
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Polygyny has also been a factor lead ing to  overcrowding in  relocation 
houses. An example  of this in  1 993  was an unhappy household with 1 2  
occupants. They were the husband, his first wife and the ir 6 chi ldren; the 
recent young second wife whom the first wife disl iked; and the oldest daughter's 
husband and their 2 chi ldren. Customarily a man would have separate houses 
for wives who did not get along, and married children would also have separate 
houses, all in the same compound. If custom had been followed there would 
probably have been only 7 people in  this house. 
Increase in marriage to outsiders 
The results in Table 8 .2  show that 64.5  per cent of the wives acquired after 
relocation (that is after receiving l arge compensation payments) were non­
Porgerans and 64 per cent of the wives were from non-Ipil i  speaking areas . The 
greatest increase was for wives from the Tari  di strict of the Southern Highlands. 
However, as previously mentioned, there has been a high fai lure rate for the 
recent marri ages to outsiders.  
Whi le most Ipi l i  marry other Ipi l i ,  it was also common for Ipi l i  men or 
women to marry outsiders-especial ly their Huli or Engan neighbours. This 
was to increase their population for defence purposes, to help with customary 
obl igations and to increase the potential for survival in a harsh environment. 
With the introduction of cash , the Ipi l i  become attractive marriage partners 
and this customary practice becomes dysfunctional . 
Table 8.2 Wives place of origin 
Before relocation Additional wives Total wives 
Place No. Per cent No. Per cent No. Per cent 
Porgera 79  58 .5  9 25 .3 98 46.7 
Paiela 25 1 8 .5  8 1 0.7 33 1 5 .7 
Laiagam 1 4  1 0.4 1 3  1 7 .3  27 1 2.9 
Tari 8 5 .9 22 29.4 30 1 4.3  
Wabag 4 3 .0  2 2.7 6 2 .8  
Kandep 3 2 .2  7 9 .3  10  4 .8  
Chi mbu 2 1 .5 0 0.0 2 0.9 
Hagen 0 0.0 3 4.0 3 1 .4 
Kopiago 0 0.0 1 1 .3 0.5 
Total 1 3 5 1 00 75  1 00 2 1 0  1 00 
Note : ' Be fore relocation' refers to the places of origin of al l the wives the J OO  surveyed men had 
married prior to this 1989 event. 'Additional wives' means the place of origin for wives married 
between 1989 and mid-1993. 
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Because Porgera is now an attractive place to outsiders, fami ly members of 
the non-Porgeran spouse wi l l  take advantage of the marriage ties and move in .  
This leads to  chain migration which compounds the outsider problem. Taken to 
the extreme this could cause the Ipil i  culture to be extinguished through marriage. 
Divorce 
Today, in Porgera, divorce in customary marri ages is normal ly conducted 
through the Vi l lage Courts. Women claim that Vi l lage Courts are making i t  
too easy for men to divorce. There i s  no mediation. This  s ituation usually  
occurs when a man wishes to  take a new wife .  The most serious all egation has 
to do with the repayment of brideprice. Vil lage Courts are making dec isions 
for women to repay the brideprice to their husbands i n  a divorce. Fai l ure to 
repay means jai l  for the woman. This i s  certainly not custom. Women do not 
pay their brideprices. According to Chris B al lard (pers . comm.)  this trend is 
s imi lar to what is  happening in  the Tari area, where men are divorcing their 
wives and obtain ing a refund on the brideprice to finance a new wife. This is 
an example of men using the Vil lage Court system to rewrite custom. 
While men find it fairly easy to obtain a divorce i n  the Vil lage Court, women 
do not. As women have no say in the courts when a husband takes a subsequent 
wife, they are forced to stay in polygynous marriages against their wi l l  and 
their rel igious bel iefs .  There have been cases of women being forced to stay in 
v iolent marriages . In one marriage, the wife either committed suic ide or was 
murdered , which lead to a tribal fight. She had repeatedly gone to the Vil lage 
Court to try to end this marriage. 
There are methods of appeal under the Vil lage Court Act against decisions 
which do not follow custom or where the aggrieved party was not permitted to 
present his or her case. Many women are sti l l  ignorant of the grounds for appeal . 
Even if appeals are lodged, the appeal system does not seem to work. 
Conclusion 
The introduction of cash from compensation led to an i ncrease in polygyny 
amongst the Ipil i  of Porgera. However the i ncrease in polygyny and the non­
traditional manner in which it is  now practised i s  also an i ncreas ing problem 
affecting women in other parts of Papua New Guinea. 
Note 
Most of this article is extracted from S .  Bonnell ,  1 994. Dilemmas of Development: 
Social Change in Porgera 1 989-1993, Thomlands (Qld): Subada Consulting Pty 
Ltd for Porgera Joint Venture (Porgera Social Monitoring Programme Report 2). 
CHAPTER NINE 
INDIGENOUS RESPONSE TO ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT ALONG THE OK TEDI 1 
Stuart Kirsch 
We declare our fourth goal to be for Papua New Guinea's natural 
resources and environment to be conserved and used for the collective 
benefit of us al l ,  and to be replenished for the benefi t  of future 
generations. 
The Fourth Goal and Directive Principle of the Papua New Guinea 
Constitution (Papua New Guinea 1 97 5). 
Unreal istic landowner demands for compensation are often cited as a significant 
cause of Law and Order problems in Papua New Guinea. Resource development 
projects l ike mining and logging have i ncreasingly become the subject of heated 
debates that threaten or lead to c iv i l  d isorder. These confl icts are usually 
explained in economic terms, focusing on landowner dissatisfaction with their 
share of the benefits from the project in question . Landowner claims for 
compensation are widely regarded as 'out of control ' ,  creating an unstable 
cl imate for international i nvestment i n  resource development projects. 
There are two major problems with economic explanations of confl ict 
between l andowners and resource developers . F i rst ,  pure ly  economic 
explanations favour resource developers and place landowners at  a disadvantage. 
Second , economic explanations obscure alternative points of v iew. From an 
economic perspective, all conflict between landowners and resource developers 
may be reduced to di sputes about compensation . In the case of environmental 
impact, for example, it i s  assumed that i t  i s  possible to provide adequate 
compensation to landowners for damage to their natural environment and 
resources, regardless of the severity of the impact and the resulting disruption 
of thei r  l ives .  This  allows developers to continue business as usual in the face of 
l andowner complaints about environmental i mpact, which are redefined as 
demands for i ncreased compensation. Yet, ignoring landowner concerns about 
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environmental impact inevitably leads to confl ict . Framing the problem in  
economic terms also allows developers to l imit their l iabi l ity to material claims, 
avoiding questions about moral responsibi l i ty to the people whose l ives they 
have adversely affected.  Fi nal ly, economic rhetoric about unreasonable 
landowner expectations actually benefits developers by devalu ing landowner 
claims. This point was underscored by a story told to participants at a recent 
conference on investment in the Papua New Guinea min ing and petroleum 
industries: if Jesus l ived in  Papua New Guinea today, the story went, and Judas 
were to betray him for thirty pieces of silver, i t  would be nearly impossible to 
find a landowner who would blame him for taking the money.2The crowd roared 
with laughter, embracing the stereotype of the greedy and immoral landowner. 
In this chapter, I propose alternative ways of understanding confl icts that 
can emerge when landowners seek to l imit  the amount of damage done to their 
natural environment and resources by development projects. I i l lustrate my 
argument by del i neati ng the response of the people l iv ing downstream from the 
Ok Tedi Mine to i ts impact on their environment. I use ethnographic examples 
to show how landowners frame thei r  confl ict with the mine in  moral rather than 
economic  terms .  From thei r perspec t ive,  the m ine  has refused to take 
responsibi l ity for i ts actions, and I discuss how landowners seek to hold the 
mine accountable for i ts effect on their l ives . I also examine how the people 
l iv ing downstream from the mine i nterpret the resulting changes to their natural 
environment. The dramatic transformation of their landscape has resulted i n  
fear of  environmental 'collapse' . S ignificantly, the people of  Bougainvi l le have 
described the effects of the Panguna copper mine on their island in much the 
same way, and I briefly compare the two cases . In presenting this material ,  my 
goal is  to demonstrate that the issue of environmental protection, and in particular, 
the environmental rights of people affected by development, must be given 
appropriate consideration i n  national debates on compensation. 
Response to environmental degradation along the Ok Tedi 
The Ok Tedi Mine is a massive open cut copper and gold m ine located in the 
Star Mountains of western Papua New Guinea (Jackson 1 982, Pintz 1 984, 
Hyndman 1 994 ) . The mine releases al l tai l i ngs and other waste materials that it  
produces directly into the Ok Tedi River, causing widespread deforestation, 
extensive fish ki l ls ,  di sruption of local food production, and a host of other 
problems .  The OkTedi is a tributary of the Fly River, and the mine has adversely 
affected the environment downstream along the Fly as well ,  albeit to a lesser 
extent. 
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In thi s chapter, I focus primari ly on the response of the Yonggom people to 
the mine. Approximately 3,500 Yonggom l ive i n  Papua New Guinea, mainly 
along the Ok Tedi River, where the effects of the mine on the river system are 
most pronounced (Kirsch 1 989). Other Yonggom vi l lages are located along 
the Fly River, north of the point at which the river forms the border wi th Irian 
Jaya, Indonesia. I have carried out ethnographic research among the Yonggom 
si nce 1 986, including two years residence in a vi l lage on the Ok Tedi River 
(Kirsch 1 99 1 ), and three return visits, most recently in 1 994 . 
More than 1 5 ,000 Yonggom speakers l ive west of the border in Irian Jaya, 
Indonesia, where they are also known as the Muyu (Schoorl 1 993) .  In 1 984, 
5 ,000Yonggom refugees from Irian Jaya settled in  Papua New Guinea in  protest 
agai nst Indonesian rule (Kirsch 1 989) . Most of the refugees continue to l ive i n  
camps close to the border, where they compete for  resources with the Yonggom 
vil lagers from Papua New Guinea. 
The Yonggom combine traditional subsistence strategies with participation 
in the regional cash economy. The area in which they l ive is  dominated by 
lowland rain forest cross-cut by narrow, swampy val leys. Their staple food is 
the starchy flour extracted from sago palms (Metroxylon sagu). They grow 
bananas in swidden gardens, along with small quantit ies of pitpit, sugarcane, 
greens, and introduced vegetables such as pumpkin and cucumber. Hunting, 
fishing, and gathering from the forests and rivers contribute an important portion 
of their diet as wel l .  Vi l lagers earn cash by tapping rubber trees, and by sel l ing 
forest and garden produce in urban markets. In town, Yonggom men and women 
work in  local stores and businesses, at the Ok Tedi Mine in  Tabubi l and the 
harbor in Kiunga, and in the publ ic service (King 1 983) .  Circular migration 
between the vi l lage and town is nearly un iversal ; however, most adults sti l l  
prefer to l ive i n  a rural sett i ng, where unt i l  recently they had greater control of 
subsi stence resources, and to which they maintain strong emotional and 
ideological ties. 
Life downstream from the mine 
In 1 992, while I conducted research for a social impact study evaluating the 
effect of the Ok Tedi Mine on the Yonggom (Kirsch 1 993), the people in the 
v i l lages told me that they could easily 'see with their own eyes' that the 'river 
had gone bad' . I observed that in  the three years that had elapsed s ince my 
previous visit , much of the rain forest fringing the Ok Tedi River had died 
along a corridor nearly 40 ki lometres i n  length. S imi lar deforestation had 
occurred along the numerous creeks and streams that feed into the Ok Tedi .  
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Riverine gardens that once were fert i l i sed by alluvial soil washed down from 
the mountains now lay submerged under several metres of sediment and other 
mine waste, i ncreasing pressure on less productive garden l and in the rain 
forest interior. According to the Yonggom, the few fish left in the rivers had 
' no fat' and ' no blood,' they ' smel led bad,' and the people were afraid to eat 
them. The white sandbanks along the Ok Tedi River, where turtles once laid 
their eggs, had been covered by tai l i ngs and sediment released by the mine. In 
contrast with the past, few birds flew along the Ok Tedi River. 
By 1 992, it had become increas ingly difficult for the Yonggom l iv ing along 
the Ok Tedi  River to produce enough food using tradi tional subsi stence 
techniques. In many of the vi l lages, people told me that the sago palms growing 
along the river and affected waterways no longer produced the usual starch 
bearing pith. In order to i ncrease their dwindling food supply, people l iving 
by the river had begun to experiment wi th a new k ind of garden, us ing 
introduced root crops and cultivation techniques borrowed from elsewhere i n  
the country (Kirsch 1 993 : 27) .  This was the first time that I heard the Yonggom 
complain about food shortages, hunger, i ncreased i l l ness and malnutrition. 
Holding the mine accountable 
One group ofYonggom vi l lagers asked me why international law did not prevent 
the mine from polluting their environment. They wondered why crocodi les and 
other riverine an imals were not protected from the mine. They claimed that the 
government and the Ok Tedi Mine are inamen ipban , which means ' l acking 
sense' . People the Yonggom descri be as inamen ipban, including sorcerers and 
those sufferi ng from mental i l l ness,  are considered i ncapable of soc ial ly 
responsible behaviour. One man told me that i f  he were to die, the Ok Tedi 
Mine would be to blame. He used the expression yi dabap kandanip, meaning 
' they wi l l  take the weight ' , an expression used to charge someone wi th 
compl icity i n  an act of sorcery. Another man stated that since the mine began 
production, the people along the river have been forced to ' l ive in fear' (une 
doberime) because of the hazardous nature of the chemicals and other waste 
material s released by the mine into their river system. 'Live in fear ! '  is  what 
people used to shout to their neighbours after a sorcery ki l l ing .  
As  these examples suggest, the Yonggom compare the mine and i ts impact 
on their environment to sorcery and its harmful effects . In Yonggom society, 
i l l ness and death are usual ly explained as the consequences of sorcery (Kirsch 
1 99 1 ) . Sorcery is a form of negative reciprocity in which soci al relationships 
are abrogated (Munn 1 986:232-3). Sorcerers violate the basic principles of 
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Yonggom society i n  acts that bring harm to others . To the Yonggom, the mine 
is i rrational and dangerous, l ike a sorcerer. 
The Yonggom also take this analogy between sorcery and the impact of 
the mine one step further. I l lness, i njury and accidents that in the past would 
have been attributed to sorcery, are now explained i n  terms of the destructive 
impact of the mine on their environment. The fol lowing three cases i l lustrate 
this process of explanation. 
Case 1 
The loss of a finger 
One day in June of 1 992, Awi Dowon took his canoe and went fishing at Ok 
Kobom, a heavi ly s i l ted creek along the Ok Tedi River. He caught a catfish, but 
cut his finger on its sharp whiskers . On his way home, his hands were exposed 
to water from the Ok Tedi .  Dowon later concluded that the river water, which 
contained copper marasin (copper chemicals) from the Ok Tedi  Mine, caused 
his finger to become infected . 
The finger became swollen and very pai nful .  Several weeks of treatment i n  
the v i l lage were unsuccessful, leading Dowon to seek assistance a t  the regional 
hospital in Rumginae . There the doctor promptly scheduled surgery to amputate 
the finger. According to the attending physician, the toxin  from the catfish spine 
caused necrosis in the lower tendons of the fi nger; this was an unusual 
occurrence, but not without precedent. Awi Dowon, however, said that he had 
been poisoned by the mine. 
Case 2 
A broken leg 
The same year, Ketop Negat from Yeran v i l lage went to Ok Kobom creek to 
fish. He chopped up a dead sago palm, looking for beetle larvae to use as bait . 
He dec ided to cut down a mature sago palm and return later to shoot any wild 
pigs that might come to feed on its starch. 
When rainfall in the mountains to the north i s  heavy, the Ok Tedi River 
swel ls greatly, forcing water back i nto i ts tributaries. When the rains subside, 
the mine wastes and sediment carried by the Ok Tedi are deposited along the 
banks of these streams as the water level s  in the Ok Tedi recede. Over time, 
these deposits have accumulated to the depth of a metre or more. The resulting 
mud banks are difficult to traverse. 
Negat was standing knee deep in one of these deposits when the tree he 
was cutting down unexpectedly started to fall towards him.  He tried to move 
away, but was not fast enough. The tree fel l  and struck h im below the waist, 
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breaking his leg . According to Negat 's wife, the mud in which Negat was 
standing prevented him from moving out of harm's way. She therefore holds 
the mine responsible for her husband's broken leg.  
Case 3 
An overturned canoe and a drowning 
Late one afternoon in 1 987, a motor canoe travel l ing from the town of Kiunga 
on the Fly River to a v i l lage on the Ok Tedi River overturned in the strong 
currents at the junction of the two rivers . Three people drowned. Several months 
later, I attended a community meeting in  Kiunga regarding compensation 
payments for the deaths. One of the men who died had two sons with reputations 
for fighting and causing trouble. At the meeting, it was alleged that the young 
men might bear partial responsibil i ty for the deaths, because someone may 
have sought revenge against them by causing the accident that ki l led their father. 
The accusation effectively quieted the family, who consented to accept the canoe 
owner's offer of compensation. 
Yonggom discussions about the responsibi l i ty for sorcery ki l l ings rarely 
produce a consensus (Kirsch 1 99 1  ) . Instead, the results of these debates are 
general ly ambiguous and open-ended, which tends to forestal l violent acts of 
repri sal against persons suspected of sorcery. Opinions are revised as new 
information becomes available .  In this case, while the behaviour of the sons 
was considered to be a possible motive for the act of sorcery that caused the 
canoe acc ident, there was no final assignation of l iabi l ity. 
When I returned to Papua New Guinea several years l ater, the case of the 
overturned canoe had been reopened. In discussions with people l iving in Kiunga, 
I was told that the canoe owner planned to seek compensation from the Ok Tedi 
Mine for the death of the passengers travel l ing in  his canoe. Tne sediment 
released by the mine into the river system has led to the aggradation of the river 
bed , which makes the river shal lower and causes it to flow faster. The result i s  
that the Ok Tedi  River has become increas i ngly dangerous to nav igate, 
particularly after heavy rainfall in the mountains. The junction of the Ok Tedi 
and Fly Rivers is consequently especially hazardous ;  this i s  how the Yonggom 
now explain the canoe accident (Maun 1 994 :97). 
Claims against the mine 
What do the three examples have i n  common? In each case, the proximate 
cause of the mishap-the wound from the sharp catfish whisker, the col lapse of 
a tree in an unexpected direction, and the strong currents at a river junction-is 
recognised by those involved . I t  is not difficult to explain what has happened . 
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Following the basic paradigm for sorcery, however, i n  which people are the 
cause of misfortune, rather than chance or natural forces alone, the challenge 
is  to assign social responsibi l i ty. At this point, explanations based on the events 
themsel ves become subordinate to moral claims.  
Sorcery accusations are used to hold people accountable for their actions; 
they are a form of social control . A sorcery accusation brings two things together 
l ike cause and effect : a person who has been behaving inappropriately, and some 
kind of loss or mishap. S imi larly, claims against the Ok Tedi Mine pair its 
destructive environmental i mpact w ith specific cases of m isfortune. They 
represent moral assertions about how the m ine has affected their l ives, and they 
seek to hold the mine accountable. 
Mining and pollution 
Even though the consequences of mining and sorcery are in many ways al ike, 
the Yonggom do not confuse the two . This fact is clearly borne out in the language 
that they use to describe the effects of the mine on their river system.3 The 
Yonggom adverb most commonly used to describe the condition of the river is  
moraron , which means spoi led, rotten ,  or corroded, such as food that has gone 
bad, or wood that has decayed. The tai l ings and other waste material s released 
by the mine into the river system are cal led muramura in Hiri Motu or marasin 
in Tok Pisin ;  both words refer to medicine as wel l as chemicals in general . The 
expression 'copper marasin ' is commonly used to refer to the harmful ,  although 
not necessarily visible, effects of chemicals used by the mine (Burton l 993b:2) .  
Final ly, the Engl ish 'chemical ' and 'poison' may be used i n  the standard way, 
as wel l as 'pol lution' and 'environment' , neither of which were part of the 
vi l lage vernacular until quite recently. 
People do not refer to the impact of the mine using the specialised vocabulary 
of sorcery : born and mirim packet sorcery, or kumka and kuman assault sorcery. 
In other words, al though the mine causes harm to people l ike sorcery does, the 
two operate in very different ways.  None of the descriptions of the i l l  effects of 
the mine have any mystical or metaphysical impl ications ;  they refer directly to 
physical and chemical processes (Burton 1 993b:3) .  Thus, while the Yonggom 
compare the effects of sorcery and min ing ,  they clearly differentiate between 
the two. The last case study also i l lustrates this poi nt. 
Case 4 
Death by assault sorcery 
Wurin Maun from Yeran v i l lage walked for several hours through the rai n  
forest, looki ng for  prawns to  catch. Alone in  the forest, he  was attacked and 
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kil led by an assault sorcerer, whom the Yonggom cal l  a kuman . His body was 
not found for several days. None of this, according to his nephew, would have 
happened were i t  not for the effect of the Ok Tedi Mine on local resources, 
which forced Maun to walk further than usual from his vi l lage for food, leaving 
him vulnerable to attack .  
In this case, even though sorcery was considered to  be  the proximate cause 
of the death, the mine is sti l l  held responsible for the circumstances that led to 
the assault. Again, while sorcery and mining may have s imi lar consequences, 
the Yonggom see them as two different phenomena. 
Environmental impact and moral accountability 
The Yonggom draw on this analogy between sorcery and mining in order to 
formulate claims about the mine's environmental impact. Anthropologists have 
described the bel ief in sorcery as a philosophy of 'social accountabil i ty '  (Douglas 
1 980:46-60) in which misfortune is explained in terms of human action (Evans­
Pritchard 1 937: 1 8- 1 9) .  The Yonggom apply this moral philosophy in their effort 
to compel the mine to take responsibi l i ty for its effect on their l ives . In doing 
so , they extend their  c laims beyond the realm of damage to the physical 
environment. They reject the view that the mine's l i abil i ty is l i mited to material 
terms. Instead they recast d iscourse about the mine as a moral issue. 
Environmental collapse 
The Yonggom consider the Ok Tedi  Mine responsible for the collapse of their 
environment: from the river system, to their gardens, to the surrounding forests. 
This view is  perhaps best summed up by their use of the term moraron to 
describe the despoi led condition of their physical landscape. Even the Yonggom 
vi l lages located in the raised foothi l ls  several ki lometres west of the affected 
river system report traumatic environmental impact. In these v i l lages, the detri­
mental effects of the mine are said to spread through the creeks and streams, to 
come up through the ground, or to fall to the earth in the rain .  That this poison 
cannot be seen in no way impedes its destructiveness, as the people from Kungim 
describe in a 1 992 letter to the Ok Tedi Mine (reproduced here verbatim): 
. . .  they seem's to be some prove of garden crops dogs and pigs,  fi sh human beings 
being sick almost every now and then. Coconuts in  the vi l lagers getting dry. Even 
our stable food [sago] has some prove of all this .  Rain makes us sick. Air we breath 
makes us short-wind. Sun makes us get sun bum. 
Before in 1 992 and the year below these everything was perfect .  Al l  these complain' s 
mentioned have never experiences. When the ITTML Company moved in,  in 1 982 
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up until now 1 992, al l  this crops mentioned above and some more were completely 
have changed and got spoiled and we are concerned and it seems to be asked that 
these are the signs affected by the Ok Tedi Mining Limited . . .  Our life style have 
changed completely (reproduced in Kirsch 1 993: 75-6). 
The mine is  regarded as the primary cause of environmental damage that is 
widespread and systematic, rather than restricted to l imited areas or specific 
plants and animals. The Yonggom fear that the natural environment has been 
affected at i ts most fundamental level, so that even the air, the rain, and the sun 
are now harmful . They bel ieve that the pol lution from the mine has brought 
about the collapse of their environment. 
A significant parallel can be found in  the Bougainvi l le case. In a 1 988  letter 
signed by Francis Ona, who later led the landowner rebell ion in Bougainvil le,  
the Panguna Landowners Associat ion requested that the national government 
commission an independent scientific i nvestigation of the environmental impact 
of the Panguna Copper Mine. The problems described in the letter i ncluded : 
soil that may have been poisoned by toxic chemicals ;  diseases plaguing their 
plant crops ; shortened l ife spans of other garden plants ; an unknown pol lutant 
affecting cocoa harvests ; introduced plant species colonising areas previously 
occupied by local flora; deforestation near mine faci l i ties; decl ine in numbers of 
game animals; landslides ; chemicals in the river system; large numbers of people 
suffering from i l lness ; air pol lution ; and the unexplained disappearance of fly ing 
foxes from the i sl and (reproduced i n  Appl ied Geology Associ ates 1 989 : 
Appendix VI) .  
The members of the landowners associ ation agreed to abide by the findings 
of an i ndependent scientific inquiry, but when the prel iminary results of the 
i nvestigation conducted by Appl ied Geology Associates were made public in 
1 989, they became i nfuriated. At a meeting to discuss the report, representatives 
of the i nvestigating team stated that 
. . .  although mining operations had resulted in extensive damage to the physical 
envi ronment, they had found no significantly high levels  of chemical pollution. They 
described as u nl ikely the opinion held by many B ougai nvi l l i ans that BCL 
[Bougainvi l le Copper Limited] was responsible for the decrease i n  wildlife and the 
decline in soi l ferti l i ty (except of course in the pit and waste-dump areas), or for 
certain i l lnesses then prevalent i n  the lease-area vi l lages (Oliver 1 99 1  :208). 
The findings of the study differed substantially from what landowners believed 
to be true, based on their own experience (Papua New Guinea 1 99 1  :53) .  Cal l ing 
the survey a ' white-wash' , Francis Ona stormed out of the meeting (Oliver 
1 99 1 :208). Connell ( 1 99 1 :7 1 )  suggests that this i ncident may have been the 
'catalyst for the transition to violence and the eventual closing of the mine' . 
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Colliding ecologies 
When two very different systems for exploiting natural resources meet i n  
overlapping geographic terri tory, we can  talk about the resulting 'col l iding 
ecologies ' .  When two ecological systems col lide, the more powerful may impose 
itself on the other, transforming the natural environment in ways that l imit  the 
effectiveness of the other system. This process may give rise to perceptions of 
environmental col lapse. 
Resource development projects l ike the Ok Tedi Mine are global in scope, 
dominated by distant capital , and responsive primarily to the demands of the 
world market. In the case of the Ok Tedi Mine, economies of scale dictate the 
massive size of the project. Mining is an intensive process, focused on a single 
type of resource, which it eventual ly exhausts. Without appropriate facil ities 
for the containment of the tai l ings and other waste material that i t  produces, the 
Ok Tedi Mine not only affects the area in which the ore deposits are located, but 
exports destruction downstream as well .  Harsh treatment of land that has been 
set aside for production may be common in industrial ised economies, but the 
resulting landscape is  quite alien to the Yonggom. 
In contrast, Yonggom subsistence and production strategies are largely local 
and regional in scope. They are extensive, drawing on a wide array of resources. 
Most of their modifications to the landscape increase the value of their resources, 
e .g .  in planting useful tree species, rather than depleting them. With the col l ision 
of these two ecological systems,  the Yonggom find that the i r  tradit ional 
subsistence strategies are no longer sufficient for survival . They are also forced 
to confront an i ndustrial landscape in their own front yard, as were the people 
affected by the copper mine in Bougainvil le. 
Nash eval uates the i mpact of col l id i ng eco logies  on  the people  of 
Bougainvil le: 
The destruction of the landscape has enormous power-it is a cataclysmic event­
in a subsistence society like Bougainvi l le. For most Bougainvi l leans there is no 
frontier, no prospects for escape, no endless scenes of other places electronically 
del ivered to give them a fantasy sense of place, as television does with us.  Their land 
is not only for material benefit, which compensation payments reduce i t  to; it  en­
codes their history and identity and is a major source of security(Nash 1 993 : 1 7-1 8). 
The loss experienced by the Bougainvil leans is  more tangible because of their 
complete dependence on their land,  more unrelenting because there are no 
alternative landscapes for them to contemplate, and more disruptive because 
their identity and history are physical ly grounded by their l and. 
The people l iving downstream from the Ok Tedi mine, l ike the i nhabitants 
of Bougai nv i l le ,  are the v ic t ims  of col l i d ing  eco logies .  The m ine  has 
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transformed their landscape almost beyond recognition. Much of what they 
once took for granted about their natural environment no longer holds true. Is 
it any surprise that they have come to regard even the rain ,  the air, and the sun 
with great suspicion? 
Signs of the environmental crisis 
Neither scientific nor economic approaches to environmental change are entirely 
compatible with the Yonggom perspective. In scientific terms, environmental 
impact can be evaluated by measuring changes in plant and animal populations. 
In economic terms,  i t  is  the loss of resources with value as commodities, that is, 
things which can be bought and sold, that are measured. However, the observation 
that few birds fly along the Ok Tedi ,  or that there are no more flying foxes on 
Bougainvil le, is more than a reference to change in species composition or 
economic loss. In each case, the missing animals al so symbol ise broader patterns 
of environmental change. 
Conservation biologists use the concept of the 'flagship species' to describe 
prominent or valuable species, the well-being of which is  dependent upon, and 
representative of, an entire ecosystem. The birds of the Ok Tedi River and the 
flying foxes of Bougainvi l le are examples of flagship species.  While social and 
cultural factors i nfluence the choice of a flagship species, their status is  a good 
indicator of the health of the ecosystem as a whole. 
Public outcry over the disappearance of a flagship species i ndicates a general 
state of alarm about environmental condi tions. It does not matter whether 
scientists can trace its decl ine directly to the mine; narrow scientific investigation 
of harm to a flagship species misses the mark . The loss of symbolically important 
species metonymically represents the broader environmental cris is .  
Yonggom resistance 
Yonggom resistance to the mine is  being carried out in an i ncreasingly wide 
array of contexts ; it ranges from demands for compensation lev ied directly 
against the mine, to pol itical efforts at the provincial level to enforce stricter 
environmental standards,  to l awsui ts in the national court system. Rumors 
c i rcu late about  an underground pol i t i c al movement known as the Fly 
Revolutionary Army, named after the organisation responsible for the upris ing 
in Bougainvi l le, although to date landowners have avoided the kind of explosive 
violence that turned the i sland of Bougainvi lle i nto a war zone. 
The Yonggom have also enlisted al l ies in the i nternational conservation 
community, in part through participation in several prominent envi ronmental 
1 54 COM P ENSATION FOR RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 
forums in Europe and the Americas. Yonggom activis ts Rex Dagi and Alex 
Maun test ified before the International Water Tribunal in The Hague i n  
conjunction with a case brought against the O k  Tedi Mine. They travelled to 
Germany to meet with the press fol lowing the 1 99 1  release of the Starnberg 
report, which criticised the envi ronmental record of the Ok Tedi Mine. The 
resulting press conference led the German Federal Parliament to pass a resolution 
directing German shareholders in  the OkTedi Mine to seek stricter environmental 
contro ls  (Schoe l l  1 994 : 1 3- 1 4) .  Dagi a lso met  wi th  l eaders of several 
conservation groups in  the United States and was a delegate to the 1 992 Earth 
Summit in Rio de Janeiro, where he participated in a press conference aboard 
the Greenpeace ship 'Rainbow Warrior II' . Dagi and Maun have successfully 
orchestrated a campaign to bring international pressure to bear on the Ok Tedi 
Mine. 
Along with their colleague Gabia Gagarimabu from Kiwai Island, the two 
Yonggom activi sts al so sought rel ief through the legal system.  With the 
assistance of Slater & Gordon, an Austral ian law firm,  the affected l and-owners 
fi led a mult i-b i l l ion dol lar l awsuit against the Austral i an resource giant The 
Broken Hi l l  Proprietary Company Limited (BHP), the majority shareholder 
and operating partner of the Ok Tedi Mine. The suit, filed in the Victorian 
Supreme Court in  Melbourne, the legal domicile of BHP, sought compensation 
for damages and a judgement that would require the mine to greatly reduce the 
volume of tai l ings and other waste material that it releases i nto the river system. 
The lawsuit represents approximately 30,000 people l iving along the affected 
rivers . 
The deci sion of the landowners to pursue their clai ms i n  court, rather than 
resorti ng to potentially violent al ternatives, should be applauded. The law may 
give them the leverage that they need in order to bring about environmental 
reform. Unless the environmental impact of the Ok Tedi Mine is brought under 
control in  the near future , however, there is no guarantee that the protests 
against the mine wi l l  remain peaceful ,  as levels of frustration regarding the 
destruction of their envi ronment continue to i ncrease. 
Discussion and recommendations 
Several general recommendations follow from the precedi ng analysis .  Existing 
insti tutions and forums which faci l itate communication between l andowners 
and resource developers should be strengthened. Landowners should be partners 
in decision-making about appropriate l evels of envi ronmental protect ion,  
strategies to m itigate damage that does occur, and changes to production 
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processes that are environmentally unsound. Landowners should also participate 
in negotiations that establ ish equitable levels of compensation when there is  
environmental impact from resource development projects. 
A regular programme of i ndependent environmental impact assessment is 
a necessary component of all development projects, but such studies should 
take cultural differences in  attitudes towards the environment into account, as 
well as scientific evidence of physical impact on the environment. The fai lure 
to understand and respond to l andowner concerns about environmental impact 
is a certain recipe for confl ict. 
In legal terms, the envi ronmental provis ions of the Papua New Guinea 
Constitution, which protect the rights of c it izens to make productive use of 
their land and resources, should be more rigorously enforced . Poli tical ly and 
economical ly, it is  necessary to address systemic imbalances which currently 
favour the plans of large developers over the rights of local landowners. The 
moral dimensions of large scale development projects, given the extent to which 
they affect people's l ives, should be given greater consideration as wel l .  Finally, 
the protection of landowner rights and the pursuit of environmental justice should 
be considered essential components of all resource development projects in 
Papua New Guinea, and fundamental concerns of the country 's legal system. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
COMPENS ATION , RENT AND POWER IN 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
Co lin Filer 
Arguments about 'compensation' i n  thi s country are not merely the result of 
conflicting evaluations of things which have been lost, damaged or destroyed; 
they also seem to reflect a deeper divi sion over the definition of 'compensation ' 
itself, and hence the conceptual and emotional relationship between 'compensation' 
and the other forms of property or val ue which engage the m inds of the 
participants. Where this divergence has been recognised, it tends to be regarded 
as a d i fference between tradit ional ,  i ndigenous or Melanesi an economic  
principles and those which govern modern capi tal i st enterpri se and publ ic  
pol icy. However, this k ind of  dual ism obscures the l inkages between the current 
use of 'compensation' as a concept in the pol i tics of national resistance to the 
world economy and the growing dependence of the national economy on that 
specific  form of compensation which economists cal l  ' resource rent' . The 
brief economic history of compensation in Papua New Guinea now terminates 
i n  an i deology of ' landownership' which is both a form of local custom and a 
form of national identity. Importunate ' landowners' seek deliverance from the 
same web of social obligations which serve to j ustify and mobil ise support for 
'compensation' c laims which are themselves ambiguous expressions of the 
value of resources and the price of power. Of course, such ambiguities conceal 
a wide range of variation i n  the role  which 'compensat ion'  plays i n  the 
'development' of different resources and the poli ti cs of different communities. 
B ut the burgeoning ideology of landownership and the locally variable practice 
of 'resource compensation' can hardly be said to encourage an effective form 
of state regulation designed to prevent the collection of rental i ncomes from 
sliding towards the criminal practice of extortion. 
Values and relationships 
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The English word 'compensation ' has a strict and narrow sense, in which it 
represents the cost of damage to one's self, one's body or one's property, and a 
broader, figurative sense, in which it can apply to almost any form of payment. 
The strict and narrow sense is  the one which crops up in various pieces of 
national legislation, l ike the Workers Compensation Act of 1 978, the Mining 
Act of 1 992, or Section 58  of the National Constitut ion . If this legal istic definition 
fai ls  to cover the ful l  range of meaning which the word now holds for Papua 
New Guineans, that is  not because they have become accustomed to the broader, 
figurative usage of the word in European discourse, but because they tend to say, 
espec ial ly when commenting on other people's claims, that some forms of 
compensation are distinctively traditional and some are not. The distinction 
thus made between genuine and dubious demands is not primarily directed 
towards the question of whether some form of damage has been correctly 
evaluated,  but to the physical and moral qualities of the ' thing' which has been 
damaged, the nature of the human agencies responsible for deal ing with it, and 
the manner in which they proceed to do so. 
The d i s t i nc t ion  betwee n ' resource  compen sat ion ' and ' ho m i c ide  
compensation' (the subject of  a previous Law Reform Commission monograph) 
appears to i l lustrate this d ifference. One may doubt the ' traditional ' qual ity of 
payments for damage done to land or natural resources because such payments 
bear an obvious resemblance to ground rent, but custom has no space for ground 
rent because ( 'as we al l know' ) customary land has never been a commodity. 
On the other hand, payments for damage done to human bodies seem to belong 
with bridewealth and funeral feasts in the larger class of ' reproduction payments' 
which have always been central to the customary 'gift economy ' ,  i n  the same 
way that markets are supposed to be the central economic i nstitutions in modern 
capital ism. 
Anthropologists tend to agree that 'bodily compensation' was the normal 
form of compensation i n  those communities which recognised the val idity of 
material transactions as a form of dispute settlement or confl ict management 
(Scagl ion and Gordon 1 98 1  ) .  Andrew Strathern ( l  993a) has noted that the l i nk 
between such compensation and other types of reproduction payment, such as 
bridewealth, can be seen i n  the identity of the valuables used as symbolic 
substitutes for human bodies, persons or services. He also draws a disti nction 
between those societies in which compensation was i ntegrated i nto a cycle or 
sequence of reproduction payments which had the general effect of reproducing 
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a certain pattern of social relations between neighbouring groups, and those 
in which each act of compensation was a separate attempt to end a violent 
relationship. But while this distinction may usefully be applied to the cultures 
of the central highlands, there is not a great deal of evidence to suggest that 
compensation of any kind was traditional ly recognised as a truly distinctive 
form of material transaction in other parts of Melanesia. 
Even where anthropologists can recognise that current demands for bodily 
compensation do carry the authority or connotation of some genuine local 
custom, the traditional validity of such demands may sti l l  be dubious for one of 
three reasons: firstly, because they are not directed at, or even by, traditional 
social groups; secondly, because they are demands for cash rather than traditional 
val uables ; or th irdly, just because they are demands. According to Strathern 
( 1 993), the very word 'compensation' is now frequently used as a 'g immick' or 
' rhetorical flourish' to conceal a greedy, selfish and thoroughly modern desire 
for free money, goods or services beneath ' an appeal and resonance derived 
from indigenous custom' ,  and this is most obviously true when the demands 
emanate from well -educated individuals and are then directed at government 
agencies or private companies as if these were traditional clans or communities . 
There is no shortage of well educated Papua New Guineans who heartily agree 
with this analysis, and have often been incl ined to blame the power of money 
for subverting the traditional significance of other types of reproduction payment, 
such as ' brideprice' , in a comparable vein (Strathern 1 98 1 ,  Fi ler 1 985) .  But 
public statements to the effect that ' money is the root of al l evi l '  disguise the 
peculiarly unbusiness-l ike way in which the forces of supply and demand affect 
both the amount and the medium of payment in different communities and 
social situations. As Hasu and Morauta ( 1 98 1 )  noted of the Toaripi of Gulf 
Provi nce-and the same point could be made about many other Papuan 
communities-the quantity and qual ity of reproduction payments, including 
compensation payments, is traditional ly determined by the donors, not by the 
recipients, because there is a 'general principle' in Toaripi society that such 
payments serve to augment the social status of the former, rather than the l atter. 
Even if this equation is reversed in other parts of the country (or under the 
i n fluence of a market economy) the i nference to be drawn here is that 
compensation payments are not governed by some abstract economic principle, 
but constitute one possible and widely variable element i n  the negotiation of 
specific social and pol itical relationships. 
This argument appl ies to resource compensation, no less than it does to 
bodily compensation , not because resource compensation i s  firmly grounded 
in any traditional economic practice, but because the resources for which 
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compensation is c laimed or paid have not yet been subjected to any single 
measure of value which commands the understanding and allegiance of those 
making the claims and those making the payments. It may be true, as Strathern 
points out,  that some Melanesian communi t ies have always made some 
al lowance for the transfer of land rights between groups or individuals in 
exchange for traditional valuables, but such transfers bear no relationship to the 
resource compensation discourse of the period since Independence, which is  
wholly devoted to the asymmetrical relationships between ' traditional groups' 
and the agents or administrators of 'development' . In this context, the defin ition 
and measurement of 'compensation' cannot be derived from any contemplation 
of traditional values, but must either be deduced from a specific method of 
calculating the price of resources or else related directly to the balance of power 
between the stakeholders engaged in the business of negotiation. But where the 
balance of power is itself i nconstant or uncertain, no method of calculating the 
price of resources can create a common understanding of the difference between 
'compensatio n '  and the other forms of payment which ari se from the 
'development' of those resources. 
It is, of course, the extraction of mineral resources which, has provoked 
most of the recent debate on this subject in Papua New Guinea (see, for example, 
Larmour 1 989, McGavin  1 994) .  Indeed, one might say that mining stars in 
resource compensat ion d i scourse j ust as murder features in debates on 
compensation for the human body. No smal l amount of t ime and effort has 
been spent in the search for a 'compensation formula' that will provide lasti ng 
sati sfaction to the various stakeholders in the mining and petroleum sector. 
However, as Burton explains i n  some detai l (this volume), the chances of 
discovering this holy grai l are sti l l remote. For reasons which are not immediately 
obvious, Burton himself extends the definition of 'compensation' to include the 
landowners' share of royalties (which are part of the resource rent) and their 
receipt of occupation fees (which are a form of ground rent) as well as the 
various types of compensation prescribed by the MiningAct of 1 992.  This does 
enable him to demonstrate that different types of payment or benefit to local 
landowners are l iable to have different relative values in different local contexts, 
mainly because of variations in the area and qual ity of the l and which is leased 
for mining and related purposes, and in the size of the l andowning population . 
However, this only serves to compound, rather than al leviate, the problem of 
distributing such benefits between a range of local claimants who can hard ly be 
expected to conceive, much less agree, a single method of eval uating the 
resources whose possession justifies their claims-not only at the moment when 
a 'compensation agreement' is actually s igned, but also through the period in 
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which relationships between the claimants are transformed by al l the local 
impacts which a mining project has (Filer l 990a) . 
In fact, the el asticity of Burton's definition matches an apparent tendency 
of local landed interests to use the idiom of 'compensation' to contain the 
greater part of all the benefits which they expect a mining project to provide. 
For example, representatives of the Lihir Mining Area Landowners Association 
produced a 'position paper' (LMALA 1 994) in which they distinguished four 
types of benefit :  one called 'compensation' for 'destruction' , and the other 
three cal led 'compensation' as 'development' , ' securi ty ' and ' rehabil i tation' . 
The first and last of these four types of benefi t  were clearly seen to match the 
cost of damage done by mining to the physical environment, and thus relate to 
what McGavin ( 1 994) cal ls 'the opportunity cost of lost subsi stence production ' .  
B u t  the notion o f  compensation as 'development and security ' was held to 
embrace a much longer l ist of desirable objects :  the sati sfaction of a constantly 
ri sing level of 'basic needs' ;  the construction of roads, schools, medical facil ities 
and other items of 'community infrastructure' ;  various forms of education 
and train ing;  the participation of landowners in ' business and commercial 
activities ' ,  including 'equity participation in the mining project itself' ; and 
the defence or reconstruction of local custom by means of something known 
as the 'Society Reform Programme' . Oddly enough, this catalogue did not 
i n c l u de the roy a l t i e s  and  occupa t ion  fees w h i c h  B u rton treats as  
'compensation ' -possibly because it was i ntended to divert attention from 
the problems posed by large amounts of cash di stributed unequally between 
the members of an ' unreformed ' society. In a subsequent memorandum 
addressed to the Law Reform Commission, the Chairman of the Association, 
Mark Soipang, defined 'compensation'  as ' the state of equi l ibrium reached 
when [the] forces of destruction and impact must [be] equal to the forces of 
compensation . . .  [so that] the Landowners are forever happy and accept the 
losses and impact they will suffer' . It is perhaps no accident that the author of 
this memorandum once l istened to the same long harangue by Francis Ona 
and other rebellious Bougainvil lean l andowners which led me to express the 
view that 'rural vi l lagers [who] would  l ike to experience economic development 
without the loss of social harmony ' may later find that they 'have experienced 
a loss of soc ial harmony and a relationship of economic dependency as a 
result of the compensation package accepted by their own predecessors' (Filer 
1 990a:27) .  
From this vantage point, the distinction between 'compensation ' ,  i n  the 
narrow sense of the term, and the ' benefit package' or 'Basic Mining Package' 
which landowning communities are now offered as the price of thei r  cooperation 
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in the development of  mining ventures (West 1 992) is  less important than the 
question of whether landowners are ' real ly '  seeking to max imise their col lective 
or personal share of mineral rents, or whether their demand for compensation 
stems from their desire to gain a certain  level of partic ipation and control i n  
the development of  their resources. 
Those who manage the 'forces of destruction and impact' are understandably 
incl ined to take the former view, largely because the demand for compensation 
threatens their own corporate i nterest in the distribution of resource rent. 
According to McGavin  ( 1 994) , landowners (or their leaders) compete with the 
various arms of government over the relative size of the unearned (rental ) 
component in their respective forms of income from mining-broadly conceived 
as ' compensation' versus 'taxation'-since both have an inclination to reduce 
the value of their respective contributions to the process of development itself. 
Th is leads him to imagi ne the formation of compensation claims as a mental 
process which is rather different to the one which Bob Browne has shown us i n  
the cartoon opposite :  
Compensation claims i n  Papua New Guinea usually start o ff  with some fabulous 
sum that first 'comes into the head' and, in customary circumstances, conclude with 
the maximum that can be extracted. In principle, there are valid claims that fall 
within an opportunity cost understanding of contributions that may be brought by 
customary landowners to the contractual setting . . .  In practice, however, the greater 
part of compensation claims brought by customary landowners are l ikely to involve 
a search for unearned incomes (McGavin 1 994: 1 2). 
It is  interesting that McGavin (an economist) should thus l ink the ' rent-seeking 
behaviour' of customary landowners with a lack of economic calculation which 
he attributes to the 'custom ' of pitching one's compensation demands at the 
other party's perceived capac ity to pay. B ut the wider gulf between Western 
and Melanesian forms of property apparently distorts this perception. As a 
result, the 'unreal istic opening claims' of landowners can also be said to fol low 
from their fai lure to recognise the s ize of the surplus avai lable for distribution, 
confusion between gross and net i ncomes, defective understanding of value 
creation, or recognition of the possibi l i ties for sabotage and banditry (McGavin  
1 994:72) .  
At this point, a more sympathetic observer may be tempted to defend the 
rational ity of the claimants by noting their capac ity to play the compensation 
game to their advantage. Richard Jackson, for example, shows some admiration 
for the Porgera landowners who ' were able, by close observation of company 
practice, to guess what the development plans would be and to plant gardens 
and bu ild houses directly on new road al ignments or development sites and 
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thus obtain compensation for these improvements' ( 1 99 1  :22). Such examples 
could be replicated in other project  areas . B ut now we find that our attention 
is directed back to 'compensation ' in  the narrow, legali stic sense, and whether 
we approve or disapprove the conduct of the claimants, it is hard to see why 
an appeal to 'custom' should be necessary to explain it .  Even where demands 
appear, to an economist or company accountant, to have passed the bounds of 
reason,  this need not imply that Melanesians and their Western counterparts 
have different evaluations of the losses they incur (Knetsch 1 989). What is more 
perplex i ng is the case i n  which the c la imants expand the very i dea of 
'compensation' to the point at which the fate of 'custom' is  selfconsciously 
inserted into it, and then related, consciously or otherwise, to the i nstabil i ty of 
what McGavin calls 'the contractual environment' and the i mponderable  nature 
of what he cal ls  'cultural deprivation' and 'cultural development' . In the common 
parlance of the mining industry, we are no longer dealing with people who are 
simply being 'greedy ' ,  but with people who 'cannot be trusted to keep their 
word' or who 'do not know what they real ly want' . 
The ideology of landownership 
Anthropologists, l ike neo-classical economists, community relations personnel 
and government officials ,  share a focus on the question of what l andowners are 
thinking about when they make particular compensation claims or sign particular 
compensation agreements. In so doing, they may fail to recognise the extent to 
which landowners are acting out an ideology of landownership which has its 
own history, and which colours the definition of compensation in  particular 
ways. They may fai l  to see that when landowners become engaged i n  a 
relationship of compensation with some external agency, their status as l andowners 
(and their consequent role within thi s  relat ionship) is not a s imple and 
straightforward fact of life .  For there is a sense i n  which Papua New Guineans 
have only become landowners over the course of the last 10 years.  
During the colonial period, the nearest approximation to the concept of a 
' landowner' in rural Tok Pisin was the phrase papa bilong graun-a phrase 
which was normal ly used to refer to an individual owner of some particular 
piece of land, often in cases where the ownership was a matter of dispute or a 
matter of i nterest to some colonial official. In the wake of national Independence 
in 1 975, this phrase was condensed into the single word papagraun, in  much 
the same way that the phrase lo bilong tumbuna ( 'ancestral laws ' )  was condensed 
into the single word kastom. In both cases, the condensation accomplished a 
new kind of col lective status for what had previously been a set of discrete 
phenomena, and also the sense of an opposition between this novel enti ty and 
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Cartoon by Bob B rowne 
Papua New Guinea Post-Courier, 16 November 1990 
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an external force-between ' landowners' and outsiders wanting access to their 
land, or between 'custom' and the prospect of 'development' . Nowadays,  
especial ly i n  areas where some ' resource development' i s  actually taking place, 
or where people are demanding compensation for the use of customary land, 
Pidg in  discourse has made way for the Angl icised term landona-thereby 
accompl ishing the conceptual separation of the ' landowners ' from their land 
(that i s, graun), even where it is  assumed or argued that this separation cannot 
be achieved in practice. 
The publ ic evolution of this status in  the English language i tself can be 
traced through the pages of local newspapers over the same period of time. For 
example, in al l the titles of all the news items, articles and letters publ i shed in the 
Post-Courier in 1 975,  I have only been able to find one occurrence of the word 
' landowner' : a front page story on 1 8  March bore the title  'Landowners Make 
Game Laws' . (The Post- Courier Selective Index has placed this story in the 
category 'National Parks, Wildl ife and Conservation' , and not in the much larger 
category 'Land, Land Disputes, Land Settlement' .)  In the titles of other items, 
the rural population appears in a w ide variety of other guises-no longer as 
'natives' , of course, but as a motley band of 'v i l lagers ' , 'squatters, ' robbers' or 
'bandits' , as Bougainvi llean ' rebels ' , 'Lufa people' , a 'Chimbu group' ,  or the 
'Piplika clan' . 
Table 10. 1  suggests that the presence of ' landowners ' on the public stage 
has greatly i ncreased since the time of lndependence, and more especially since 
1 987, while the i ncidence of discourse about 'compensation' has also increased, 
though not so markedly, but the overal l volume of public debate on the general 
subject of ' land' has remained relatively constant, or perhaps even decl ined, 
over the same period. 
If we m ake a d i st i nct ion between i tems which deal wi th ' resource 
compensation ' and those which deal with ' bodily compensation ' ,  we find that 
the first of these categories accounted for 2 of the 3 'compensation' headlines in  
1 975,  no headlines i n  1 987,  4 i n  1 988 ,  1 1  in  1 992, and 16  i n  1 993.  In 1 975 ,  the 
Table 10.1 Inci dence of newspaper items about ' land ' ,  ' l andowners ' and 
'compensation ',  1975-93 
Items in Post-Courier Selective Index 1 975 1 987 1 988 1 992 1 993 
Titles containing the word ' landowner' 1 1 0  44 59 99 
Ti tles containing the word 'compensation' 3 1 1 3  23 34 
Total items on the subject of ' land' 1 02 57 82 54 65 
Note: 'Compensation' covers 'Compo' and 'Compensated' .  
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Index placed items on the subject of bodily compensation in the category of 
items deal ing with 'Payback and Compensation' (of which there were only 3), 
while items on the subject of resource compensation were placed in  the general 
category of items deal ing with 'Land, Land Disputes, Land Settlement' . By 
1 987, the Index had a separate category for items on the general subject of 
'Compensation ' ,  which has normally i ncluded a mixture of items deal ing with 
bodily and resource compensation, but in most recent years, there has been a 
separate category of items on the subject of 'Land Disputes and Compensation ' ,  
where most o f  the items are about resource (rather than bodily) compensation . 
A total of 32 items were placed under this latter heading i n  1 987, 33 in 1 992, 
and 55  in 1 993, while the more general category of items about  'Compensation' 
contained 1 8  items in  1 987, 29 in  1 992, and 32 in 1 993 .  From this we can 
perhaps infer that most (though not al l )  of the increase in  public debate about 
'compensation' represents an increase i n  debate about resource compensation, 
rather than bodily compensation. 
The growth of public debate about resource compensation is intricately l inked 
with the development of ' landownership' as the principal vehicle of national 
populism. Once released from their colonial subjection, Papua New Guineans 
(or 'Melanesians' )  have been learning to think of themselves as people who are 
distinguished from other nations or races by their singular physical and emotional 
relationship to ' the l and' which all of them possess. The ' automatic citizen ' 
who has no customary land rights is a contradiction whose existence cannot be 
admitted . The identification of ' the people' as (customary) ' landowners' is also 
the fl ipside of denials that there is such a thing as 'poverty ' or 'peasantry' in  
Papua New Guinea. It is because ' we' are all petty landlords that we can neither 
be peasants nor be poor. Declarations concerning the sheer abundance of national 
natural resources (commonly contrasted wi th the fol ly  of their current 
exploitation or mismanagement) are also part of the same ideological construct. 
So is the proposition that there is no square inch of national territory which 
does not have a customary landowner attached to it (the mental abol ition of 
terra nullius) , the belief that customary land is always owned by groups cal led 
'clans ' , and even the statement that land tenure is an alien concept. 
Regardless of the much-quoted 'fact' that 97 per cent of the surface area 
of Papua New Guinea remains under customary tenure (the real figure being 
somewhat higher), the ideological qual ity of customary ' landownership' is 
evident in  the rather different 'fact' that any statement about ' landowners' can 
now be defended and attacked from the same political standpoint. For example, 
Lynch and Marat ( 1 993) have attacked the new MiningAct for cal l ing landowners 
' landholders ' , as if to deny the substance of their tenure, while another radical 
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lawyer, Brian Brunton ( 1 995), makes exactly the same substi tution in order to 
emphasise the idea that customary 'owners' only hold their land i n  trust for 
future generations, and perhaps also to repudiate the feasibility of registering 
customary land. Indeed, the recent eruption of 'popular' protest against the 
so-cal led ' land reforms' supposedly  being imposed upon Papua New Guinea 
as an integral part of the World B ank's 'structural adjustment programme' 
provides a wealth of further i l lustrations of the way in  which this ideology has 
entered i nto the construction of a national identity. 
The following extracts from letters written to the Post-Courier newspaper 
are al l part of a col lective defence of 'national integrity ' against the onslaughts 
of ' international monsters ' : 
Registration of customary land . . .  will  signal the loss of power which is usually derived 
from the special bond between people and their land. It  is this power that brought 
giant mining companies crawl ing into the courtroom; this same power legi timises 
our rights to demand compensation from unscrupulous transnational corporations; 
it  is the power that holds at bay bad business practices by foreigners by way of 
prolonging negotiations, demanding proper business deals, environmental p lans, 
etc . .  . It wou ld be the beginning of division and destabi l isation of families,  clans, 
tribes,  communities and u ltimately  the nation, hence the disintegration of our 
traditional cultural autonomy (Post-Courier 17 July 1 995). 
We know we are blessed with resources. We are a rich people with what we have­
people who know their true connection to the land wil l  understand this. Take the 
l and  from u s ,  and we are tru e beggars on our  o w n  s o i l ( Post - Courier  
1 August 1 995).  
Land tenure is  a Western concept l ike many other foreign ideas which have fai led 
terribly in this country. Land entitlement over time changes hands and does not 
belong to a particu lar person, c lan or tribe for that matter. That is  why we have land 
disputes all over the country . . .  If the landowners and not landlords wish to participate 
in  meaningful development then teach them to be developers of their own land. Let 
them borrow the money from the banks and let them run thei r own busi nesses on 
their own land . In this way we wi l l  have self sustainable development co-existing 
with unspoi led cultural environment. Our land will not be turned to desert by foreign 
companies (Post-Courier 4 August 1 995). 
Registration wou ld promote the cunning middleman looking for the s l ightest 
opportunity to make profit at the expense of  the s i lent customary landowner . . .  Minor 
di sputes within a clan may be suppressed in order to get land registered. Once the 
land's  value has increased the land owner who was not happy in the beginning 
cannot come back and sue anybody because now he has to deal with a corporate 
body's land (Post-Courier 10 Augusut 1 995). 
We believe the Government's wish to register our customary land i s  a calculated 
move by it  and the World Bank to wreck the normal , easy and simple vi l lage l ife of 
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all customary landowners within this country, which we know is one of [the] best 
in the whole world (Post-Courier 25 August 1 995). 
The assumption that a country's age-old traditional system can be wiped out at the 
whim of a financial institution shows the contempt of outsiders for this growing 
nation . . .  My brothers: in the Bible Esau ' sold his birthright for a mess of pottage' ! 
Let us pray that this Papua New Guinea of ours under God, does not commit that 
same foolish error! The bride gives herself gladly to the groom: together they find 
happi ness in the future. The groom rapes the bride: tragedy is assured. Landed or 
Landless: I t  i s  the people's time to choose (Post-Courier 22 September 1 995) .  
The irony in  this particular stream of consciousness is  that the World Bank's 
current interest i n  promoting the registration of customary l and i n  Papua New 
Guinea is part of i ts attempt to rational i se the d istribution of resource rents 
from log exports i n  ways which wil l  ensure a greater material benefit to the 
'real ' customary owners of the logs being exported. From which its opponents 
infer that it must be a very cunning monster too. 
Of course, what Papua New Guineans say i n  publ ic  debate about their land 
or their resources may not bear any obvious relationship to what they do in 
practice when confronted with a 'compensation s ituation ' .  This also is  a feature 
of ideologies in general , s ince their internal contradictions natural ly give rise 
to the view (which Papua New Guineans often espouse) that 'mere talk' i s  no 
guide to actual behaviour. So it is  reasonable to ask if the historical development 
of spec ific forms of resource compensation is  the outcome of negotiations 
between key players or stakeholders in which ideolog ical statements or 
sentiments about landownership play only a marginal or occasional role .  And 
we may l ikewise wonder whether some of the articles of faith which now pop 
up in publ ic debate about resource compensation have been transposed there 
from some unrelated range of practical , h istorical experiences. 
Take,  for example, the simple proposi tion that 'c lans own land' . Th is  
particular art icle of  fai th is not  one which has emerged as  part of  a popular 
reaction to the facts of pol i tical i ndependence, but was one of many rules of 
thumb which guided the colonial administration of ' native custom' .  But if we 
fol low that l ine of analysis which regards particular types of group as the 
effect of particular types of transaction, rather than v ice versa, then we can 
find the element of novelty by asking how the status of 'clans' as l andowning 
groups has been amp l i fi ed or d i s torted by  the growi ng popu l ar i ty of 
' compensation' as the public goal of their collective action . It can be shown 
that the Goilala ' landowners' of the Tolukuma gold m ine in Central Province 
have actual ly i nvented 'clans' in the course of their own debate about the 
prospective distribution of material benefits from this particular development. 
But even in the very different cultural sett ing of the Lihir islands, where 'clans' , 
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in the normal ethnographic sense of the word, were already the product of 
mortuary feasti ng pract ices ,  the same prospect is st i l l  transforming the 
significance of 'clans' as local people try to formulate a set of 'Lihir Land 
Rules' which wi l l  codify local entitlement to those areas of land required for 
mining purposes and later serve (they hope) to solve disputes aris ing from the 
monetary value of these holdings. From these examples we can begin  to see 
that the question of whether 'clans'  exist as ' l andowners' in the fabric of 
national identity is  the question of how 'clans' have actually become groups 
of landowners claiming compensation from development of their resources . 
In this respect, we can propose that publ ic identification of the mass of 
Papua New Guineans as 'customary landowners' i s  a phenomenon which owes 
a good deal to the mineral prospecting boom of the early 1 980s, when substantial 
sections of the rural population began to formulate the v iew that roving white 
geologists were the new heralds of true 'development' , dri l l ing thei r  way through 
the failures and disappointments of the post-colonial pol i tical system. It then 
became a foundation stone of public debate about these same failures and 
disappointments through the scandal which erupted around the ' Placer Pacific 
share issue' in the latter half of 1 986, when many of the country 's  i ndividual 
'el ites' were thought to have used their inside knowledge to make i l legitimate 
windfall profits from stockmarket speculation. This perception of corruption made 
a considerable impact on the national election campaign of 1 987, but when that 
election fai led to bring about a change of government, and the government 
continued to negotiate the development of the new Misima and Porgera gold 
mines with the company which had sought ' local partic ipation' through its earl ier 
share float, the new wave of public  debate about the mining industry created a 
new role for ' landowners seeking compensation' at specific project sites-not 
least on Bougainvil le, of course, but not just there. We might then proceed to ask 
when and how the outcomes of this debate were not only embodied in the general 
tenets of national populism, but also made a dist inctive impact on the negotiation 
of other projects or issues-from logging projects to repeater stations to high­
way robbery. But we should not forget that an economic h istory of compensation 
in  this country has several other i ngredients, some of which date back to the 
colonial period, and most of which are sti l l  present as distinctive contexts within 
which compensation is  demanded, debated and paid. 
The history of compensation 
Although Burton (this volume) notes the provi sions which were made for 
compensation of 'natives' in  the early mining ordinances of Papua and New 
Guinea, the earl iest episode in this particular history which stil l  bears on the 
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configuration of current national di scourse is surely the payment of ' war 
damage compensation' by the Austral ian administration in the aftermath of 
World War II. Substantial segments of the 'native' population received almost 
one mi l l ion pounds under this heading in the 5 years from 1 946 to 1 950. This 
was compensation for both loss of relatives and loss of property, and thus 
represented a mixture of what I have chosen to call 'bodi ly'  and ' resource' 
compensation. 
Few Europeans reali sed that many Papua New Guineans were disappointed with the 
amount of compensation, that 5 pounds for a lost pig and 20 pounds for a dead son 
seemed small after the experience of Western mili tary wealth during the war, of 
riding in  army trucks and cars, eating army rati ons and seeing vast mi l i tary 
encampments buil t within weeks (Griffin et al. 1 979: 1 07). 
The enormity and variety of the damage done during the war lasted long enough 
in the minds of those affected by it for a new set of claims to be made against 
the suffering and toi l  of the 'war carri ers ' in the aftermath of national 
Independence. One might have expected that demands for this particular form 
of bodi ly compensation would natural ly vanish as death took its tol l  of the 
remain ing carriers, but a recent spate of anniversaries, combined with the 
development of a world market in war relics, has provoked a new series of 
demands which recombine the value of an ancient service with the value of a 
place or item of hi storical significance. For example, i n  March 1 992, the 
' landowners ' of the Kokoda Trail were reported to be demanding community 
projects worth K3.5 mi l l ion before they would al low the trail to be used as 
part of the 50th ann iversary Anzac Day celebrations-the greater part of the 
demand being directed at the Papua New Guinean and Austral ian governments 
' as part of the war carriers ' compensation ' ,  while the rest was directed at two 
travel agencies which were expected to make substantial profits from their 
sponsorship of the Kokoda Epic Run (Post-Courier 26 March 1 992). 
War damage compensation has thus been assimilated to another form of 
resource compensation which originated outside the 'resource sectors ' of the 
national economy and became the subject of substantial agitation in the 1970s . 
This concerns the land removed from customary tenure during the ini tial period 
of contact between indigenous and colonial regimes, when it can now be 
claimed that the transactions were distorted by grotesque disparities in  the 
perceptions and evaluations of the two sides. In this case also, claims for 
compensation are directed partly at the increase in the value of an asset over 
time, and partly at the fraud or trickery by which it was in itial ly secured. 
Around the time of Independence, claims of this sort were mixed up with the 
pol i tics of plantation ownership in the Gazelle Peninsula, but they have since 
come to revolve around the land which has been used for urban development 
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and certain types of economic i nfrastructure. Their motivation has also come 
to include, in  some cases, an element of frustration with the perceived fail ure 
of relevant government agencies to honour past undertakings to the ' original 
landowners' ,  and also an element of fraud or trickery on the part of the claimants 
themsel ves , especia l ly when the claims are made in respect of recently 
negotiated leases whose faults cannot be traced back to the dawn of colonial 
h istory. 
Some observers see this  new bundle of motives as the defining element in  
most of  the compensation claims now being made against the State, whether 
these be claims for use of land and other natural resources or for damage done 
to human bodies. But we have yet to consider that part of the preceding history 
of compensation in which the process of government has involved the promotion 
or regu lation of compensation payments between natural or corporate persons 
whose own experience of this process may wel l have affected their understanding 
of payments due to them from the State i tself. 
In the central highlands of New Guinea, where war damage was not an 
issue, the first episode in the modern history of compensation was the support 
of the colonial administration for the conduct of peace-making ceremonies as 
an alternative to the practice of 'payback' between neighbouring clans. By this 
means,  bod i ly  compensation was g iven the stamp of colonial authori ty 
as a central branch of ' traditional ' pol itical economy. Meggitt ( 1 977) and Gordon 
( 1 98 1 ) have both remarked on the way that 'blood money '  soon came to be 
seen as a sort of 'fine' imposed by the state in a futile attempt to stem the actual 
flow of blood, and later became the subject of 'excessive' demands by claimants 
who were no longer prepared to accept the mediation of the courts or the practice 
of ' traditional ' exchange as legitimate methods of ending a feud. 
The notorious history of homicide compensation in  the central highlands 
may nonetheless conceal some more pervasive changes in  the relationship 
between the ' roads '  called ' l aw' and 'money ' in the years preced ing and 
fol lowing Independence. In  many parts of the country, local government 
counci l lors who inherited the semi-judicial mantles of the old luluais and vi llage 
constables seem to have made i t  their business to encourage the use of cash as 
the standard measure and means of payment for all the 'wrongs ' which could 
be settled beyond the official notice of the colonial legal system, yet sti l l  appealed 
to the authori ty of ' law' to underwrite this practice. From my own fieldwork i n  
a Sepik vi l lage in  the early 1 970s, I can sti l l  recal l the huge amount o f  time that 
councillors would spend in making a publ ic account of the precise amount of 
money which one person owed another for some particular l i st of 'wrongs'­
and also their pretence that a l l  these 'prices' were imposed or  underwritten by 
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the 'government' which gave them the authority to  do  the sums. Yet this way 
of thinking about the financial power of the State was at variance with the one 
which colon ial admin istrators had i n  m ind when they sought to use the 
institution of local government as an instrument to teach the native population 
the relationship between taxation, public spending and democracy. And it seems 
fa ir ly  c lear that  the capac i ty of the S tate to regu l ate the pract ice  of 
'compensation' amongst i ts subjects was eroded by the contest, which has 
grown increasingly acute since Independence, over the 'balance of payments' 
between the State itself and its constituent communities. When the use of money 
is no longer subject to the real or imaginary force of Western law, the col lection 
of taxes, fines and fees by the various arms of government creates the expectation 
of an equal ly disposable return. Pol i ticians and officials are then led to conclude 
that ' handouts ' of one kind or another are the only way to sustain the legit imacy 
of the State, even if the distribution of such payments always purchases support 
from one direction at the cost of losing it elsewhere. 
In this respect, the highland region is perhaps unusual i n  the extent of the 
demands made by both sides in the contest for financial sovereignty. For example, 
Strathern ( 1 98 1 :  1 7) noted the strenuous attempts of Vil lage Court officials in 
the Dei Counci l area to collect the maximum level of fines payable for various 
offences, while punitive police raids on highland vil lages are now met with 
legal action for punitive damages against the perpetrators. The 's trong arm of 
the law ' ,  which once forced people to make peace with each other, now merely 
provokes a further round of claims against the State i tself. 
If the significance of 'compensation' has thus been affected by the financial 
form of citizenship, it has also been affected by a separate process which owes 
more to the economics than the politics of post-colonial society. This may be 
conceived as an i nversion of the relationship between bodily compensation and 
resource compensation, whereby the latter replaces the former as the main point 
of articulation between ' traditional ' and 'modern' economics. This is  also the 
point at which the ideology of landownership begins to cast its long shadow 
across the pol i tics of national identity, and from which it might even be said 
that, if England is (or was) a nation of shopkeepers, then Papua New Guinea, 
which was once a nation of gardeners, is now becoming a nation of gatekeepers 
and rentco l lectors-or at l east a nat ion of fem ale  gardeners and mal e  
rentcollectors. 
Although there may sti l l  only be a minority of the rural population which 
actual ly does receive some form of resource rent, the vast majority now seem to 
subscribe to the bel ief that their land does contain some valuable resource­
whether gold, oi l ,  diamonds, or the truly  visible logs-and that their only chance 
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of 'development' l ies in their share of the rent to be col lected from the extraction 
of these resources by some ' mul tinational ' company. Sttirzenhofecker has 
provided a graphic i l lustration of this state of mind in  her portrait of a Duna 
community whose male members 
blend received notions regarding powerful spiri ts with rumours regarding the finding 
of oil resources, in such a way as to move from the picture of a sacred landscape, 
whose fertility must be preserved for the future, to a picture of an exploitable landscape 
avai lable for manipu lation by a company . . .  Their peripheral location, coupled with 
rumours of the centralising potential of company development, have given them an 
almost apocal yptic vision of what such a form of development could bring to them, 
regardless of the likely ecological consequences (Stiirzenhofecker 1 994:27) .  
The lack of ' real ism' i n  such expectations should  not lead us to suppose that 
they are founded on an incorrect assessment of the forces driving the economy. 
For the popular perception of 'development' as the collection of a resource rent 
reflects the real historical tendency for an ever-increasing proportion of the 
national income to be obtained in this form-and an ever-diminishing portion 
of that rental income to be avai lable for ' rational investment' on the part of the 
State or in accordance with national and provincial development plans. The 
remai nder accrues to a mot ley band of ' customary l andowners ' whose 
consumption of the proceeds may or may not leave a surplus which may either 
pay the price of their admission to the accumulation strategies of an existing 
'national bourgeoisie' -most commonly through the purchase of urban real 
estate or the formation of 'joint ventures' with foreign entrepreneurs-or else 
be stolen from them by the fraudulence of their ' leaders ' , 'consultants' and 
'advisers ' . 
Corruption notwithstanding, foreign developers may find some reassurance 
in the idea that a nation of rent col lectors is a nation with which they can 
ultimately do business, once the laws of price and value have been recognised 
on both sides of the table. 'Resource compensation ' wi l l  become a form of 
' resource rent' to the extent that compensation claims are subject to a rational l y  
calculable form of  regulation . I f  the developers are successful i n  their efforts to 
secure this form of regulation, then they wi l l ,  i n  a sense, have created a nation 
of rent collectors, in the same way that their previous efforts to gain immediate 
access to natural resources on customary land has already created a nation of 
customary landowners . In one sense, Peter Fitzpatrick anticipated this earl ier 
creation when he argued that ' natural resource extraction can i tself assist 
indirectly in the conservation of the traditional mode of production' because 
( l ike Austral ian aid) it reduces the rel iance of the 'dominant internal c lass 
e lements ' on  the surplus value produced by the 'peasantry ' (Fi tzpatrick 
COMPENSATION, RENT AND POWER 1 73 
1 980:20 1 ) . In language more fami l iar to Papua New Guineans, the national 
'elites' are not obliged to exploit their 'grassroots ' compatriots directly when 
al l 'customary landowners' have a common interest (and a certain amount of 
success) in  extracting a share of the profi ts made by foreigners extracti ng 
natural resources from their land. However, i f  this common interest encourages 
or presupposes the maintenance of 'the traditional mode of production ' ,  there 
is less reason for developers to hope that landowners demanding compensation 
are on their way to becoming petty l andlords col lecting a reasonable rent, and 
more reason for them to suspect that 'compensation '  i s  another name for 
extortion, and thus a form of theft rather than a form of rent, whose collection 
is hardly to be distinguished from the 'gate-keeping' practices of the hold-up 
merchants along the Okuk Highway. In that case, we may not be contemplating 
the forward march of a market economy, but regression towards the state of 
affairs which existed at the time of 'first contact' ,  when mutual host i l i ty or 
'negative rec iprocity ' was the characteri stic form of economic relationship 
outside of the community within which reproduction payments were organised . 
This we may call the developer's nightmare. 
Custom and development 
While there may be some rhetorical value in the proposition that 'compensation' 
is  beginning to take on the characteristics of some other economic relationship­
such as rent or extortion-the approximation remains imperfect in practice whi le 
the actual demands, negotiations and payments are sti l l  embedded in  a network 
of personal relationships which endures beyond these specific acts and includes 
a variety of other economic i ngredients. If it is true to say that ' resource 
compensation' represents a crucial point of articulation between the ' traditional 
mode of production' and its modern capi tal ist counterpart, then ' tradition'  i s  
more l ikely to  be  represented by this network of personal relationships than by 
any particular type of economic transaction . But we do not have to dig up and 
defend some model of 'tradit ional economy' before we can proceed to ask how 
'resource compensation ' reflects and constrains the more general pattern of 
current relationships between, and within,  ' l andowning communities' , and their 
relationship to the variety of organisations or 'development agencies' from whom 
compensation is expected or demanded. 
Several observers have noted that local l andowners have an understandable 
tendency to compare, or even to model, thei r  relationships with developers on 
those relationships which already feature in their  customary networks of 
reciprocity. Writing about the impact of the Misima gold mine, Gerritsen and 
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Macintyre phrase this observation in terms of an abstract distinction between 
'reciprocity '  and 'contract' : 
For Misimans unfamiliar with the rigidities of commercial contracts, the appeal 
to the letter of the law is  not only baffling, it  is antisocial. More specifical ly, it 
fai ls to take into account the prevai ling notions of reciprocity and the customary 
indebtedness of guest to host ( 1 99 1  :44). 
Jackson remarks that local vil lagers deal with mining company employees as if 
they were 'a  sort of kinsmen' ( 1 99 1 :2 1 ), while Strathem writes of a 'clan mentality' 
which causes people to deal with all sorts of external agencies as if they were 
'super-clans' ( 1 993a:60) . It is not difficult to concede the plausibi l ity of such 
observations, and yet they seem to raise as many problems as they solve. 
Given the sheer variety of personal relationships which we may normally 
expect to find in any matrix of local custom, it is surely pertinent to ask which 
particular relationships are being used to gloss the interface between landowners 
and developers, and then it may not seem so plausible to suppose that all members 
of a local community wi l l  make rout ine appeal to one form of personal 
relationship when deal ing with anyone who represents an external development 
agency in  all the circumstances of their mutual i nteraction. Of course, landowners 
may use customary norms and routines of hospi tality to deal with i ndividual 
developers as they would deal with any other type of guest in their community. 
But when we try to investigate or conceptual ise the substance of their mutual 
conduct, we may find that we are no longer deal ing with any actual pattern of 
relationships between real individuals in concrete social settings, but only with 
snatches of rhetoric which, l ike the abstract opposition of ' landowners' to 
'developers' , are applied to 'development discourse' i n  a certain type of public 
forum-say the meetings of a local Social Impact Monitoring Committee or 
the letters of complai nt written by self-appointed 'grassroot' representatives to 
the editor of the Post-Courier newspaper. 
Once we al low that there are several ways for l andowner-developer 
relationships to reflect the pattern of personal relationships already found within 
a local community, we may then wonder how the process of 'development' 
transforms the qual ity and variety of these relationships, and how the talk of 
'compensation'  figures in this transformation. For example, Kirsch (th is  
volume) considers the extent to which Yonggom vil lagers have come to deal 
with Ok Tedi Mining Limited as if it  were a type of corporate sorcerer, whose 
employees are no longer welcome as guests, let alone as pseudo-kinsmen, in 
l ight of the damage which min ing has done to their local environment. In 
cases such as this, one may readily i nfer that rel ationships between landowning 
communities and mining companies have an inbuilt tendency to deteriorate to 
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a condi tion of ' negat ive rec iproc i ty '  (Sahl i n s  1 965)  i n  which the most 
antagonistic forms of 'customary' interaction serve as models for a popular 
resi stance to 'development' . Under these c i rcumstances,  an ' excess ive 
compensation demand' may no longer represent a bid to achieve or restore 
some notional condition of 'balanced reciprocity '  between landowners and 
developers , but may only count as an act of outright hosti l i ty, l ike a spear 
hurled at the enemy. But  that does not mean that compensation demands­
excessive or otherwise-signal a uniform switch in the circuits of material 
exchange between these two sides. Where forms of reciproci ty depend as much 
upon what Sahlins ca1 1s ' the spirit of exchange' as on the quantity or value of 
material transactions, one may ask i f  ' resource compensation' has a variable 
psychological dimension of its own, so that negotiations on this subject can 
occur at many points in  the degeneration or improvement of relationships 
between the owners and developers of a particular resource. 
We can phrase this problem in a somewhat different way by asking what 
kind of material and personal relationships between landowners and developers 
are probable or possible at different stages in a specific process of resource 
development. Developers are l iable to answer this question by default  when 
they complain about the inabil i ty of landowners to abide by the terms of a 
contract. McGavin lends this complaint the blessing of ethnographic authority : 
The anthropological record of indigenous cultures i n  Melanesian nations reveals 
that even where agreements have been reached through prolonged encounter and 
wi tnessed by solemn and public assent and ritual , these agreements sti l l  represent 
the state of affairs and even of emotions at the times and places of their articu lation 
(McGavin 1 994: 1 9) .  
In this l ight, we are l iable to envisage the course of landowner-developer 
relationships as a cumulative process of mutual frustration which stems from 
the i ncompatib i l i ty of their respect ive u se of words and thi ngs to make 
'relationships' .  On the one side, developers attempt to package their relationships 
w i th l andowners i n  spec i fi c  forms of bal anced rec iproci ty, i nc l ud i ng 
compensation agreements, each of which is intended to function as a fixed 
point of reference, a signpost constantly pointing to their mutual rights and 
obl igations, within the changeable landscape of ' local emotion ' .  On the other 
side, landowners are constantly seeking their own private ways and means to 
remove these elements of balance from the landscape, and when they cannot 
reach this goal through the manipulation of a ' customary ' flow of gifts and 
favours between themselves and i ndividual developers, they do so by the 
'customary' orchestration of hostil i ties instead. But this renewal of the opposi tion 
between modern and traditional ways of ' doing business' obviously begs the 
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question whether both sides are inherently i ncapable of l earning to appreciate 
the other's point of view, or whether they are kept apart by certain aspects of 
the process or the concept of 'development' . 
At one stage in the development of the Lihir gold mine, when the l andowners 
(or their leaders) were sti l l  formulating their concept of 'compensation ' , one 
of the mining company 's executive officers decided to purchase l arge quantities 
of traditional shel l money from the islanders in order that ' the company ' could 
make a corporate and ethnic contribution to the mortuary payments which 
Lihirians regard as the epitome of local 'custom' .  In the event, he was dissuaded 
from thi s  course of action by col leagues who were perhaps mindful  of a 
recommendation made in the socio-economic impact assessment of the mining 
project, that ' the company should adopt a community l i ai son strategy which 
aims to preserve the power of Lihir "custom" without appearing to patronise it' 
(Fi ler and Jackson 1 989:74 ) . If i t  is  true that developers are more i nsistent than 
landowners on the need for ' resource compensation ' to be set apart from those 
reproduction payments which sustain a local network of personal relationships, 
their i nsistence need not be due to an ignorance of local custom, nor even to 
their fai lure to perceive the benefits of bei ng integrated i nto it, but may just 
follow from their recognition that a mining company cannot behave as i f  it were 
a ' super-clan' without disruption to the fundamental principles of any 'gift 
economy' .  And if the landowners of Lihir have now developed a concept of 
'compensation' which i s  broad enough to encompass the anticipated fruits of 
'development' and the local roots of 'custom' ,  this need not imply that they 
bel ieve developers, as a col lective entity or as a set of discrete individuals, have 
the capac ity or obl igation to partic ipate in the amalgamation of these roots 
and fru its. 
On the other hand, we should be just as wary of assuming that landowners 
are bound to construe their own participation in relations with developers i n  
terms of  the famil iar and relatively static features of  their 'customary ' rights 
and obl igations. Even while some developers have been meditating on the 
feasibil ity of making a corporate descent i nto the underworld of 'custom' ,  some 
landowners have been making a countervail ing effort to assemble new roles or 
structures through which to regulate the process of 'development' . As previously 
noted, some Lihirians have assembled a Society Reform Programme which 
purports to defend local 'custom '  from the i mpact  of ' development'  by 
interposing a dense thicket of councils and committees whose combination of 
pseudo-bureaucratic and pseudo-tradi tional features m ight wel l cause the 
developers to label i t  a 'cargo cult '  if they were not constrained from doing so 
by the requirements of pol i teness in the name of 'compensation' . When I had 
occasion to ask a committee of Lih irians why they had i ncluded a Counci l  of 
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Chiefs within the structure of their Society Reform Programme, when 'we' all 
knew that Lihir had no customary i nstitution of hereditary chieftainship, they 
just said that they were fol lowing the 'Fij i  model ' .  On an earl ier occasion, 
when di scussing the soc ial impact of the proposed Tolukuma mining project 
wi th what was defi n itely not a committee of Yulai landowners in Goi lala 
District, I raised the possibi l i ty that they might also wish to regulate this impact 
by forming a Council of Chiefs, firstly because of the growing popularity of 
such bod ies in other parts of Papua New Guinea, and secondly because Goilala 
custom, unl ike that of Lihir, does contain hereditary chieftainship (Hal lpike 
1 977;  Hirsch 1 988) .  Th is suggestion was rejected on the grounds that chiefs 
do not have counci ls  and are not responsible for managing the local soc ial 
impact of such things as gold mines. Instead the Yulai chose to fabricate three 
'clans' for their community-where 'clans' were no more recognisable in Yulai 
custom than were 'chiefs' i n  that of Lihir-and then proceeded to demand that 
each new 'clan' should play an equal part in the negotiation of 'development' 
and di stribution of its economic benefits, despite the fact that many individuals 
were sti ll unable to dec ide which 'clan' was theirs or how to make their choice 
of membersh ip. 
Such ' i nventions of tradition' have become a commonplace of Melanesian 
soc iology. But once these artefacts are placed within the mutual relationships 
of landowners and developers, i t  i s  pertinent to ask how the social construction 
of such relationships, especially as this takes place in the sphere of ' resource 
compensation discourse' , materially modifies the internal constitution of both 
landowning communities and the corporate entities which seek to organise the 
process of development. In l ight of the points already made, we can now see 
that there are two ways of answering this question, but they are not mutual ly 
consistent. On the one hand, we may conceive the substitution of resource 
compen sat ion  for bod i l y  compensat ion  as part of a w i der process of  
commercial isation which has the general effect of ' l iberating' i ndividuals from 
a framework of local 'custom' which is thereby transformed into the reified 
instrument of their own personal pursuit of wealth and power in a new corporate 
environment. On the other hand , we may recognise that local networks of 
rec iprocity are constantly escaping the reifications of custom from which 
individual landowners are also disentangling themselves, and are subject to their 
own forms of development which may threaten to subvert the bureaucratic 
rational ity of the 'developers ' as much as they constrain the social disintegration 
of the ' landowning community' . 
Both of these perspectives can be found in  Andrew Strathern 's exasperated 
account of 'excessive compensation c laims '  in the central highlands . While 
landowners seek to deal with the State and other corporate agents of development 
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as if they were traditional corporate bodies ( ' super-clans ' ), their appl ication 
of this 'clan mental ity '  is  somehow mixed with the 'short-sighted selfishness' 
of certain individuals, whose own preference for short term gains i n  the shape 
of 'compensation ' ,  combined with their reluctance to share such benefits with 
other members of their own community, creates an obstacle to that same process 
of 'development' which should ideally displace the 'clan mentali ty '  from this 
arena (Strathern l 993a:60) . Local journal ist Frank Senge presents the same 
paradox in a somewhat different form. People whose mutual compensation 
demands were traditionally restricted by ' the conti nuous possib i l i ty that a 
s imi lar demand could be made i n  return' have now discovered that this restraint 
does not apply to the business of negotiating pay-outs from the government or 
from big business, so individuals are encouraged to adopt a profit-max imis ing 
strategy i n  their approach to these negotiations, even while the process of 
'development' has i ncreased the scale, if not the sol idarity, of those ' customary ' 
groups which sti l l  engage in ' normal tribal negotiations' , and places an ever 
diminishing burden on ' the i ndividual 's  abi l i ty to pay ' (Post-Courier 2 January 
1 99 1 ) . 
These are not coincidental i nconsistencies . On the one hand, they reflect 
a real contradiction in the social construction of 'compensation' as an economic 
relationship. On the other hand, they point to the existence of regional and sectoral 
variations in the form and significance of this relationship which cannot readi ly 
be fitted i nto any s ingle definition or i nterpretation .  In  the remai ning sections 
of this chapter I shall try to specify the nature of this contradiction and these 
variations. 
The price of power 
In the article to which reference has just been made, Frank Senge cites the 
ultimate absurdity in compensation claims in the shape of a letter written by 
a senior public servant in the Department of Eastern Highlands Province to the 
leader of the League for National Advancement, John Nilkare, on behalf of a 
group of disgruntled voters, demanding that the Member of Parli ament pay 
them K I 0,000 because his party's  candidate had recently won election to the 
Lower Asaro seat in  the Eastern Highlands Provincial Assembly. This demand 
was apparently justified on two grounds: 
Being a person of notable status as a businessman, Mr Ni lkare has used h is  position 
and money to deprive the small man; and [t]he transport (allegedly) provided by Mr 
Nilkare brought more people to the polls for the winning candidate, something which 
other candidates could not do. 
Senge then reflects that: 
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With this demand, compensation claims have finally burst through the barrier 
of materi a l  goods and sai led c lear i nto the complicated kingdom of morals ,  
principles, justice and equality, and al l  the other brothers and sisters of right 
and wrong (Post-Courier 29 January 1 99 1 ). 
The absurdity of the demand l ies partly i n  the fact that i t  does not belong to 
either of the categories which I have called 'bodily' and ' resource' compensation, 
but constitutes the ridiculous anticipation of a further stage in the history of 
compensation as an economic relationship, where the parties to that relationship 
are no longer landowners and developers, let alone traditional clans or tribes, but 
voters and pol iticians. In other words, in thi s scenario, 'compensation' no longer 
counts as the price of 'development' , let alone the pursuit  of ' custom' ,  but as an 
economic form of pol it ical patronage. However, in  the m ind of an i ndigenous 
journal ist, this form of 'compensation' does not consist in the cynical exchange 
of money and commodities for pol itical support, but as a pecul iar way of seeking 
to impose some fantastic ' moral principles' on this perfectly fami l i ar (albeit 
regrettable) transaction . 
The point at i ssue here is the tendency for all forms of compensation to be 
placed under the umbrella of 'custom' (a good thing) by those who actually 
claim them, but then to be repudiated as a form of 'pol it ics' (a bad thing) when 
the claims are lodged by other people. So i f  it is  sti l l  true to say that the transition 
from 'bodily'  to ' resource' compensation has weakened the power of 'custom' 
as the moral basis for compensation claims, then the alternative is not exactly 
'pol i t ics '-a game which moral Melanesians cannot cla im to play-but 
something more akin to an expression of dependency or powerlessness. Another 
national commentator, Koreken Lev i ,  provides a perfect i l lustration of this 
sentiment: 
When landowners stand with their compensation claims, it i s  not done in  a vacuum. 
They stand opposed to the cunning, the smart, the educated and the exploiters . They 
stand, u sed and abused, and their land so often taken from them. It is  in this light 
that we must look at compensation demands .  Only then can we begin to understand 
why the people in the outlying areas of our country seem to have the urge to create 
prob lems for the Government, to provide chal lenges to their authori ty. The 
complicated bureaucratic bungling, the ineffective administration of resources, the 
unequal di stribution of national i ncome, an economy making a few rich and many 
poor, unequal di stribution of services . . .  you want reasons for ' u nreasonable '  
compensation demands?There you have them . . .  Al l  these factors play a part in  urging 
the rural people to get benefits any way they can. I t  al lows the powerless to grab a 
little power in this unequal world that is Papua New Guinea (Levi , Post-Courier 3 1  
January 1 992). 
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Here again the ' spirit of exchange' is l iable to bend the l ines which we might 
seek to draw between relationships l ike 'compensation ' ,  'rent' and ' theft' by 
reference to the economic values of material products or natural resources. There 
is, for example, a considerable difference between the spirit  in which a ' rascal 
gang' seeks the bravado required for an armed hold-up and the spirit of righteous 
outrage in which a group of 'clan elders ' assaults some i tem of publ ic property 
in order to material ly critic i se the decl ine of government services. What i s  
perhaps common to  these two cases, however, is  that singular lack of ' economic 
calculation' which so annoys the orthodox economist-an absence which is  
also evident i n  the way that rents and ransoms are actually negotiated and spent, 
which cannot be read i ly accommodated in a cynical  portrai t  of pol i t ical 
patronage, and which seems almost to resist the emergence of a formally rational 
approach to the pursuit of money and power. For there is  l ittle doubt that these 
two cases also share a common motivation in  the popular bel ief that groups and 
organisations outside one's own 'community ' , one's own circle of continual 
material reciproci ty, are necessari ly engaged in the unscrupulous accumulat ion 
of weal th by theft ,  fraud and decept ion ,  thus  i nv i t i ng and deserv i ng 
countervai l ing acts of 'negative reciprocity '  or demonstrations of one's own 
superior moral ity through claims to 'compensation ' from the perpetrators of 
injustice. 
In this way we return to the question of substantive rational ity, of what i t  is 
that Papua New Guinean vi l lagers, landowners or cit izens ' real ly want' when 
they seek various forms of 'compensation ' .  Money? Justice? Power? Publicity? 
Or variable combinations of such things, depending on the circumstances of 
the claim and the positions of the i ndividuals who make i t? 
When Papua New Guineans accuse each other of 'playing pol it ics' w ith 
compensation claims, they imply the exi stence of a moral standard by which 
'false' or ' inauthentic '  claims, of the kind denigrated by Frank Senge, can be 
distinguished from ' true' or 'genuine '  claims, of the kind extolled by Koreken 
Levi .  Furthermore, the general conception of 'polit ics' as a 'bad road' is one 
whose negative value seems to rely heavi ly on an image of the 'polit ician' as 
someone who simply uses money as a means to gain more power and s imply 
uses power as a means to gain more money. But it i s  not so easy to define the 
path which people think is being  fol lowed by the makers of ' authent ic '  
compensat ion c la ims,  or  to  decide i f  the rhetorical components of such 
authenticity reflect a practical alternative to 'politics' , or whether the inexorable 
spread of capital ist institutions and mental i ties is  turn ing all the claimants into 
pol iticians by default .  
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There is  n o  doubt that most Papua New Guineans have a sincere desire for 
money. Indeed, the recent history of deal ings between logging companies and 
local landowners reveals a remarkable willingness to exchange substantial ' natural ' 
values for short term cash benefits which rapidly evaporate in ' unproductive' 
forms of personal consumption. The history of compensation, and especially 
of resource compensation, also shows that claimants are i ncreasingly disposed 
to lodge their claims in monetary form. Such a preference can easily be taken 
to imply that money is dissolving or displac ing other social forms of value 
from the realm of economic l ife, but economic anthropologists have shown 
that this deduction fail s  to comprehend the Melanesian version of the monetary 
form of customary values in a modern economic setting (Strathern 1 979;  
Gregory 1 980; Maclean 1 984 ; Filer 1 985 ; Nihil l 1 989). This means, amongst 
other things, that Papua New Guineans may place a very high value on the 
possession and circulation of money, but sti l l  deny that money and power may 
properly be used i n  pursuit of each other. And this denial ,  I would argue, is  
due to the fact that 'power' is  not (yet) conceived in the Western manner, as 
somethi ng which, l ike money, can be a legitimate form of personal property, 
but in the 'customary ' way, as something which is properly avoided , dissipated, 
multipl ied or neutral i sed by the efficacy of moral agents. In popular discourse, 
therefore, the concept of 'power' is the subject of a si lence as striking and 
profound as the volume of noise which distorts the meaning of 'money' . And 
if the credibi l i ty of compensation claims is  undermined when they are seen to 
be a way of 'playing pol itics ' ,  this does not mean that there is anything unworthy 
in those compensation games which are a way of playing money. 
If compensation i s  more l ike gambl ing than extortion, what then can we say 
about the rules and risks of playing such a game? How do monetary calculations 
and demands reflect and shape the pattern of relationships between a group of 
players who are l iable to have increasingly divergent understandings of the 
values which they stand to gai n or lose as a result of their negotiations? 
In his discussion of homicide compensation, Gordon has suggested that an 
answer to this question may be found in the practical 'philosophy of money ' 
which the players use to reproduce the difference between ' traditional ' and 
'spurious '  demands. According to Gordon, c laimants betray the difference 
between genuine damages (sari moni) and false profits (win moni) by the manner 
in which their demands fluctuate through the process of negotiation. In the case 
of an inauthentic claim,  ' the demand is  for almost immediate payment of the 
complete sum [and] i ni tial c laims tend to be very high and then rapidly drop, 
often to no payment at al l ' , while the authentic alternative is one i n  which ' an 
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immediate token and a promise to pay later often suffice [and] claims tend not 
to be high initially and do not drop so drastical ly '  (Gordon 1 98 1  :99). In this 
example, it  appears to be the conduct of the game itself which makes the 
difference, and not the strength of an appeal to principles of equity or 
commentaries on the motivations of the players . But  what difference is made 
when the values at stake are natural resources rather than human bodies, and 
the players entering the game are either landowners or developers? 
When landowners demand cash from developers, or robbers demand cash 
from their victims, both may seem to confirm George S immel 's observation 
that an obligation to hand over money is more degrading than one which can be 
met with goods or services. On the other hand, Knetsch ( 1 989) has proposed an 
alternative psychology, in which people value their material losses more highly 
than they value any compensating gains which have the same market price, and 
landowners should therefore prefer the mitigation of environmental damage to 
a compensation payment which reflects the value of their lost resources . In 
either case, developers have an understandable interest in minimising the cash 
component of their debts to landowners and converting the balance into 'benefi t 
packages ' whose 'value' i ncl udes the greater element of control which the 
developers are thereby able to exercise over the way that their own money i s  
spent. From this point of  view, one may readily imagine that some or  a l l  of  the 
demands made by landowners are also motivated by the wish to minimise the 
price, and maximise the volume, of control which they exert, from their side, 
on the process of developing their natural resources. But in that case, it  should 
not be so difficult to find the ' magic formula' by which the two sides can strike 
an appropriate balance of power at an equitable rate of exchange, and thus 
agree to cal l their compensation game a draw. 
The obvious explanation for this difficul ty is that l andowners are not 
interested in a 'fair price' for their resources, or a reasonable ' trade-off' between 
financial and pol itical rewards, but seek instead to do away with every form of 
wealth and power which makes them seem to be dependent or i nferior in  their 
relationship with ' their' developers . In that case, the compensation game cannot 
be drawn, and cannot even be concluded, because landowners do not frame 
their demands by reference to the value of their own resources, but by reference 
to the size of the developer's pockets-the infamous ' ability to pay ' .  In their 
endless and fruitless search for some form of material equal ity in what is  
necessari ly an asymmetrical relationship, landowners may therefore seem bound 
to recycle the difference between authenticity and ins incerity in resource 
compensation discourse as the opposition of some ' norm of reciprocity '  to an 
assertion of unprecedented greed . And if developers can never actually be 
assimi lated to a customary network of material exchange, it would seem that 
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the development of resource compensation as a capital ist i nstitution must 
degenerate into that game of 'pol itics' where custom and moral ity are both 
discarded. 
B ut why should we assume that Papua New Guineans who play the 
compensation game conceive the purpose or resul t  of this exercise as a 
disposition of material wealth between the various players, and then only ask 
whether this arrangement conforms to customary standards of exchange or 
the real ities of modern capital ism? Wolfers ( 1 992 :252) has suggested that 
some stake-holders in  the resource compensation game may have a bigger 
stake in the perpetuation of confl ict than they have in the negotiation of a 
settlement, not only because they cannot agree with developers about the value 
of their resources, but because these same resources may be both 'a bargain ing­
chip for beneficial participation in change' (Wolfers 1 992:254) and the subject 
of intense local dispute over their real ownership ( 1 992 :246). Gordon ( 1 98 1 :93) 
has l i kewise decried the tendency of many anthropologists to regard the 
'custom' of blood money as a form of dispute settlement instead of recognising 
that bodily compensation payments were often motivated by the fear of 
impendi ng defeat i n  what was normal ly  a violent  relationship between 
neighbouring groups . In both cases, talk of 'compensation ' may be said to 
obscure an imbalance in  the distribution of power because i t  implies that this 
imbalance can be corrected by the redistribution of wealth. But beyond this, 
talk of an imbalance in the distribution of power can also be said to obscure a 
deeper discrepancy between the values which Melanesian and Western players 
seek to real ise in the relationship of resource compensation, where landowners 
may be less interested in achieving the correct 'balance of power' between 
themselves and their developers than in demonstrating that the latter are as 
powerless as decent people ought to be. 
Hence the curious ambivalence which seems, to Western ears at least, to 
be the hal lmark of the Melanesian contribution to the resource compensation 
game. The philosophical equations of the Lihir landowners may thus be taken 
either as ' a  bargaining-chip for beneficial participation in change' , or as a 
fearful defence of local custom against the menace of a capitalist economy, or 
as a cunning ruse to lengthen the l ist of damages for which the mini ng company 
wil l  have to pay, or as an instrument of insubordination which denies the right 
of company or government to wrap their own paternali stic principles around 
this package. Francis Ona's infamous demand for ten bi l lion kina contained a 
similar raft of ambiguities (Filer 1 990a). Developers confronted with the kind 
of paradox in  which l andowners seem to demand and repudiate the same thing 
at the same time may be reminded of the Mock Turtle's question: 'Wil l  you, 
won' t  you, will you, won' t  you, won ' t  you join the dance?' Of course, the 
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form and substance of responses to this invitation vary over t ime, as l ocal 
expectations of ' development '  are progres s ive ly modifi ed and l argel y  
disappointed b y  the actual conduct o f  developers whose 'power' to real ise thi s  
condition turns out to  have been overestimated (Stilrzenhofecker 1 994). Francis 
Ona's fi nal refusal to 'join the dance' is  a long way from Mark Soipang's  
insistence that 'compensation' should make landowners ' l ive happily ever after' . 
But so long as landowners are sti l l  wi l l ing to play the game with developers, 
the true location and the final price of power remains a constant puzzle in  
thei r  mutual relationship. 
The state of difference 
In the prev ious section I have only considered the power of the State as 
something which appears and disappears within the practice of compensation 
as an economic relat ionship between l andowners and developers, where 
'developers' may either be private companies or government agencies. In thi s 
final section I shal l consider that same power as something which is exercised, 
abused or ignored in the regulation of such relationships. While the State may 
sti l l confront the membership of landowning communit ies as an al ien and 
somewhat i ncompetent provider of jobs, goods and services, i t  i s  also the 
place in which the l andowning citi zens of Papua New Guinea sti l l  play pol itics, 
despite themsel ves, with ever-growing numbers and i ntensity, and thereby 
constantly 'pol iticise' the rules, procedures and sanct ions which apply to the 
measurement of value and the circulation of wealth. On the other hand, the 
problem of ' governance' does not merely cons ist in a s i ngul ar national 
distortion of an ideal and alien form of pol i t ical economy, but also i n  that 
Melanesian state of difference which makes i t  supremely difficul t  for the 
Government to make laws and pol icies which pay due regard to the d iversi ty 
of local custom and practice w i thout paying an unacceptable price i n  the 
sacrifice of national integri ty. 
In the case of compensation ,  th i s  condit ion of d ivers i ty has several 
dimensions which can be conceived as i ntersecting paths through the terrain of 
'national development' . Firstly there i s  regional variation in the extent to which 
' compensation ' actual ly matters as an economic or pol i tical phenomenon. 
Scagl i o n ' s  ( 1 9 8 1 )  co l l ec t ion  of  wr i t ings  on the subj ec t  of ' ho m i c ide  
compensation' barely conceals the popular bel ief that such things exercise the 
minds of 'h ighl anders ' to a degree which ci t izens of other regions neither 
understand nor aim to imitate . If such perceptions are correct, the difference 
may be ascribed, as we have seen, to regional varieties of 'custom' or the timing 
of specific features of the PaxA ustraliana. But whichever way we try to explain 
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the current dispari ty in atti tude and practice between the 'typical highlander' 
and his (or her) lowland compatriot, we are l iable to find as much variation 
within regions as between them, and 'highlanders' may then turn out to be 
divided by a mixture of cultural and historical factors which is quite unl ike 
the mixture which supposedly uni tes them. While Strathern ( 1 993) distinguishes 
between those highland cultures i n  which compensation traditional ly had the 
effect of either sustain ing or closing social relationships between neighbouring 
communities, Gordon ( 1 98 1 )  proposes that 'excessive' compensation clai ms 
have come to be the hal lmark of those highland communities i n  which the pace 
of development has s imultaneously generated an increase in ' tribal warfare' 
and faci l itated the acqu isition of leadership by a new social stratum of 'upwardly 
mobile' individuals .  It may be possible to reconcile these two perspectives, as 
Strathern h imself has sought to do, and yet the task is  much more difficult when 
the claims of 'history ' and 'culture' have to be combined i n  local , regional and 
national domains. 
It is  certainly possibl e to construe the transition in emphasis from bodily to 
resource compensati on ,  and the emergence of a national ' i deology of 
landownership' , as  elements i n  the creation or reorientation of a national pol i tical 
space, in which the polarisation of urban and rural sections of the population, 
or the separation of a mobi le 'educated el i te' from the tangle of 'rural roots ' 
and 'urban squatters ' ,  has greater bearing on the shape of modern property 
relations than do the residues of ancient 'culture areas' or the receding vagaries 
of the colonial encounter. In this kind of account, 'resource compensation' figures 
as one of the more pecul iar-perhaps even defective-economic substances in  
a process of ' nation-making' which cobbles together bits and pieces of custom 
and history, without any special regard for their actual place of origin,  and 
attaches them to some new c lass or stratum of 'Papua New Guinean ' or 
'Melanesian ' persons (Foster 1 995) .  I t  may be argued , for example, that 
landowners, developers and other travel lers along the Okuk Highway are now 
bound together by a s ingle bundle of economic relationships, extending al l the 
way from Lae to Kutubu or Porgera, which both encourages and overrides the 
sound of 'Morobean voices ' crying for their lowland province to be 'cleaned' 
of highlanders and compensation at a single stroke. On the other hand, i t  can 
j ust as wel l  be argued that l ocal  and regional sentiment is cont i nual l y  
undermining the platitudes of  national popul ism as  the al ien artifice of  the nation­
state is practically looted and pi l laged by the latter-day leaders of traditional 
pol itical communities (Jacobsen 1 995). And this argument gains weight from 
the new forms of spatial differentiation and pol i tical disaffection which attend 
the general pattern of resource development and thus embrace the specific 
practice of resource compensation. 
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The min ing and petroleum sector, whose financial and pol i tical weight 
appears to dominate the general pattern of resource development, presents the 
most extreme version of such novelties, for the uneven incidence of mineral 
exploration and extraction, in both space and time, has redivided rural areas 
according to the expectation and experience of such activities . The nation now 
boasts a small number of ' lucky-strike' communities whose members have 
been temporarily blessed (and perhaps ultimately cursed) with the d iscovery 
and exploitation of an 'economic deposit' beneath the surface of their land . 
Over the l ast ten years or so,  the n at ional government has seen fi t to 
'compensate' this particular group of landowners with a constantly i ncreasing 
share of the resource rent which accrues from 'their own' project, thus reducing 
i ts previous commitment to deploy this surplus  for the wider purpose of 
'national development' . Such has been the publ icity accorded these acts of 
generosity, and so widespread the wanderings of company geologists, that the 
rest of the rural population has been more or less consumed in the anticipation 
of a mineral-dependent destiny. More so in those ' impact areas' where people's 
fantasies and jealousies have been provoked by their proximity to an actual 
'project' (Jackson 1 99 1 ;  Strathern 1 993;  Stilrzenhofecker 1 994); less so in  
those ' traditional economic regions' whose previous advancement is  more 
l i kely to provoke compla ints about the greed of the so-cal led 'm ineral 
provinces' (West 1 992 :3 1 ) .  And then, of course, there is  Bougainvi l le .  
In the period since the eruption of the Bougainvi l le rebel l ion, public debate 
about resource compensation has natural ly gravitated towards the boundaries 
of those enclaves of mineral resource development where the developers have 
been encouraged or obliged by government to take on many of the latter's normal 
functions. On this score, resource compensation discourse is a way to talk about 
the problematic al location of responsibil ities for organising the di stribution of 
wealth and power within these economic zones. The problem lies primarily in 
the pol iti cal and economic consequences of a legal distinction drawn between 
the ' true l andowners ' ,  the acknowledged owners of land leased to the developers, 
and the rest of the ' local population ' ,  which is normally the vast majority. For 
when people are excluded from a share of some resource rent on the grounds 
that they are ' not l andowners' , that is, not the owners of the particular resource 
on which the rent is being paid, their resentment springs not only from the 
perception of an arbitrary discrimination, but also from the feeling that an assault 
has been made on their most fundamental sense of identity, for i f  they are ' not 
landowners' , then they are nothing. 
Then again ,  mineral resources are not the only natural resources whose 
extraction generates this kind of concern. The logging industry, the fishing 
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i ndustry, and even the 'conservation i ndustry ' ,  contain their own specific 
versions of the resource compensation game, partly because these industries 
make d ifferent phys ical  contribut ions to the general pattern of uneven 
development, and partly because their corporate ' stakeholders ' have different 
rules and strategies for deal i ng with customary landowners . 
In the logging i ndustry, for example, the game is more l ike a form of 
gueril la warfare than a set piece battle. Despite the widespread damage caused 
by logging compan ies on customary land, the question of 'compensation' for 
such damage is rarely addressed through the pages of the national newspapers, 
nor is it the subject of elaborate legal and bureaucratic regulation . Although 
there are several factors which may be c i ted in explanation of thi s relative 
silence (Filer 1 99 1 ;  Brown and Holzknecht 1 993), it is probably safe to say 
that the soc i al and techn ical  cond i t ions  of the i ndustry have created a 
conste l l at ion  of local rel at ionsh ips between l andowners ,  loggers and 
government officials i n  which resource compensation certainly exists, both as 
a concept and a practice, but i s  normally managed in a more variable, flexible, 
informal-and sometimes i l legal-manner than is typical of the mining and 
petro leum sector (Holzknecht ,  th i s  vol ume) .  In the fi sh i ng  i ndustry, 
'compensation' typical ly takes the form of ransom� paid to recover fishing 
boats which have been kidnapped by raiding partil!S of coastal vi l lagers in 
those areas, most notably the Gulf of Papua, where the i nshore fishery is 
especially lucrative. Although some fishing companies have been prosecuted 
for breaching the three-mile l imit on the extent of 'customary waters' , the 
government has normally abstained from such negotiations. In the conservation 
industry, by contrast, 'compensation ' is the hidden topic of negotiations which 
i nvol ve the government  w i th local resource  owners ,  non-government  
organisations and members of  the international community, and whose explicit 
focus is the nation's wealth of 'biodiversity values' .  In this case, 'compensation' 
dare not speak its name because it must comprise a package of i ncentives 
which wi l l  motivate the customary owners of this weal th to sacrifice those 
rental incomes which accrue from its destruction-incomes which they tend 
to lump together with the ' compensation '  paid by the 'developers ' of their 
resources (Sekhran 1 996) .  In this case, therefore, one is  almost led to say that 
'compensation' is the price of giving up 'development'-which does not make 
much sense to rural v i l lagers in Papua New Guinea. 
When these sectoral variations are superimposed upon the various spatial 
polarities which I have previously mentioned, they produce the kind of playing 
field on which the best of referees would have some trouble staying upright. If 
local government counci ls were unable, despite their best efforts, to regulate 
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the size of brideprice payments in the later years of the Austral ian colonial 
regime, and if the newly i ndependent State of Papua New Guinea found that 
compensation payments made for death and i njury, especial ly the death and 
injury of central highlanders, were equal ly  i nfert i le ground for price control, 
how much more difficult must it  now be for any part of government to regulate 
the compensation paid for natural resources whose diversity is both the envy 
of the world and the foundation of a national resistance movement whose 
success depends as much upon i ts fragmentation as i ts lack of any common 
enemy or the pecul iar hypocrisy with which its leaders formulate their goals .  
In 1 99 1 ,  the National Parl iament passed an amendment to Subsection 3(90) of 
the Criminal Code which announced a penalty of up to seven years i n  prison 
for those players of the compensation game who would not l isten to the whistle. 
This stated that : 
A person who, with intent to extort or gain anything in payment or compensation 
from any person : (a) demands the thing, payment or compensation and (b) in order 
to obtai n compliance with the demand:  (i) causes or threatens to cause injury to any 
person or damage to any property; or ( i i)  does or threatens to do any act which 
renders or i s  l ikely to render any public road, bridge, navigable river, or navigable 
channel ,  natural or arti ficial, i mpassable or less safe for travell ing or conveying 
property; or ( i i i)  otherwise unlawful ly threatens or inti midates any persons, is gui lty 
of a crime. 
Some months after the gazettal of this amendment, the local newspapers reported 
that the pol ice were not yet aware of its ex istence (Post-Courier 5 December 
1 99 1  ) .  Yet the absence of any subsequent prosecutions or convictions for these 
various 'pol itical ' offences provides a rather nice reflection of the corresponding 
lack of action under those envi ronmental laws which ought to regulate the 
depredations of developers . 
Some social scientists have racked their brains to think of other i nstitutional 
sol utions for the problem posed by the pol itical necessi ty of denigrati ng ,  
tolerating and supporting popular demands for 'resource compensation ' . These 
have recently i ncluded ' [t]he equivalent of an environmental advocate or 
ombudsman . . .  charged and funded to investigate and to press for redress of local 
grievances ' (Wolfers 1 992 :245) ,  a 'Compensat ion  Comm i ss ion ' to set 
' reasonable levels and principles in terms of which levels could be decided on 
an "actuarial" basis' (Strathern 1 993 :6 1 ), and the establi shment of 'Local Area 
Development Trusts' to ensure that the surplus incomes of landowners ' are 
effectively and efficiently applied to capital reconstruction and expansion . . .  so 
that the aim of improved economic security is achieved ' (McGavi n  1 994 :xvi i i ) .  
Yet the authors of these bright ideas do not  seem to have great confidence i n  
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their appl ication . Strathern instantly concedes the obvious point that local 
variations in both the substance of 'custom' and the level of 'development' 
make it difficult ( if not impossible) to regulate ' traditional ' payments between 
soc ial groups, and can barely prevent h imself from making the very same 
point about those 'modern ' payments which are now part of the regular currency 
of re lat ionsh ips between landown ing  pol i t i c i ans and the i r  l andown ing 
constituents. Wolfers thinks that his lone crusader ' i s  more l ikely to appear 
just to local people than a paternalistic state ' , but si nce the real contest is with 
local networks of po l i t i ca l  patronage,  he promptly recogn ises that the 
establi shment of this office 'would, arguably, be as l ikely to lead to an increase 
as to a decrease in effective opposition to ex isting conditions-and thus bri ng 
about conflict generated by local people agai nst those who benefi t from these 
conditions' (Wolfers 1 992 :245).  
The risk, as often recognised, is that the 'th inking of the Government' i s  
subject  to  cont inual di stort ion by the  most  extreme, i ntractable or noisy 
presentations of this ' resource compensation problem' .  Each 'solution' therefore 
only serves to dampen some particular enthusiasms at the cost of sponsoring a 
further round of aggravation i n  another corner of the country. In this ' state of 
difference' , the best that can be said is that the noise of resource compensation 
di scourse functions l ike a thermostat which measures and controls the heat or 
friction generated by the differential local impact of the process of ' resource 
development' itself. This means that we should not expect to fi nd the element 
of regulation in the foresight or inventions of the State, nor in  the values, strategies 
and tactics of the ordinary citizen, but rather in those murky pools of mutual 
misunderstand ing, fear and loathing which consume relationships between the 
parties to this process, and occasional ly, l ike volcanic geysers, spit them out. 
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Compensation, as payment for wrong doing causing harm or 
loss, is a well-used customary concept in Papua New Guinea 
and can be seen as a form of conflict management. Demands 
for high compensation payments in exchange for the use of 
land have become a problem hindering development. T he 
claims are engendered by what may be described broadly as 
environmental presence on the part of developers. 
Claimants are landowners and the communal land tenure 
system in Papua New Guinea means that virtually all native 
citizens are landowners. Land is owned by kin groups and is 
passed on to successive generations. So people alive at any 
time are custodians and have the right to use land but not 
necessarily to dispose of it permanently. 
This volume deals with land compensation as it applies to 
resource development and is therefore essential reading for 
potential developers and investors in Papua New Guinea. It is 
part of a research project which expects to propose 
guidelines, possibly leading to legal reform, for solving issues 
surrounding the need to compensate landowner groups for 
use of their land. It is a qualitative complement to survey 
results examining general attitudes on the subject which are 
published in Law Reform Commission Working Paper No.27. 
Susan Toft is a British social anthropologist who has worked in 
Papua New Guinea over a period spanning twenty-one years. 
She is Principal Project Officer at the Law Reform Commission. 
Notable among other original research she has conducted in 
Papua New Guinea is a ground breaking study of domestic 
violence, also for the Law Reform Commission, and a study of 
the Pawaia of the Purari River for the Department of 
Environment and Conservation. She has worked in related 
and other fields in Zimbabwe, Iran, Sierra Leone, Kenya 
and Madagascar. 
